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ABSTRACT  
The Value of Value-Added: Science, Technology and Policy in Educational Evaluation 
by 
Daniel Douglas 
 
 
Advisor: Paul Attewell 
In the first decade of the 21st century, researchers and policymakers in K-12 education began to 
focus on evaluating teacher and school performance based on students’ standardized test scores. 
One evaluative technique, value-added assessment (VAA), has been given particular attention. 
This research presents a comprehensive study of the theoretical, technical, historical and political 
dimensions VAA. Theoretically, the assumptions that underlie value-added diverge significantly 
from the observed operations of the schools and classrooms these models are supposed to 
evaluate. Technically, even if the theoretical assumptions are accepted, teachers’ actual value-
added rankings are shown to be unstable across time periods and classrooms for individual 
teachers based on publicly-available data from New York City schools. Historical discourse 
analysis shows how the political and technical evolution of VAA fit a pattern common to prior 
technical innovations in educational assessment. Finally, making a case study of the Vergara v. 
California trial, this research demonstrates the political force of VAA data in spite of its known 
limitations. These findings are considered in the context of sociological theories of science and 
policy.      
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
As society becomes more dependent on scientific and technical processes to identify and address 
perceived social problems, it is necessary to better understand how the logic of science and 
technology interacts with other social logics. The debate over value-added assessment (VAA) of 
schools and teachers affords an interesting contemporary case precisely because it so 
prominently features the idea of scientific rigor. In the sense of historian of technology Bertrand 
Gille (1986), value-added is a technical ‘invention’ that has become an ‘innovation’ – it has 
proceeded from being a matter of scholarly interest to having consequences for broader social 
life.  Using value-added assessment as a case study, I ask: what is the role of science in the 
political sphere when scientific method itself is part of the policy? 
Teacher assessments based on growth in students’ standardized test scores have become a major 
point of contention in the long struggle over standards-based public education reform.  They 
were at the center of President Obama’s $4.35B Race to the Top (RttT) program which, 
beginning in 2009, pushed state governments to compete against one another to change the way 
schooling is evaluated. The Chicago Teachers Union cited these evaluations as one of the key 
reasons for a long strike which began and ended in 2012. New York City and Los Angeles both 
had very tense legal battles over the release of teacher ratings in 2011 and 2010, respectively; the 
release in Los Angeles reportedly led one teacher to commit suicide. These assessments have 
been cited as influences in widespread institutional cheating scandals in Washington, DC; El 
Paso, Texas; and Atlanta, Georgia. More recently, this use of testing has been the driving force 
behind a successful test boycott by Seattle high school students, a lawsuit against the Florida 
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department of education by teachers in that state, and a growing opt-out movement staged by 
parents across the country. 
Value-Added Assessment (VAA) is the term commonly associated with these measures of teacher 
quality.1 Originally imported from agricultural science, value-added assessment was developed 
as an educational evaluation tool in the early 1990s by William Sanders, then a researcher at the 
University of Tennessee. Its history can be traced back further to the work of economists, 
especially Erik Hanushek, who has researched and advocated for outcomes-based assessment of 
this sort since the beginning of his career in 1968.2 But it wasn’t until the last decade, with the 
passage of No Child Left Behind Act and the Education Sciences Reform Act that the value-
added system began to be considered as a legitimate tool.  
The Tennessee Value Added Assessment System (TVAAS) was the first evaluation program to 
rely on the education production function concept.  TVAAS data, its architects claimed, showed 
that teacher quality predicts students’ academic growth better than race, socioeconomic status, 
classroom diversity or class size.  It is notable, however, that in the beginning, Sanders was 
careful to say that value-added data should not be used to make decisions about individual 
teachers (Hill D. , 2000). Other important technical caveats were later made clear by other 
researchers including statisticians (McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004) 
testing experts (Koretz, 2000)and other economists (Kupermintz, 2003). 
                                                             
1 The term Value-Added is used in this proposal as a catch-all to include several different types 
of assessment which purport to measure teacher ability based on year-to-year growth of student 
test scores. Other versions, notably Student Growth Percentiles (SGPs) have come into use in 
some state education systems. I use the term Value-Added to refer to these various methods 
taken as a whole. 
2 See for example Hanushek (1970; 1971; 1992). Another early (though more critical) discussion 
of this model is advanced by Samuel Bowles (1970). 
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Value-Added assessment did not have a great deal of political currency (or the necessary 
longitudinal tracking data) in the 1990s and early 2000s – though it was the subject of much 
academic discussion during those years. Mandatory testing had been implemented for schools 
receiving Title I funding since the 2001 implementation of No Child Left Behind, and thus 
provided the necessary test score data. But evaluations still took place only at the school or 
district level, rather at that of individual teachers, and did not focus on growth measures like 
VAA. Indeed, before 2009, only four states had any systematic test-based evaluations of 
individual teachers. But since Race to the Top in 2009, value-added has become a central part of 
the national school reform debate.   
At that time, we also observe a broad shift in the rhetoric around teacher evaluations. A 2009 
report by The New Teacher Project, based on surveys of school districts in four states, claimed 
that the public school system was essentially indifferent to teacher performance except in rare 
cases when a teacher was marked for removal. The authors called this indifference the “Widget 
Effect,” referring to the idea that all teachers were seen as equal and interchangeable.3 Based on 
                                                             
3 This shift in rhetoric, which implicitly bemoans the interchangeability of teachers and the 
similarity of effectiveness ratings, is historically ironic. Curriculum reform movements since the 
1960s have attempted to “teacher-proof” classroom experiences – especially those of poor and 
minority students. The most explicit of these is “direct instruction,” an approach developed and 
championed by behavioral psychologist Siegfried Engelmann.  Direct instruction is conducted by 
script, affording teachers little if any autonomy in deciding what to teach and when, let alone 
how. There is a vast literature and a decades-long debate about the efficacy of this method of 
teaching (National Institute for Direct Instruction, 2011). As with the evaluation reform 
movements discussed in the work that follows (particularly chapter 3) Direct Instruction was 
variously resisted in its explicit application, but still has an important impact on American public 
schooling (Kozol, The Shame of the Nation, 2005). Given this, it is unsurprising that teachers 
would be found to have similar levels of effectiveness. Value-Added assessment, despite the 
claim that it leaves teachers free to choose their methods, still results in standardization of 
instruction by making the test the sole arbiter of quality. Since test questions appear in specific 
format, and a single approach to each test question is likely to be optimal, instruction in content 
is reduced to rote delivery of what I would call solution routes. Instead of teaching the concepts 
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surveys, the study showed that an overwhelming proportion of teachers were given satisfactory 
ratings, despite teachers’ and administrators’ reported awareness of ‘ineffective’ colleagues. 
While the report did not specifically call for value-added measures of teacher quality, the 
differentiations they recommend – distinguishing poor from fair, fair from good, and good from 
great – are a direct nod to those called for by advocates of test-based assessments (Weisberg, 
Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009, p. 29). 
A group of well-known economists (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, The Long-Term Impacts of 
Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2011a) went further, 
making the headline-grabbing claim that differences in elementary school teachers’ effectiveness 
can have profound effects on students’ adult incomes. Their study, titled “The Long-term 
impacts of teachers,” claimed that a one standard-deviation increase in teacher value-added 
during one school year correlated with an increased annual income of $182 per student at age 28 
(Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and 
Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2011a, p. 4). They extrapolated this correlation to argue that 
teacher replacement policies that used value-added assessment could add $1.4 million in lifetime 
earnings per classroom per grade. Although subsequent research made severe challenges to these 
claims (Adler, 2013; Rothstein J. , 2015), Chetty et al.’s findings were mentioned by President 
Obama in his 2013 state of the Union Address.   
In another politically important moment for VAA, researchers funded by the Bill & Melinda 
Gates Foundation conducted a massive multi-year study on test-based assessment, called the 
Measures of Effective Teaching (MET) study. The MET study attempted to randomly assign 
                                                             
upon which test questions are based, one teaches the ways to the wanted answer. Teaching to the 
test is discussed further in chapter one below.  
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students to teachers – one of the statistical assumptions required for value-added assessment – in 
order to resolve the question of whether value-added actually measures are invalidated by 
selection bias. A second component of the study attempted to correlate different types of teacher 
assessment with value-added measures (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013).  The MET 
study authors admitted that the experiments were compromised by attrition, non-random sorting 
of students into classrooms and the voluntary nature of school participation (p.15). A critical 
review of the MET study further observed that different measures of teacher ability – value-
added, peer observation, and student surveys – were only weakly correlated (Rothstein & Mathis, 
2013). Both of these findings suggest that the answer to the question asked in the MET report’s 
title – Have We Measured Effective Teaching? – is no. 
But from the standpoint of educational policymakers, it seems as if value-added measures are 
unproblematic. The above reports – but not the corresponding critical responses – gained 
significant attention. They have been used to argue that 1) current means of evaluating schooling 
are ineffective, and 2) that teacher quality can be accurately measured by value-added 
assessment systems.  Notable mentions in speeches by former US Secretary of Education Arne 
Duncan and President Obama, as well as the text of Race to the Top itself, have pushed these 
techniques to the front of the education reform menu. 
Calls for test-based accountability also have to be considered against the backdrop of national 
education policy writ large. Since the Great Recession, lawmakers across the political spectrum 
have called for austerity measures which have impacted services ranging from social security to 
NSF funding to mail delivery. In this frame, calls for ‘efficient,’ ‘accountable’ public schooling 
can be considered part of a strategy for dismantling teachers’ unions in an effort to lower states’ 
labor costs. While many point out the direct threat that accountability measures pose to teaching 
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as a profession (Ravitch, 2010) some suggest that these broad-reaching spending cuts constitute a 
crisis of public values and moral deregulation (Giroux, 2012). 
Up until now, Value-Added Assessment has been discussed primarily in terms of its ability (or 
not) to assess teachers’ and schools’ contribution to student learning.4 That discussion continues 
in academic circles, but we nonetheless see a continued roll-out of these policies. Value-added 
forms of assessment may indeed expand from K-12 to higher education (Chingos, 2013) and to 
teacher education programs (Guarino, Reckase, & Woolridge, 2012). The task of this project is 
to understand how and why this happens. Doing so requires treating the phenomenon at the 
historical and political-economic levels, as well as understanding the social-scientific debate 
which serves as ammunition in the political battle.  
Accountability, Efficiency, and School Reform 
 
The goal of Value-Added Assessment and its predecessors in education is to make schools, 
teachers, and the whole system of education “more efficient” and “more accountable.” But these 
words are so often used that they can lose their meanings. Efficient at what? Accountable to 
whom? Further, the nature of education – or even the narrower concept of ‘teaching and 
learning’ – is too complex either to augment efficiency or to hold any person or institution 
accountable by means of quantitative metrics. But it is the evolution of the historical meaning of 
efficiency in education which motivates this research.   
                                                             
4 A few researchers have begun to examine some political aspects of these evaluations; Gabriel 
and Lester (2013)used discourse analysis of public committee meetings to understand how 
Value-Added moved from a technology to a practiced policy in Tennessee.  Both Baker et. al. 
(2013) and Pullin (2013) discuss the potential legal challenges that would accompany the use of 
student test scores in teacher evaluation.  
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Raymond Callahan’s (1962) Education and the Cult of Efficiency looks at the attempt in the 
early 20th century to bring Taylorism into public schools. Callahan analyzed the rise of ‘scientific 
management’ in public education, but the policy emphasis was clearly on the latter term in the 
phrase. Strong management was then seen as the key to school reform; science – in the Taylorist 
sense – was only intended to inform the changes. For this reason, much of Callahan’s data refers 
to early classroom management texts by administratively-oriented progressives such as Ellwood 
Cubberly and John Franklin Bobbitt. Indeed, as historian David Labaree (2010) points out, 
educational progressives’ key successes in this period were the centralization and 
professionalization of school administration.  
Callahan argues that the vulnerability of school administrators relative to the other political 
actors – business and political leaders, as well as the media – led to a contradictory attempt to 
apply the principles of scientific management to schools. What is more sociologically interesting 
is the book’s assessment of the array of political forces which pushed efficiency and productivity 
into education, how that agenda was resisted by educators, and the extent to which each side 
succeeded. At one level, the situation in the early 20th century described by Callahan is much like 
what we see today; business leaders and elected officials sought to make public education more 
efficient by asserting control over the way school administration and assessment. Thus, one 
aspect of this project is to update Callahan’s story in terms of existing political forces.  
Diane Ravitch’s (2010)broad treatment of current school reform efforts, including test-based 
assessment, identifies at least some of the principle political actors in education reform and some 
of the ideological assumptions that motivate them. She argues that policy is being driven by a 
coalition of lawmakers concerned with ‘educational standards’ and private foundations interested 
in data-driven decision-making and the privatization of public schooling. In her work on the 
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history of No Child Left Behind, DeBray (2006) suggests that education policy has been a 
particular focus of the growing efforts of conservative think-tanks since the mid-1990s. 5 But 
these accounts leave unexamined the roles of politicians and social scientists (of all political 
leanings) in the process of creating and enacting this particular version of assessment.6 
Science, Technology and Policy 
 
But the technologies of assessment have also clearly evolved since the period described in The 
Cult of Efficiency, as has the perception of technology’s role in education. The capacity to collect 
and analyze numeric data at unprecedented levels of complexity places education research and 
statistics in a much more central place than was the case at the turn of the 20th century. 
Accountability and efficiency have been “buzzwords” in public school reform for as long as 
there have been public schools to reform. But the growing capacity to quantify the process of 
teaching and learning – or the belief that such a capacity exists – changes the meaning of these 
terms. Political commentator Evgeny Morozov (2013) makes the broad point that as technology 
advances, policymakers increasingly rely on ‘quick fixes’ afforded by computers, risking what 
                                                             
5 Elizabeth DeBray’s Politics, Ideology and Education (2006) notes that the accountability 
architecture for NCLB comes from a cadre of “New Democrats” and that the Bush 
Administration passed this legislation against the opposition of Congressional Republicans.  
6 The role of the teachers’ unions in shaping evaluation policy is certainly as important, if not 
more so, than that of social scientists. Given its implications for school labor practices, whatever 
its impacts on student learning, the Obama administration’s ‘Race to the Top’ is for teachers a 
‘race to the bottom.’ Brill (2010) has portrayed these evaluation policies as ‘The teachers union’s 
last stand.’ Thus, it is critical to analyze how unions and their leaders have made sense of and 
either struggled against or embraced these policies. Stanley Aronowitz (2014) examined the 
different variations of organized labor’s response to technical innovations as ‘adaptive’ or 
‘interventionist’ strategies. The former approach accepts technological change as inevitable and 
seeks to bargain for the existing membership, come what may in the future. The latter seeks an 
active role in determining whether and how technology will be implemented in the workplace. 
The role of teachers’ unions is considered at various points in the research below, but a thorough 
examination of this aspect of education policy creation is beyond the scope of this study. 
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he calls “the folly of technological solutionism.” The political dimension of education reform 
must be understood in light of these technical changes. 
Thus, while Callahan’s research questions how ‘scientific’ principles inform the management of 
schooling in the early 20th century,7 in the contemporary situation, science seems at least as 
important to understand as management (if not more so). The relationship between science and 
policy has been theorized following two broad themes.  
One broad position regards science as a value-free enterprise. This perspective on science can be 
traced back as far as Plato, but is first brought to the social sciences in the work of August Comte 
(1853/1998) and Emile Durkheim (1895/1982) under the heading of positivism – the position 
that scientific method can provide us with unmediated access to truth. While positivism has been 
widely criticized and updated in the field of philosophy (Phillips & Burbules, 2000), it continues 
to constitute the implicit assumption of much social scientific work. In this frame, scientists 
stand apart from political interest provided they closely adhere to methodological principles, and 
science itself is only politicized when the knowledge it generates is coopted by interested parties 
(for example see Henig, 2008).  
Theorists in more critical traditions argue on the other hand that science contains its own implicit 
values. The Frankfurt school views scientific reason and the technology it produces as 
reinforcing a logic domination which is connected to the commodity form posited by Marx 
(Horkheimer & Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, 1944/2002; Marcuse, One-Dimensional 
                                                             
7 Reese (2013) also examines the question of testing and its impact on educational reform, but 
begins his investigation in the mid-19th century and focuses on Massachusetts. He too suggests 
that the primary motivation of progressive reformers was to change the structure of schooling, 
but notes that the emphasis on written tests was animated by a fascination with the nascent 
science of statistics. 
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Man, 1964/1991). French social theorists, under the broad heading of post-structuralism, 
emphasize the socially constructed nature of scientific knowledge and view science as a 
dominant regime of truth which consequently shapes the consciousness of both scientists and 
non-scientists (Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970/1994; Althusser, 1990/2012). Still another 
strand of critical theory drawing from diverse perspectives focuses on scientific method as the 
mechanism that allows science to become dominant over other forms of discourse (Feyerabend, 
Against Method, 1993). Theorists in this tradition propose that challenges to this dominance 
must disrupt the pervasive belief in value-free, objective science and return science to the field of 
discourse (Aronowitz, 1988).   
 Proceeding from these theoretical perspectives, and taking value-added assessment as a 
contemporary case study, this research asks two basic questions: How does a technique like 
value-added, initially conceived as a tool of academic inquiry, become a policy tool? Further, 
once this transformation takes place, what is the role of science and scientists in the public 
sphere when their techniques become policy tools with social consequences?  I address these 
questions in the following chapters. 
Chapter one looks at value-added assessment in theory and practice and thereby summarizes the 
technique, its basic justification, and some of the main threads of technical criticism. The 
questions addressed here are: how do the theoretical assumptions of value added modeling in its 
various incarnations align (or not) with the ways in which schooling actually happens? Further, 
what might a schooling system that aligns with such a technique look like? I argue that key VAA 
assumptions about classrooms and schools – random assignment of students to classrooms, 
stable student retention, annual pre- and post-testing, and most importantly attribution of students 
score gains solely to teacher quality – vastly misrepresent what actually happens in schools. 
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Further, relying on Willard Waller’s (1932/2014) Sociology of Teaching, I contend that the 
emphasis on test-taking required by VAA presents serious challenges for both classroom 
management and for the larger moral project of schooling.  
Chapter two examines New York City VAA data and demonstrates some major problems with 
the technique. The data for New York City were made publically available by a 2012 freedom of 
information act (FOIA) request by some of the city’s major news outlets. They have since been 
the subject of a few journalistic treatments, but none have merged the data with school-level 
characteristics, which are also publicly available and are included in my analysis. The question 
answered here is: how do value-added assessments actually behave in practice? Analysis of these 
data first reveals that VA measures fluctuate from one year to the next. Next, relying on a subset 
of teachers who teach the same subject to more than one group of students in a single year, I find 
that even within the same year and subject a single teacher’s rating can be vastly different 
between classrooms – suggesting that VA is not a stable trait within individual teachers. Finally, 
I use regression analysis to show that teachers’ VA scores are significantly impacted by certain 
school characteristics although VA models claim to have adjusted for school-level influences.  
Chapter three investigates how the history of evaluations research and education policy led to the 
practice of evaluating teachers on the basis of students’ test scores. This chapter is a synthetic 
treatment of existing work on both social science methodology and on the history of ‘scientific’ 
education policy. I analyze the early genesis of paper-based testing in Massachusetts in the mid-
19th century, the push for scientific management of education documented by Callahan (1962), 
the rise of standardized achievement testing between World War I and the 1950s, and the 
expansion of systems analysis techniques into social and education policy in the 1960s and 70s. 
This historical treatment of educational assessment innovation shows that repeatedly when new 
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evaluation technologies are introduced into the field of education, they appear as both ‘panic’ 
and ‘panacea.’ They are first used to diagnose familiar problems of schooling, albeit at new 
levels of detail, and with increased vigor. They are also accompanied by unreasonable 
expectations for solving supposed education problems. Ultimately, however, the enthusiasm for 
these technological fixes wanes either due to political resistance by educators, or when new 
techniques supersede them.    
Chapter four takes the social science literature on value-added itself as an object of a discourse 
analysis. The science behind value-added has been mustered as evidence by critics and 
proponents alike. This chapter answers the following question: how does the discourse around a 
technique like value added evolve as it moves from a matter of academic interest in the invention 
stage to one of political relevance in its innovation stage? I treat the scholarly work on VAA in 
two phases: first from 1994 until roughly 2008, when discussion of using student test score gains 
to evaluate teachers was primarily occurring within academic circles; then, from 2009 to the 
present, when the federal Race to the Top Program thrust VAA into the forefront of policy 
development. This analysis shows that as VAA transformed from a research method to a policy 
tool, critical discourse about its fitness for the task of teacher evaluation was drown out by more 
zealous advocacy of VA as a policy tool.  
Chapter five seeks to clarify the use of scientific knowledge of Value Added Assessment in 
recent struggles over its implementation as policy. I do this by analyzing the 2014 Vergara v. 
California case, which made value-added assessment the centerpiece of expert testimony in a 
lawsuit which sought to overturn teacher tenure protections in that state. This chapter explores 
how value-added research was understood in a courtroom setting and, further, how is the ideal of 
science used in pursuit of political objectives. I find that expert testimony by proponents of VAA 
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understated the dubious assumptions required for modeling teacher effectiveness in this way. 
Further, when opposing experts sought to explain and critique these assumptions, they were 
regarded as less scientifically rigorous than those who presented ‘objective data’ from VAA 
research.    
The sixth and final chapter brings these findings together and attempts square them with broader 
perspectives on science and technology articulated in social theory. Specifically, this chapter 
traces the literature on positivism in the social sciences and critical theories which argue that 
science is constituent of power in modern society. I conclude by arguing that the dominant belief 
in science as a value-free enterprise has peculiar consequences when the tools of research 
become tools of policy.  
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Chapter 2: Value-Added in Theory and Practice 
 
On February 24th 2012, the New York City Department of Education released value-added 
performance rankings of 18,000 teachers in schools across the city’s five boroughs, which were 
subsequently published (in some form) in all the city’s major newspapers. This came after a 
lawsuit by the United Federation of Teachers failed to prevent the release of the data on grounds 
of privacy. In the days and weeks following, commentary came flowing in from corporate 
philanthropists (Gates, 2012), city officials (Walcott, 2012), and well-known education 
researchers (Hanushek E. , 2012; Darling-Hammond, 2012). For most of these commentators, 
what was at issue was not whether or not there should be a system in place to evaluate teachers, 
but the public nature of the data release and the uses to which the data will be put.  
New York was not the first school system to make its teacher ratings public. In April of 2011, the 
Los Angeles Unified School District released value-added rankings of schools, and followed that 
with the release of teacher value-added scores in May. This release was prompted by the Los 
Angeles Times conducting their own value-added assessment in August of 2010 and publishing 
teachers’ names and rankings, an event that reportedly led one teacher to commit suicide after 
receiving a low ranking (Zavis & Barboza, 2010).  
While the public release of rankings was notable in these two major cities, the use of Value-
Added Assessment (VA) has spread to school systems across the country. Indeed, it has become 
the preferred method of teacher evaluation for states interested in the federal “race to the top” 
program which mandates that districts competing to receive funding tie teacher evaluation to 
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student performance. Further, many states and school systems have begun using these teacher 
assessments to make decisions on promotion, tenure, compensation and dismissal of teachers.8 
Since the development of the first functional value-added assessment system in Tennessee in the 
early 1990s, economists, sociologists, statisticians and policy analysts of all stripes have debated 
the validity and proper use of this approach to assessing school and teacher performance. While 
this chapter intends to make some contribution to those debates, the larger purpose is to put value 
added assessments in an historical context of education policy and assessment technology. We 
begin by looking at some theories of work measurement; then we will consider the technique and 
political roots of value added assessments in this context. Next, we will compare the theoretical 
assumptions of VA to the reality of its application in schools, thereby highlighting some of the 
methodological criticisms. Finally, we look at the use, misuse and potentially hazardous effects 
of these assessments to the extent that they resemble and differ from those of other forms of 
workplace accountability.    
The Technology and Politics of Work Measurement 
 
While Value-Added models are a relatively new development in the history of education, the 
basic principle of measuring work by outcomes is really quite old, perhaps as old as economics 
itself. Sociologists often consider work measurement through the lenses offered Max Weber and 
Karl Marx. 
Max Weber’s concern with rationalization was a macro-historical argument about a shift in 
worldview and belief (one that replaced non-rational explanations of natural and social 
                                                             
8 By 2014, 45 of the 50 states were on track to have the necessary data systems for VA 
assessment (National Council on Teacher Quality, 2014). 
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phenomena with a rational or scientific attitude towards cause and effect, means and ends) and 
simultaneously an argument about the emergence of new institutional forms. Bureaucracy 
enhanced top-down authority, improved information transparency and ‘accountability,’ and 
facilitated rational means/ends decision-making. According to Weber, written records, rules and 
standardized operating procedures, defined responsibilities and duties within a hierarchy, and 
employment of credentialed experts, were all mechanisms that made administration more 
predictable, accountable, and enduring, and therefore more effective than earlier forms of social 
organization. Simultaneously, Weber highlighted the development of tools for rational 
organizational decision-making, in particular emphasizing capital accounting and double-entry 
bookkeeping (Carruthers & Espeland, 1991). 
 
Scholars have followed in Weber’s footsteps by documenting the evolution of managerial and 
organizational technologies that enhance information flow and decision-making. Chandler 
(1977) and Yates (1993) examined the rise of professional management in the US, identified 
shifts in organizational forms and – in Yates’ case – new tools for organizational 
communication. Drucker (1954)  pioneered ‘management by objectives’- a technique for 
aligning organizational activities with desired goals. World War Two saw the development of 
statistical quality-control techniques that also increased predictability and uniformity in 
production (Deming W. E., 1982). Much of modern management theory can also be viewed as 
efforts to improve the rationality of planning, decision-making and control within bureaucratic 
organizations, through a variety of structural and procedural innovations (Micklethwait & 
Wooldridge, 1996). 
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From a Weberian perspective, the movement towards value-added assessment of teachers and 
schools can be read as a recent example of a centuries-old effort to extend bureaucratic methods 
of accountability into previously exempt settings, a small step forward in the rationalization of 
education. Value-added assessment might prove as important a new tool in education as double-
entry bookkeeping once was for industry. What the Weberian perspective does not consider, 
however, is that efforts at increasing managerial control may go well beyond the rational use of 
information for decision-making.  
Another tradition in industrial sociology draws its inspiration from Marx, and emphasizes 
managerial control over employees rather than rationalization. Marx noted that employers 
purchase the labor power of employees, their potential for work. It therefore falls upon 
management to ensure that this potential is actually transformed into work done, into marketable 
products and services – for capitalism to survive, exploitation must proceed. Since this 
perspective views workers’ employment in capitalist firms as necessarily alienated, a struggle 
ensues between management and labor over the degree of effort expended, the pace and intensity 
of work, and the degree of autonomy and self-direction of workers (Bendix, 1954).  Scholars in 
this tradition have documented different types of control over employees, and different forms of 
resistance and/or acquiescence that vary either historically or across different occupational 
niches in the economy (Burawoy, 1979; Edwards, 1979).  
Measuring the work done by individual employees and paying them according to measured 
output is one of several managerial control strategies that have waxed and waned over time. In 
the early 20th century, Frederick Taylor (1911) championed a strategy called “scientific 
management” that involved studying manufacturing jobs in order to discover the most efficient 
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methods to (say) machine a particular metal component.9 Workers were then shown the “one 
best way” of accomplishing their task; their output was measured, and they were incentivized to 
follow that behavioral recipe through piece-rate and related payment-by-results schemes. The 
Gilbreths applied similar techniques to routinized office work. 
Taylorism had unanticipated consequences that blunted its spread. It intensified industrial 
conflict by making the struggle between labor and management very visible: setting the piece 
rate affected workers’ ability to earn. Management frequently cut rates when they discovered 
employees earning too much, a response that Taylor himself viewed as irrational because it 
focused on managerial prerogative and status distinctions rather than the maximization of output. 
Workers then developed various strategies for subverting work measurement, including output 
restriction. Worker turnover, unionization, and strikes increased (Aitken, 1960). In practice, 
Taylorism intensified struggles over control at the workplace, undercutting tacit effort bargains 
that tended to emerge between employees and management.  
Computerization of clerical work in the 1960s and 1970s led to predictions that computer 
surveillance would lead to a revival of work-measurement, piece-rates and payment-by-results. 
Attewell (1987) reviewed the evidence and concluded that this development was unlikely except 
in jobs that were highly routine and required little employee discretion, and where employees 
were in such abundant supply that high turnover rates (and possibly unionization) were 
acceptable to managers. Today however, to the degree that so-called “Big Data” can be used to 
document professional work like that of doctors and teachers, it seems possible that this could 
change. 
                                                             
9 Scientific management is considered in great detail in Chapter 3. 
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In the past, payment-by-results has not been common in non-routinized and professional jobs, 
except situations where there is a clear numerical measure of individual output. Some 
salespeople are paid commissions or bonuses based on their sales volume, and some lawyers 
receive bonuses based on billable hours, but these are exceptions to the more common situation, 
where professionals are paid a salary, and where individual work measurement is not 
prominent.10 
One personnel practice that emerged and spread since the 1960s is the practice of having an 
annual review of a professional or white-collar employee’s performance, usually undertaken 
during a meeting between the employer and a supervisor. One variant, associated with large 
firms like IBM and General Electric involved assigning a letter grade to the performance of 
white collar employees, based on the qualitative judgment of the supervisor, rather than using 
objective work measurement. In its most punitive versions, writers suggested that these grades 
would be curved, so that (for example) the bottom quarter of employees who received a low 
grade in the annual assessment would be fired (Deming W. E., 1982, pp. 101-106). There is no 
evidence that this punitive version of performance evaluation was widely adopted; it seems 
unlikely that large proportions of employees would have been laid off annually based on such 
reviews without this being noted by the business media. Moreover, the expense of recruiting and 
retraining one quarter of employees, not to mention the intensification of conflict in the 
workplace, would be considerable. 
A related development, facilitated by computerization of transactions and records was a 
proliferation of sales and production “targets,” creating multiple performance measures. 
                                                             
10 Attempts to reward teachers and other professionals are also considered in Chapter 3.  
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Employees could then be held responsible for whether they were reaching their targets on several 
of these measures. W. Edwards Deming, the father of quality control, was highly critical of this 
kind of assessment because it pressured employees to improve performance without giving them 
any understanding of how to better meet those targets. It held individuals responsible for 
outcomes over which they may have had limited control. As he put it: “…management by 
numerical goal is an attempt to manage without knowledge of what to do, and in fact is usually 
management by fear” (Deming W. E., 1982, p. 76). 
Linking assessment and/or pay of teachers to value-added measures of student performance is in 
one sense an extension of this type of control via targets. But it is novel insofar as it seeks to 
measure and reward the quality of a professional’s work performance, rather than measuring 
effort or output indicators like numbers of children taught. And it aims to do so through 
“objective” quantifiable measurement, rather than using a supervisor’s judgments. Since this 
application of value-added measures is in its infancy, and current systems are linked to modest 
bonuses rather than large scale layoffs, it is hard to judge where this new form of workplace 
control might go. However, if we draw an analogy to the findings of industrial sociology of the 
past, we would expect that using value-added measures as a form of “high stakes” assessment of 
teachers with substantial penalties and rewards would lead to gaming and cheating on assessment 
measures, cause increased tension and labor conflict within schools, and could thrive only in 
contexts with a plentiful supply of new teachers to replace those leaving.  
Evidence has already emerged of widespread cheating on high stakes tests in schools, carried out 
by teachers and principals, even before a value-added assessment has been deployed for 
assessing individual teachers (Vogell, Perry, Judd, & Pell, 2012; Boyette, 2011). In the current 
economic climate, there may be a steady supply of new teachers seeking jobs. But there is 
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already a high level of voluntary teacher turnover, especially in schools that serve low-income 
students, where recruitment is sufficiently problematic that many staff members teach outside 
their areas of specialization (Ingersoll, 2003). Moreover, projections of teacher retirements have 
led commentators to predict looming teacher shortages.11 Based on past research on workplace 
control, these features would limit a control regime in which teachers were strongly rewarded or 
sanctioned according to value-added assessments of individual teachers.12  
The immediate problem for doing work measurement of teachers is: how does one measure the 
work?  Unlike industrial labor and some clerical tasks, teaching can’t be rated simply according 
to speed or accuracy of execution at the level of the process. Moreover, the hurdle is raised even 
further if one wants to be ‘objective’ and measure that work based on outcomes rather than on 
teacher performance.  The outcome of teaching – educated students – is not at first glance 
something inherently measurable. Thus, to argue that teachers’ work can be measured in the way 
of other work processes, two major uncertainties must either be overcome or avoided: first, that 
some measureable student outcome faithfully represents her educational achievement; second, 
                                                             
11 Jesse Rothstein (2012) discusses the implications of value-added measures of teacher 
effectiveness in the context of teacher labor force shortages. That paper and other statements 
related to teacher labor force issues are discussed in chapter five below.  
12 There are also diverging views on whether turnover is a problem. Teaching is a “back-loaded” 
profession, in which many of the most enticing benefits come at the end of one’s career – salary 
increases and often generous pensions. Professional autonomy also increases for veteran teachers 
who are afforded tenure protections (also see chapter 5 below for more on this issue). Given 
these structural factors, many education reformers see high teacher turnover as a feature, rather 
than an unintended consequence, of heavy-handed evaluation policies – as they removes teachers 
before they become expensive and relatively hard to control. Gordon Kane, and Staiger (2006) 
argue that ‘reducing barriers to entering teaching’ should accompany the introduction of test-
based evaluation systems. A similar impulse animates programs like Teach For America, which 
has eager recent college graduates enter the classroom for a short time (usually two to three 
years) with the expectation that they will move on rather than become career educators.    
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that some part of this achievement can be precisely and correctly attributed to the work done by 
an individual teacher.  
First Difference Models 
 
At the most basic level, value-added assessment relies on a technique called “first difference 
models. 13” For educational assessment, the ‘difference’ in question is between a pretest score 
and a posttest score on some measure of student achievement. Between the two tests is the 
intervention – teaching – and the difference between the two scores is said to be the effect of that 
intervention. James Coleman and his colleagues (1966) utilized first difference models to 
examine the impact of school segregation on the academic outcomes of minority students and 
later on the differences between public and private schools (Coleman et al 1982). This work 
stands at the beginning of a long line of research that has used some form of value-added 
assessment, but at the level of the school rather than of the individual teacher. The difference 
between evaluating an individual and an aggregate (like a school) is of both practical and 
theoretical consequence, which will be addressed in the following sections. Nonetheless, in 
theory, by using a first difference model, Value Added Assessment is able to ‘objectively’ – that 
is based on outcomes rather than on ‘subjective’ observation of teaching – assess school or 
teacher effects on student learning growth.   
 
                                                             
13 Methodologically, Allison (1990) looks specifically at the use of first differences or “change-
scores” as dependent variables in regression models, and outlines the use of first differences in 
‘fixed effect’ models with longitudinal data (Allison 2009). Liker and his coauthors (1985) offer 
a good comparison between two wave panel data – which looks at different cohorts over time to 
measure trends – and first differences, which look at the same cohort over time. 
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Teacher Quality 
 
Given that a tool exists to measure – however accurately – the ability of teachers to affect 
students’ achievement, the data collection needed to make such evaluation possible is both costly 
and complicated. Furthermore, attempting to impose such an intrusive measurement system is 
likely to generate resistance, as it has in other workplaces. Thus, some amount of political will 
and intellectual justification must be present to initiate the process. Economist Eric Hanushek has 
advocated for identifying effective teachers based on student achievement since the 1970s.14 
Other economists have recently made this case drawing on larger data sources and newer more 
sophisticated methods (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying Effective Teachers Using 
Performance on the Job, 2006; Rockoff, 2004). The common thread among these studies is that 
they seek to place an effective teacher – measured by her ability to produce high score gains on 
standardized tests – as the centerpiece of an economically efficient classroom while 
simultaneously challenging assertions about the positive effects of decreasing class size (Milesi 
& Gamoran, 2006), better teacher training and credentialing (Ballou & Podgursky, Reforming 
Teacher Preparation and Licensing: What is the Evidence?, 1997; Aaronson, Barrow, & Sandler, 
2003), and more generally increasing school funding (Hanushek E. , 1997). 
A Very Brief Primer on Value Added Assessment 
 
Value added assessments are said to measure teacher effectiveness based on student achievement 
growth. In the past, school performance has been evaluated by changes in grade-level test scores 
from one cohort of students to the next – comparing this year’s third graders to last year’s. 
Thoughtful supporters of value-added systems criticize this older system as unfair (Harris D. N., 
                                                             
14 Hanushek’s contributions to Value-Added will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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2011), as it penalizes schools – and teachers – for having students who start out with lower test 
scores and thus will always be seen as lagging behind despite efforts made to improve. As a 
growth model, value added attempts to account for where students start, measures changes in 
those students, and judges progress and effectiveness of instruction on that basis.  
How value-added assessment works in theory is quite simple. Here, we imagine a single teacher, 
in a single-grade classroom, teaching only one subject to a group of students. Even this last point 
can muddy the terrain; we make a serious leap by saying that any subject can be taught without 
reliance on the others. But, that is one of many discussions for later; for now, we are speaking 
about – and perhaps clarifying – the ideal conditions under which this form of evaluation would 
be conducted.   
To measure value-added for this teacher, one needs two tests: a pretest which is administered 
before the teacher works with the class, and a posttest which is administered after that teacher 
has finished working with the class. Each student has a score on both tests, and the difference 
between each student’s two scores – posttest minus pretest – is that student’s “gainscore.” Then, 
we average the gainscores of all the students in the teacher’s class, and we have an average 
gainscore. This is the measure of what the teacher contributed, by his instruction, to the class’ 
learning in that subject in that timeframe.  But the average value-added, on its own, does not tell 
one very much about the quality of that teacher, as it’s just a single point. 
Once this average is taken, it is compared to other teachers who teach the same grade and subject 
to their classes. Each of them also has an average gainscore for the year. With enough teachers 
and classes, the data points begin to form a distribution of average gainscores. The distribution of 
average gainscores has a mean, which is said to be the effect of the “average teacher” on student 
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achievement growth in that grade and subject. Our original teacher would then be compared to 
the average teacher.  Based on this, he could fall into three categories: below average, average, 
and above average; using the same system, our teacher could also be assigned a percentile 
ranking. In this way, value-added becomes a relative measure. This is important because in such 
a relative system, there will always be some group of people performing below the average level 
of effectiveness.    
To summarize: we now have, based on pretest and posttest measures for an entire class (or 
classes), an estimate of an effect for our teacher; we have used it to compare our teacher to others 
teaching the same subject at the same grade level.15   
Selected Criticisms of Value Added Assessment  
 
Having established the basic principles of how value-added assessment utilizes a first difference 
model to attempt an ‘objective’ measurement of teacher effectiveness based on student 
outcomes, we now move to consider some of the salient criticisms of value-added assessment as 
a technical process. What all the criticisms in this section share is that they address the mismatch 
between the theoretical principles of value-added and the realities of the work to which they are 
applied. For each criticism mentioned, we will address any modifications that have been made in 
practice or have been suggested by the research. For some of the criticisms, we also share our 
own correctives which we have not seen addressed in the literature. 
Value Added Models are ideally based on random assignment of students into classes, but 
students are almost never randomly placed in either classes or schools (Kupermintz, 2003; 
                                                             
15 In the Appendix to this chapter, I provide a diagram which shows the many points of 
interaction which Value-Added leaps over in inferring teacher quality from student test scores. 
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Rothstein J. , Teacher Quality in Educational Production: Tracking, Decay, and Student 
Achievement, 2010)– and in most school systems in the country, precisely the opposite is true. In 
large school systems, students are placed in schools based on both residence and preference. 
Within schools, there is usually some degree of tracking into general education, gifted programs, 
and various forms of developmental education, which is to say nothing of the various programs 
for which students are pulled out of their ‘regular’ classes during the day.  Now, let’s imagine a 
gifted classroom to see a different angle. The students in this class have likely scored high on the 
pretest and will likely do well on the posttest, demonstrating achievement growth. But how much 
of that gain is attributable to the teacher and how much to the relatively more diligent students he 
teaches and to their families? Further, what ought to be said about peer group effects? Here, the 
issue of separating measured teacher effects from actual teacher effectiveness may end up giving 
the teacher too much credit. It is thus little surprise that in New York City after the release of 
teacher VA ratings, the Daily News was able to print a subhead which read “Surprise: the best 
teachers are at the best schools” (Sandoval, Lesser, & Chapman, 2012). An analogy to factory 
work would be to compare the efficiency of two groups of sheet metal workers, giving one group 
pre-measured sheets and the other not, and evaluating the teams as if they were equal on all 
fronts. This is not to say that Value Added treats everyone equal and makes no attempt to adjust 
statistically for the non-random assignment of students into classes; it is simply that given the 
degree of non-randomness that exists in most school settings, statistical adjustments may not be 
enough.    
One variant of non-random distribution of students is that certain variables – for example race 
and socioeconomic status – have long been linked in sociological and educational research to 
lower performance on tests. If teachers are to be held to account for achievement growth, it 
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seems important that these characteristics should be included in a quantitative assessment of a 
teacher’s ability based on test scores. While the value-added system developed by Sanders uses a 
pure first-difference model which assumes that controlling for a students’ ability in the pretest is 
enough to obviate the inclusion of student characteristics, another system developed for the 
Dallas schools primarily by William Webster and Robert Mendro (1995; 1997) utilizes 
Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) and multiple statistical controls for student characteristics 
in addition to controlling for prior achievement.  The fairness variable model originally used by 
the Dallas schools has gained favor in some municipalities such as New York City, while the 
original Tennessee system has been implemented in others including North Carolina.  
The inclusion of ‘fairness variables’ as statistical controls in the modeling of teacher value-added 
is a clear response to the problem of non-random distribution. But the distribution of student 
problems is not fully accounted for by this response if we imagine student learning following a 
model other than a simple linear process. Specifically, value-added models assume that student 
achievement – as reflected by test scores – grows along a relatively straight line and at a 
consistent rate from one year to the next. The changes in time (x) are independent of the changes 
in growth (y). But it is just as possible that learning happens in such a way that over time the rate 
of learning growth changes. Our hypothetical model follows the notion compound interest – in 
which you collect interest that becomes part of the principle and subsequently accrues interest of 
its own. Simply, as students learn more, the “more” that they have learned further enables them 
to learn more in the next time interval. This may pose no problem if these students are randomly 
distributed in classes, but when they are not as is typically the case, we could think of a class of 
higher ability students as initially able to accrue more knowledge and thus able to build on this in 
subsequent years. If student learning were to follow this model, measures of teacher 
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effectiveness based on student learning gains would have to account not only for the way certain 
variables affect the rate of growth, but also the way they affect the growth of the rate.   
Having outlined some concerns related to students, we now move to the source of the 
measurements – the exams taken by students. We hold aside the debate about whether testing in 
general is an accurate measure of what students know or learn and consider whether or not the 
tests being used are designed the task of evaluating the effectiveness of teachers.  
As noted above, measuring value-added depends on successive testing of students both before 
and after the intervention of a teacher to measure the teacher’s effect and relative effectiveness. 
As such, these tests should – following the norms of sound scientific practice – occur 
immediately before and immediately after the intervention takes place.  But, as with the 
distribution of students into classrooms, actual school practice varies significantly from this 
evaluative ideal. Students do not typically take a test on or before the first day of school to 
determine what they know at “t=0.” Further, they do not typically take the tests being used in 
value added assessments at the very end of the year. Since these tests are often used to evaluate 
student progress and are used in student promotion decisions, they need to be graded before the 
end of the year. Moreover, if there is only one test per year, then the prior year’s post-test 
becomes the pre-test for the following year’s teacher.  Two obvious problems emerge. First, two 
teachers’ work is being measured with each test – the end of “last year” and the greater part of 
“this year” in question – but only one “this year’s” teacher being evaluated by it. Secondly, the 
test does not account for the intervening summer. So, our fourth grade teacher will be evaluated 
partly on the performance of her students’ third grade teacher(s) and will be rewarded or 
penalized for whatever her students did or did not retain from the previous year after the 
summer. While examining the effect of different test instruments, Papay (2011) finds that test 
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timing does have an effect on teacher value added estimates, more so than the difference he finds 
from the use of different standardized test formats.  Summer learning loss has been studied and 
found to be unequal across different groups of students and in the expected directions (Downey, 
von Hippel, & Broh, 2004; Alexander, Entwisle, & Olson, 2001). McCaffrey and his colleagues’ 
(2004) very carefully argued work suggests that the assumption of VAA that teacher effects 
persist undiminished is a significant flaw in the model specification.16 Finally, as we shall see in 
the following section, the work of the prior year’s teacher can have unexpected consequences.  
Many authors have argued that, though there is enough data within an entire school to generate 
reliable estimates of the school’s value added, using the same information for individual teachers 
presents an issue of statistical power. Most teachers don’t teach enough students, and therefore 
don’t have enough students’ test scores, to generate reliable estimates of their value-added. This 
is especially true of teachers in their first few years and for teachers who teach smaller classes 
(McCaffrey, Lockwood, Koretz, Louis, & Hamilton, 2004; Braun, 2005). Acknowledging this 
problem, the Tennessee system does not evaluate special education classrooms, where the classes 
are too small to produce reliable estimates (Topping & Sanders, 2000). Since these measures are 
intended in many systems to determine retention and promotion of new teachers, the problem of 
statistical power cannot be put aside, as it is precisely the individuals who are most affected 
whom these systems do the poorest job assessing. If a teacher is considered for tenure after two 
years of teaching, and promotion decisions must include this type of assessment, annual test 
score changes of a few dozen students will partially determine that teacher’s career for years to 
come.  
                                                             
16 See also Briggs and Weeks (2011). 
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The problem of missing data is particularly acute for teachers in urban schools, and especially 
among low-SES students, where moving from one school to another is a regular occurrence. If a 
student moves between schools, then that student’s change in test scores – good or bad – cannot 
be meaningfully attributed to any one of the teachers she has interacted with. Further, at the level 
of the school, fluctuating populations could make a school’s measured effectiveness somewhat 
meaningless, as they don’t serve a stable population (Baker, et al., 2010; Corcoran, 2010).    
Uses, Misuses, and Unintended Consequences of Value Added      
 
So far, we have discussed both what value-added intends to do in theory, and how that ideal 
squares with the realities in the schools where such assessments are used. The general point is 
that while value added purports to measure what students learn in school, it’s not very well 
suited to what actually happens in school. This is shown both at the level of students in 
classrooms and at the level of the measurement instruments – the tests themselves. We now turn 
to what happens after a value-added score is generated to see the potential hazards of using this 
type of quantitative measure of teacher effectiveness as a tool in the educational workplace. 
When New York City released its value added scores in 2012, the confidence intervals reported 
by the media – an average of 35 points for math and 54 points for English – showed exactly how 
unstable the rankings were be for a single year’s estimates. The largest margins of error (75 
points for Math and 87 points for Reading) were found for teachers who were at or near the 
middle of the distribution.  So while the estimate of a teacher’s relative effectiveness can be 
categorized as at, above, or below the average; the confidence interval could span all three 
categories (Santos, 2012). The inaccuracy of estimates is due to the small number of students 
each teacher works with even over the course of many years; even after five years of teaching in 
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a single grade, many teachers will have data for less than a hundred students.  Further, as 
teachers often move in and out of grades and/or subjects, the amount of useful evaluative data 
will further decline.  
Once scores are generated, they are typically used to rank teachers against their colleagues. This 
use of value added is problematic for the majority of teachers who are ranked because of 
problems with accuracy. While the ‘best’ and ‘worst’ teachers often rank consistently, most 
teachers, whose scores would place them in the middle of the distribution – for argument’s sake, 
within one standard deviation of the mean – are subject to often radical swings in their rankings 
(Corcoran, 2010; 2009; Amrein-Beardsley, 2008). In some cases, a fraction of a point’s 
difference in average value-added could push a teacher in the top third of the rankings (67th 
percentile) to the bottom third (33rd percentile) because both lie within one standard deviation. 
Depending on the district’s or state’s policy, that objectively minor shift could have major 
consequences for a teacher’s career (Winerip, 2012).  
Beyond the composition, accuracy and propriety of value-added measures are concerns about the 
effects of the testing regime which it necessitates. Daniel Koretz (2000) goes into detail to 
explain how teachers can and do ‘game’ tests and what impacts this may have on education as a 
whole. The most blatant form of gaming is cheating, whereby teachers give students answers or 
change answers after the test is over. Widespread cheating in Atlanta, Georgia led one of that 
state’s leading newspapers to investigate cheating on a national level; indeed they found 
suspicious test score patterns – where improbable increases in one year were followed by drops 
in the following year – in school districts across the country (Vogell, Perry, Judd, & Pell, 2012). 
The authors of the investigative piece were very direct in noting that data driven accountability 
and ever-rising benchmarks mandated by No Child Left Behind figure prominently in the 
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increase of overt cheating on tests. Other specific cases of widespread cheating have been 
reported in New York, New Jersey, Philadelphia and Washington DC (Boyette, 2011; Otterman, 
2011; Winerip, 2011b; 2011c). 
Two more subtle forms of gaming are ‘coaching’ and ‘achievement transfer.’ Coaching in this 
context means teaching students tested concepts in the style that they appear on the exams; if 
division is tested horizontally – where the terms to be divided are listed left to right – it is 
specifically taught that way.17 Achievement transfer means spending more time on the subjects 
or topics that will be tested at the expense of non-tested subjects or, alternatively, focusing 
instruction on students who are likely to show larger score gains than on their peers who will not. 
While we could see these all happening with any standardized testing program, it would only be 
exacerbated if teachers felt that their job security was directly affected by the results of these 
exams. 
A further problem concerns two types of institutional misattribution. The first is an obvious 
problem – many teachers teach subjects (or grades) where there is either no annual assessment or 
any at all. But in an accountability system where everyone must be evaluated on the basis of 
student test scores, this means that teachers may be evaluated based on score changes that have 
nothing to do with the subjects they teach. This was indeed the case in Tennessee, which was 
documented in the New York Times (Winerip, 2011). If these evaluations are consequential, as 
they are in Tennessee, teachers are liable to be promoted or rewarded, punished or fired, for 
score changes that have nothing to do with their own abilities.  
                                                             
17 Koretz found that when students who were taught to solve math problems vertically were 
subsequently given a test that presented them horizontally, scores dropped. 
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The second type misattribution can happen when cheating or other gaming happens. Because the 
scores in the prior year serve as the baseline for achievement growth in the following year, a 
teacher who games his students’ tests sets an artificially high benchmark for the next year’s 
teachers which is unlikely to be met. If the inflation of scores goes unnoticed, the teacher who is 
assigned to the previously gamed students will end up looking as if she added little or in fact 
detracted from student learning growth (Tuque 2012). It should be noted that this does not 
simply mean the prior year’s teacher needs to cheat; focused instruction on tested topics or 
matching instruction to test format could create the same artificially high pre-test scores.  This 
type of misattribution should be cause for alarm given the recent string of cheating on high-
stakes testing throughout the country. 
It was noted above that value-added results in a relative assessment of teacher quality; this seems 
at face value to be an improvement over assessments based on ‘objective’ threshold, as these 
tend to privilege teachers with students who are closer to this benchmark at the outset. But while 
making the index relative to the student’s starting point is an improvement, the ultimate 
comparison is between teachers. In practice that means that some teachers will always be below 
average, even if what happens in the average classroom is ‘objectively’ good. Take the 
hypothetical example of ‘experienced’ teachers: when compared to newer teachers, they tend to 
perform better; however, when compared to one another, some if not many experienced teachers 
who are generally good may fall below average on this type of assessment.  If Value-Added is 
used to determine pay increases, bonuses, and discipline, the unintended consequence could be to 
chase good teachers from the grades and subjects where their efforts are most valuable. 
Hypothetically, you could have quality experienced math teachers opting for Kindergarten 
classrooms for fear of assessment. 
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Sociological trouble with Value-Added: An Authority Paradox 
 
A final potential pitfall that has not been often mentioned is a paradox of classroom authority. 
This returns us to our starting point – work measurement. Stake (1971) mentions this potential in 
an article written about performance contracting in education. He makes the plausible argument 
that in a situation where teachers’ evaluations are dependent on student test outcomes, students 
have an unusual amount of power. If students can achieve a wide variety of scores on 
assessments when giving their best efforts, it is certainly possible for them to achieve an even 
wider variety of results without such. Simply put and to quote Stake, “bad performances are in 
their repertoire.” While this is an unlikely situation, it is a consequence that needs to be 
considered, especially as the consequences of these tests on teachers become widely known. To 
move to a factory analogy, Burawoy (1979) points out those personnel not subject to piece-rates 
were often very consequential for the pace of piece-rate work. Such calculations of efficiency, 
piece-rates and value-added, do not take into account this problem of inter-subjectivity; the 
output is treated as if it were the sole responsibility of the individual worker. In the case of the 
teacher, the very object of their action is itself a self-directed actor, which raises this problem 
from an occasional incident to a systemic flaw.     
But I want to take the concept of an authority paradox back to the classroom using a largely-
forgotten sociological work on teaching from Willard Waller.18 I will conclude by considering 
Waller’s notion of classroom authority, its relation to Durkheim’s conception of authority and 
education, and the impact of high-stakes testing on this relationship. 
                                                             
18 I first discovered Waller’s studies of teaching while reading David Labaree’s (2010) work on 
school reform movements.  
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To this point, we’ve shown that the assumptions of value-added assessment betray many 
important classroom realities. Indeed, this mismatch between model assumptions and actual 
school and classroom life are at the heart of the American Statistical Association’s and American 
Education Research Association’s official objections to this sort of testing-driven assessment 
(American Statistical Association, 2014; American Educational Research Association, 2015). 
But the effects of VAA on classroom authority and the interaction between students and teachers 
are not as well-attended. Willard Waller came to sociology as a former high school teacher, and 
closely examined the social and psychological situation of teachers and students in the 
classroom.  
For Waller, schooling is a distinctive social situation because of its mode of authority. School is 
organized around ‘despotic authority,’ in which teachers and school administrators unilaterally 
dominate students. But he characterizes that authority as in a state of ‘perilous equilibrium.’ 
While power in the school is theoretically vested in administration, and practically vested in 
teachers, “The control of school affairs…rest[s] upon the consent, mostly silent, of the 
governed.” (Waller, 1932/2014, p. 12) Thus, Waller places the ultimate power in schools with 
students, “the most tractable but most unstable members of the [school] community.” (p. 10) 
Furthermore, parents and the wider community place constraints on teachers’ and administrators’ 
authority in the classroom, compounding the fragile classroom situation. Thus, one main task 
question in his Sociology of Teaching is “How can the teacher control school life at all?” (p. 3)  
Waller discusses various factors which shape classroom authority.  School imposes an artificial 
social situation with pre-determined goals. Students are compelled to attend school and have no 
say in its content or conduct.  As such, schooling is organized around ‘institutionalized 
leadership.’ The teacher holds authority because of her institutional position. This is distinct 
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from personal or charismatic leadership, in which leaders emerge from among groups by their 
actions. Because of the institutionalized nature of her position, the teacher is obliged to maintain 
social distance from her students through a system of formal relations.19  This formality keeps 
the individual personalities of teachers and students from coming into contact. Waller sees the 
teachers’ use of personal authority as a disciplinary risk, as it would reduce social distance and 
thereby degrade institutional authority – which he regards as far less compelling than personal 
authority. Social distance also keeps students from investing too much emotional energy into the 
classroom situation.  
But why keep students from investing energy in their schooling? To keep the inherent 
antagonism of the classroom under control. Beneath the formal classroom relationship lays a 
fundamental hostility between the ordered world of adults and the spontaneous desires of 
children. Waller explains this hostility through Simmel’s conception of the feud, in which 
antagonisms are based on group status rather than personal motives.20 Teachers are charged with 
pushing students into the world of adults, which affronts the world constructed by groups of 
children. The despotic arrangement of schools amplifies this enmity by preventing teachers and 
students from engaging interpersonally – denying students the sort of personal connection they 
desire. Even as they adhere to the formal rules, students express hostility. Although school rules 
favor the teacher, students resist by mechanically obeying rules or engaging in disobedience not 
covered by the rules. Students thereby hollow out the meaning and intention of the rules. Waller 
suggests that this subversion of classroom rules can only be minimized if teachers command 
                                                             
19 Waller is not in favor of this structure of schooling. Institutional leadership tends toward 
formalism, where the institution serves its own narrow ends without regard to its intended social 
function.   
20 Simmel develops this concept in Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (1922/1955). 
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some amount of personal influence over students beyond the institutional power they are 
assigned.  
This general condition of institutional leadership is troubled by another feature of schooling. A 
classroom full of students constitutes a crowd.21 This group setting makes order more unstable, 
and obliges the teacher to hold the audience, keeping her relationship with its members 
“significant to the exclusion of others.” (p. 160)  The classroom crowd can transform into a mob 
if sufficiently incited.  When this happens, inhibitions are lowered and the fundamental hostility 
between students and teacher is more likely to reach the surface as students react to one another 
rather than to the teacher. This transformation must be actively suppressed. The teacher seeks to 
maintain students’ crowd orientation by avoiding emotional reactions to students, maintaining 
seamless classroom routines, and isolating individuals who might incite a mob feeling. Losing 
control of a class is one of the most traumatic events in the teacher’s career, and it either 
reinforces her commitment to classroom authority or destroys her career altogether. 
Thus personal engagement is both necessary and dangerous in the classroom – teachers cannot 
afford to breach formality for the sake of discipline, but discipline without personal influence 
breeds discontent. Thus successful teachers must “filter personal influence through the sieve of 
the institutional relationship.” (p. 190) The successful teacher carefully utilizes formal rules and 
sanctions, and only infrequently (in crisis situations) transcends the formal setting to engage in 
personality contact with students. These rare instances may take the form of emotional responses 
like anger or of frank appeals to individual students.  
                                                             
21 The theory of crowd psychology [e.g., LeBon (1895/1969); Tarde (1898/1969)] had an 
important impact on the early development of Sociology.   
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Waller’s emphasis on the student-teacher relationship can be traced further back to Emile 
Durkheim’s sociology of education.  In Moral Education, Durkheim’s most comprehensive 
statement on schooling, he defines education as a project of secular morality. He argues that the 
family and the church cannot, as they once had, be responsible for transmitting morals befitting 
modern society. Durkheim believes that “we must discover the rational substitutes for those 
religious notions that for a long time have served as a vehicle for the most essential moral ideas.” 
(Durkheim, 1961, p. 9) But as he posits the necessity of rational notions to replace religious ones, 
Durkheim is careful not to push this emphasis so far as to eliminate the sacred character of the 
educational process.  
“If then, in rationalizing education, we do not retain this [sacred] character and make it 
clear to the child in a rational manner, we will only transmit to him a morality fallen from 
its natural dignity. At the same time, we will risk drying up the source from which the 
schoolmaster himself drew a part of his authority and also a part of the warmth necessary 
to stir the heart and stimulate the mind.” (p. 13) 
For Durkheim, authority is strictly relational, bound up in the interactions among individuals in 
such a way that some feel others to be superior. Authority figures are so because they embody 
(or are seen to embody) the values of society. As for the authority of the teacher, Durkheim feels 
this depends on the teacher ‘s respect for her own role as an educator which radiates out to the 
students. This veneration of the role is distinct from a sense of personal superiority, which 
Durkheim (like Waller) sees as detrimental to the educational process. 22 
                                                             
22 Durkheim and Waller differ on why personal authority is dangerous. Durkheim sees school 
discipline as an educational device in itself. This is based on his contention that education is a 
process of moral formation, in which children learn to conduct themselves for the benefit of 
society. For this process to be successful, the authority of the teacher has to appear to students as 
impersonal, a stand-in for the social orientation that students must internalize. Waller agrees 
nominally with the importance of morality for the school teacher, but sees personal authority as 
dangerous primarily to the orderly functioning of the classroom.  
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“…the dominant part played by the teacher in generating this feeling [of respect for the 
rules] – the personal role that he plays – entails a danger we must guard against…lest the 
child develop the habit of associating the rule itself too  narrowly with the person of the 
teacher…” (p. 156) 
Thus Waller’s focus on the educator’s need for personal authority is located firmly in the 
sociological tradition. Returning to the broader question, the classroom situation is as perilous as 
Waller describes; his references to feuds, deep-seeded hostility, crowds and mobs are all 
understandable to the experienced teacher.  Now consider an invasive teacher evaluation system 
which depends upon student performance from the vantage point of the student-teacher 
interaction. It would not take long for students to understand their role in these assessments: their 
performance on examinations determines whether their teacher is considered effective or not.23 
Teachers could disclose this actively by suggesting that students ‘not try hard’ on pre-tests to 
improve growth scores. Even without overt declarations, increased emphasis on test preparation 
could further indicate a teacher’s personal stake in narrow student outcomes. For the vindictive 
student, this could appear as an opportunity to get back at a teacher for real or perceived slights. 
Even among compliant students, the sense of who controls the classroom could be altered. In 
short, teacher evaluations so closely tied to students’ outcomes requires much more student 
cooperation in the classroom. This impacts more than just the potential for disruptions, as serious 
as that can be for teachers and students alike; it undermines the notion of authority that 
characterizes the classroom.  Under such an evaluation regime, students may not perceive the 
teacher as vested with the authority of the institution, as she is as much a subject of external 
domination as they are. This leveling of teachers and students – now equal before the eyes of the 
                                                             
23 Rothstein (Rothstein J. , 2011) mentions such hazards of measurement in his review of an 
early stage report of the Gates Foundation Measures of Effective Teaching study. “But the MET 
study’s inability to examine how teachers, students and administrators respond to the use of 
MET measures for high stakes decisions limits what the MET project can tell us about the utility 
of the measures for real world use.” (p. 7) 
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exam – could further jeopardize the already perilous classroom situation.  Whether or not one 
agrees with the goals and methods of traditional schooling, it is clear that such invasive 
evaluation systems problematizes that system.  
But beyond the authority question, there is a further problem which is endemic to such 
evaluation which Waller would recognize. Value-Added assessment requires a lot of testing. As 
noted above, proponents argue that there should be pre- and post-testing each year in every 
subject to accurately capture teacher effects. While he far predates the large expansion of testing 
documented in Chapter 3, Waller addressed testing and grading as they relate to classroom 
authority and the broader project of education: 
“By introducing an element of the artificial and the forced, by placing the emphasis on 
upon the false, objective symbol of the subjective reality of learning, it vitiates the 
relationship of teacher and taught.” (p. 372)  
The relationship between teacher and taught Waller describes is challenging, but it is also vital to 
the enterprise of education. Testing harms that relationship by mistaking a representation for the 
thing itself. Curiously, this anticipates Donald Campbell’s (1975) law of social indicators by half 
a century, but in a much more important way. Over time, excessive evaluation saps students’ 
desire for education. Waller says that while the primary school student desires the teacher’s 
personal influence (which the primary school teacher avoids), by the time students arrive in 
college – where teachers seek to exert personal influence on young adults – the students have 
become institutionalized and desire the narrow formalism of the grading system (p. 368). This 
troubling paradox is only exacerbated as the scope and importance of testing grow. Whereas 
teachers in the past may have been able to use testing at their discretion and thus tread delicately 
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over this paradox, teachers under a high-stakes testing regime cannot afford to deviate from the 
script of preparation and evaluation.24  
So far, we’ve considered the theoretical model of value-added against the practical realities of 
the schools and classrooms in which it would be applied. By way of early theories in the 
sociology of education, we have suggested some short- and long-term negative consequences 
such an evaluation regime would have. We now turn to consider empirical Value-Added data in 
order to demonstrate some of the problems outlined here.  If VA has troubling theoretical 
characteristics, and some are already empirical demonstrable, we will then move to consider how 
and why it has become a preferred mode of educational evaluation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
24 In chapter 3, we will see that even some of the most ardent standardized testers were careful to 
frame their products as something that should be tailored to fit by professional educators.  
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Figure 1: Value-Added and the teacher-student-test score chain 
Tests are, by definition, indirect and incomplete indicators of students’ knowledge of subject 
matter. They do not represent the quality or quantity of education received in the schooling 
process, and certainly do not measure anything about that process or the individual responsible 
for it. Value-Added makes inferences based on a third-order abstraction, bypassing the 
complexities that bring us from classroom to test score. 
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Chapter 3: Value-Added by the Numbers: A Quantitative Presentation Using NYC 
Teacher Evaluation Data 
 
Having discussed the problems with VAA in theory, I move to demonstrating some of the major 
empirical problems with Value Added assessment of individual teachers using existing data, as 
well as adding some potential problems not considered by others.  
There are three issues demonstrated below. First, the concept of temporal instability noted by 
Darling-Hammond et al. (2012) and Sean Corcoran (Corcoran, 2010), among others – that 
teacher Value-Added rankings vary over time well beyond what one would expect of a reliable 
rating system.25 Secondly, making use of teachers who had two records or more in a given year, I 
show that value-added is not only unstable temporally, but also that it is highly variable for an 
individual who teaches more than one class in a given year.  Finally, I demonstrate the problem 
of “persistent school effects;”  despite the fact that New York City value-added measures control 
statistically for school level variables in the estimation of teacher value-added, I find that school 
characteristics are still highly predictive of a teacher’s value-added ranking.26 The cumulative 
evidence here suggests that teacher ranking according to value-added scores is both imprecise in 
assuming that abilities are relatively stable and improper given that characteristics of schools are 
beyond teachers’ capacity to change. This is problematic given that proponents of VA suggest 
that among existing evaluation methods, VA is unique in holding teachers accountable only for 
things they can control (Harris D. N., Value-Added Measures in Education: What Every 
Educator Needs to Know, 2011).  
                                                             
25 Also see Goldstein (1997) and McCaffrey et al. (2008). 
26 The problem of school-level sorting is also noted by Rothstein (2009; 2008).  
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Data Source: NYC Value-Added FOIL Data 
 
Under Mayor Michael Bloomberg and schools Chancellor Joel Klein, New York City launched a 
pilot program in the use of value-added assessment for teacher evaluation. The program was 
conducted by the Value-Added Research Center at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and 
cost an estimated $3.6 million (Otterman, 2010). New York State has since contracted the 
American Institutes of Research Value-Added division to construct its teacher evaluation system. 
The data come from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request made by The New York 
Times and a dozen other New York City media outlets to the NYC Department of Education in 
September of 2010 (Santos, 2012). The United Federation of Teachers (UFT) sued to keep the 
named teacher rankings private, and the subsequent litigation delayed the release until February 
of 2012. In September of 2011, New York City announced that it would no longer personally 
oversee the creation of teacher data reports which included these value-added rankings; that 
function has now passed to the state level (Phillips A. , 2012).    
The data were made available for download by television station New York 1, which was party 
to the FOIL request to the Department of Education.27 There were three data files (and three 
supplemental files) corresponding to three years 2009-10, 2008-09, and 2007-08. Each of those 
files contains Value Added measures and rankings based on three or four years of data (called 
multi-year) a measure and ranking based on individual year data (called single-year). The first 
file also contains single-year estimates for 2005-06 and 2006-07. Thus, I have five single-year 
and three multi-year data points. Math and English Language Arts value-added scores are 
                                                             
27 The data are available for download at http://www.ny1.com/content/news/156599/now-
available--2007-2010-nyc-teacher-performance-data 
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calculated for NYC teachers of grades 4 through 8; each grade/subject combination generates its 
own score, so most teachers in fact receive more than one score per year. Any data point based 
on fewer than 10 students’ scores is omitted from publicly-available data because of the Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) of 1974. 
The table below presents the number of cases available for each data point across the two tested 
subjects.  Each of the analyses presented below will make use of different combinations of data 
points. The first three single-year estimates come from a single file provided in the FOIL request, 
and are thus used for the analyses of temporal stability and of persisting school effects.28  The 
analysis of intra-teacher stability makes use of the three multi-year data points in both subjects.  
Table 1: Number of Records for Data Points in the FOIL data file 
Data Point N of Cases 
2005-06 single year 6,488 
2006-07 single year 9,022 
2007-08 single year 16,707 
2008-09 single year 16,044 
2009-10 single year 15,630 
2005-07 multi-year 16,707 
2006-08 multi-year 10,779 
2007-09 multi-year 11,289 
 
The FOIL data were merged with school-level characteristics drawn from parallel years of the 
New York City School Progress Reports; both data files used the same unique identifier for 
schools. These reports contained variables including school enrollment size and attendance rate, 
the percentage of Title I students (a proxy measure of economic disadvantage), the percentage of 
students who were black or Hispanic, and an environment score which incorporates student, 
                                                             
28 New York 1 did not provide unique teacher identification variables, which made it difficult to 
merge the three separate FOIL data files.  
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staff, and parent perceptions of school safety and atmosphere.29 Below, I show the number and 
proportion of cases in each subject/year of the FOIL data that were successfully merged with 
Progress Report data. 
Table 2: Merge Results for FOIL and NYC School Progress Report data  
VA Data Year/Subject N of Cases % matched (N matched) 
2006 ELA 8,779 98% (8,650) 
2006 MATH 8,660 98% (8,526) 
2007 ELA 8,547 99% (8,474) 
2007 MATH 9,404 99% (9,333) 
2008 ELA 8,580 99% (8,498) 
2008 MATH 9,409 99% (9,332) 
  
To demonstrate the temporal instability of value-added rankings, I use two techniques. First, I 
calculate changes in rankings between single-year estimates and produce histograms of absolute 
changes. This is used to discern the extent to which teachers’ rankings bounce over time. Second, 
I use regression models to investigate what variables are related to the bouncing of teacher 
rankings.  
To show the persistence of school effects in determining teacher value-added, I first utilize 
Analysis of Variance to show that there is a significant amount variance in value-added rankings 
between schools. Then, using a statistical tool known as a sheaf coefficient, I demonstrate that 
school characteristics when taken together are a powerful predictor of changes in teacher value-
added. This is a significant finding given that the rankings themselves are supposed to control for 
school characteristics.  
                                                             
29 Documentation on the NYC school progress reports can be accessed at: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Accountability/tools/report/default.htm#Methods 
   
 
47 
 
Finally, I look at within-teacher, within-subject variability at a single point in time. To do so, I 
first plot a teacher’s two rankings and report correlation coefficients. Then, I use kappa, a 
measure of inter-coder agreement to assess whether value-added rankings are any more reliable 
at evaluating teachers than random chance.  
Findings 
 
VA “Bouncing:” Temporal Stability of Value-Added Rankings 
 
The performance categories used here are the same defined by the methodology report produced 
by the Value Added Research Center (VARC) which was contracted by the New York City 
Department of Education to collect and analyze these data. ‘Low’ corresponds to rankings below 
the 5th percentile; ‘Below Average’ to rankings between the 5th and 24th percentile; ‘Average’  to 
rankings between the 25th and 74th percentile; ‘Above Average’ to rankings between the 75th and 
94th percentile; and high refers to rankings at the 95th percentile and above.30  
Tables 3 through 8 below show teachers’ movement among performance categories between 
three single-year data points. I refer to this phenomenon as “bouncing.” For simplicity, only 
teachers with all three years of data were included in these tabulations.   
 
 
                                                             
30 In many policy-oriented papers on VA, the top and bottom five percentiles are singled out as 
“highly effective” or “grossly ineffective.” The latter category is the focus of many arguments 
for teacher dismissal policies, while the former is often discussed in terms of merit pay bonuses 
(Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a; Hanushek E. , 2009).    
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Table 3: Ranking movement between year 1 and year 2 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985)  
   06-07 category (%)   
        
05-06 category 
Low  Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals  
(N) 
Low 0 42.9 57.1 0 0 7 
Below Average 0.7 28.8 67.9 1.9 0.7 271 
Average 0.4 11.2 76.0 11.3 1.0 2,251 
Above Average 0.3 5.2 56.4 31.5 6.7 406 
High 0 2.0 46.0 38.0 14.0 50 
 
The first observation from table 3 is that the majority of teachers do not move out of the 
‘average’ performance category between any two years. Indeed, this is the case across all six of 
these tables. The width of the ‘Average’ category (50 percentile points) makes this unsurprising.  
What we observe is that even if a teacher was classified in the ‘High’ or ‘Low’ categories in the 
first year, she is very likely to be classified as Average in the following year.  
Table 4: Ranking Movement between year 2 and year 3 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985)  
   07-08 Category(%)   
 
06-07category 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals 
(N) 
Low 0 30.8 69.2 0 0 13 
Below Average 2.0 30.6 62.6 3.9 0.8 356 
Average 0.4 12.0 74.9 12.1 0.7 2,150 
Above Average 0.5 3.4 58.2 31.5 6.4 407 
High 0.0 5.1 37.3 33.9 23.7 59 
 
The same pattern is found in table 4. No math teacher who was ranked ‘Low’ in the 2006-07 
school year was found in the same category in the following year. The majority of ‘Below 
Average’ and ‘Above Average’ teachers in 2006 drifted into the middle category in 2007. 
Teachers ranked in the ‘High’ category were unlikely to fall below average ranking, but over a 
third fell into the ‘average’ category.  
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Table 5: Ranking Movement between year 1 and year 3 – All Math Instructors (N=2,985) 
   07-08 Category (%)   
 
05-06 category 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals 
(N) 
Low 0 42.9 42.9 14.3 0 7 
Below Average 1.9 26.6 66.4 5.2 0 271 
Average 0.5 12.9 73.7 11.9 1.1 2,251 
Above Average 0 5.4 57.9 30.5 6.2 406 
High 0 0 50.0 30.0 20.0 50 
 
Examining movement among math teachers over a two-year period from 2005-06 to 2007-08 
(Table 5), we again see the same general trends. Most math teachers are ranked ‘Average’ at one 
or the other time point, and even those ranked ‘High’ or ‘Low’ more often than not return to the 
broad middle.  
Table 6: Ranking movement between year 1 and year 2 – All ELA (N=2,795)  
   06-07 Category   
 
05-06 Category 
Low  Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals 
Low 0 7.7 61.5 30.8 0 13 
Below Average 0.4 11.6 80 7.5 0.4 225 
Average 0.1 6.6 87.1 5.8 0.5 2,324 
Above Average 0.3 6.0 82.9 10.7 0 298 
High 0 0 72.0 20.0 8.0 25 
 
With English Language Arts (ELA), the drift to the middle is again the dominant trend, though 
we see a bit more extreme movement for those ranked in the top categories. In table six, we see 
that eight percent of ‘Below Average’ teachers in 2005 moved into the top two categories in the 
following year; likewise, about six percent of those ranked ‘above average’ moved to the bottom 
two categories in 2006.   
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Table 7: Ranking Movement between year 2 and year 3 – All ELA (N=2,795) 
   07-08 Category   
 
06-07 Category 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals 
Low 0 0 100 0 0 3 
Below Average 0 17.7 74.0 8.3 0 192 
Average 0.7 9.5 77.3 11.6 0.9 2,399 
Above Average 1.6 8.0 64.2 23.0 3.2 187 
High 0 7.1 35.7 28.6 28.6 14 
 
The same pattern is observed between 2006-07 and 2007-08, shown in table 7. The great 
majority of teachers were ranked in the ‘Average’ category in at least one of the two years. A 
small but not inconsiderable proportion of teachers ranked ‘Above Average’ or ‘Below Average’ 
moved to the opposite side of the distribution.   When we examine movement among ELA 
teachers over the two-year period between 2005 and 2007 (Table 8), we see the same patterns as 
before. 
Table 8: Ranking Movement between year 1 and year 3 – All ELA (N=2,795) 
   07-08 Category   
 
05-06 Category 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Totals 
Low 7.7 0 69.2 15.4 7.7 13 
Below Average 0.4 13.3 77.3 8.0 0.9 225 
Average 0.7 10.5 77.4 10.8 0.6 2,324 
Above Average 0.7 4.4 67.8 23.8 3.4 298 
High 0.0 4.0 40.0 40.0 16.0 25 
 
To provide a more nuanced picture of year-to year movement, I plot the absolute change in 
teacher rankings between years. This allows us to see changes not just between categories, but 
the magnitude of the swings in ranking from year to year. The first set of graphs refers to 
changes between 2005-2006 and 2006-2007.  
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Figure 2: Absolute ranking change between Year 1 and Year 2  
Elementary ELA    Elementary Mathematics 
          
  Middle School ELA    Middle School Mathematics 
    
 
Across all four frequency charts in Figure 2, we see that a large proportion of teachers had 
modest ranking changes of 10 percentage points or less. But a fair proportion had high absolute 
changes that were 30 points or more. Many of these changes would not often have had 
consequences for teachers had the rankings been used for evaluation purposes. But from the 
perspective of a measurement system, these often dramatic ranking changes suggest that there is 
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not a stable characteristic underlying these assessments.31 If there were, we would expect a much 
steeper decline from left to right in the chart, with very few teachers experiencing high absolute 
changes in ranking.  
Figure 3: Absolute ranking change between Year 2 and Year 3  
Elementary ELA    Elementary Mathematics 
   
  Middle School ELA    Middle School Mathematics 
  
Figure 3 presents the same array of four histograms, but for changes between 2006 and 2007. 
Particularly in Middle School ELA and Mathematics, if we set 20 percentage points as a 
threshold, nearly equal proportions of the data are on either side. The very shallow slope of the 
                                                             
31 From a working conditions perspective, the stability of a ranking system can also impact 
teacher morale. If teachers perceive assessments as having little direct relationship to the work 
they do, it can lead to feelings of hopelessness. Rothstein (2012) notes this in his simulation 
study of teacher quality policy. 
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bottom two panels suggests that the reports of wide confidence intervals in a single teacher’s data 
report bear out in subsequent years.  
Figure 4: Absolute ranking change between Year 1 and Year 3  
  Elementary ELA    Elementary Mathematics 
  
Middle School ELA    Middle School Mathematics 
 
Figure 4 again presents the same frequency histograms, but for changes over a 2-year period 
between 2005 and 2007. Here again we see very shallow slopes in most of the histograms which 
suggest the prevalence of very drastic absolute changes in individual teachers’ rankings in this 
two-year period.  
 
0
5
1
0
1
5
%
 o
f 
d
a
ta
0 20 40 60 80 100
absolute change between y1 and y3
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
%
 o
f 
d
a
ta
0 20 40 60 80
absolute change between y1 and y3
0
5
1
0
%
 o
f 
d
a
ta
0 20 40 60 80 100
absolute change between y1 and y3
0
2
4
6
8
1
0
%
 o
f 
d
a
ta
0 20 40 60 80
absolute change between y1 and y3
   
 
54 
 
Value-Added “Swaying:” Within-Teacher Variation in VA Rankings 
 
The previous demonstrations focused on year-to-year changes in teacher rankings – bouncing – 
and showed them in some cases to be quite dramatic, even if very few would have had 
consequences for teachers in terms of either merit pay or dismissal in a ‘live’ assessment system. 
Now we turn to a different sort of variation in rankings – within teacher variation – which I call 
“swaying.” This analysis takes teachers who received more than one ranking in a single year, in a 
single subject at the same school. Most of these therefore come from middle school teachers who 
taught multiple grades in the same year. For simplification purposes, I took only teachers who 
received exactly two value-added rankings and excluded those who received three or more. The 
purpose of the following two sets of analysis is to demonstrate that even within one year, a 
teacher’s value-added ranking is highly unstable. Here, instead of using one-year data points, we 
use the three-year data points which are recommended for use in teacher evaluation by VARC.32 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
32 Q: Which teachers received Teacher Data Reports?      
A: Reports were generated for approximately 18,000 English language arts and math teachers 
who taught 4th-8th grade students in 2007-08, 2008-09, and 2009-10. Teachers did not receive 
these reports if they did not teach a subject that culminated in a state math or English exam, 
taught for less than the full year, or did not teach a minimum number of students required to 
receive a report. Teacher Data Reports were calculated for each grade and subject individually. 
One teacher may therefore have multiple reports (e.g., a teacher who teaches 4th grade math and 
English).  
Accessed from: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Teachers/TeacherDevelopment/TeacherDataToolkit/FAQ/default.htm 
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Figure 5: Scatterplot of ELA teachers’ rankings in one year in two separate classrooms33 
 
 
Figure 5 presents a scatterplot showing a teacher’s pair of rankings in a single year. Given the 
same time and same subject, we would expect to see at least some correlation in their ranking – 
but the correlation coefficient, Pearson’s r, is a non-significant .08. This means that there is very 
weak non-significant relationship between how a teacher is ranked based on her ‘performance’ in 
one classroom and her performance in another classroom in the exact same time period. We see 
data points in both the bottom right and top left corners, representing teachers who were among 
the ‘best’ based on their performance in one grade level and among the ‘worst’ based on their 
performance in another. This is hard to believe given that it is the same teacher at the same point 
in time. 
 
                                                             
33 Pearson’s r statistic = .0796, p=.1595 
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of Math teachers’ rankings in one year in two separate classrooms  
 
The data for dual-grade math instructors paints a similar picture. Notably, there is a statistically 
significant Pearson’s r of .350 (p<.001); but this figure represents a weak correlation between the 
two variables. The diagram again shows a wide distribution, including values in the top-left and 
bottom-right corners where correlated data should not appear. This suggests that the relationship 
between a teacher’s performance rankings in one grade and her performance rank in another 
grade in the same year at the same school are at best weakly correlated.  
 
As another way of examining teachers with multiple value-added rankings in a single year, we 
can use a statistic of inter-observer agreement. In medical research, these sorts of measures are 
used to determine the extent to which two observers agree on the interpretation of various patient 
records; but they can theoretically be used “in any situation in which two or more independent 
observers are evaluating the same thing” (Viera & Garrett, 2005). The statistic that measures the 
rate of agreement is called kappa. 
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Table 9: ELA teachers’ within-subject, within-year rankings with kappa statistic 
Classroom 1 
/Classroom 2 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Total 
Low 0 0 3 0 0 3 
Below Average 0 9 38 8 1 49 
Average 0 37 146 27 5 215 
Above Average 0 4 29 3 3 39 
High 1 0 6 0 1 8 
 
Table 9 shows that 159/314 cases (51 percent) agree across classrooms. We would expect 160 
cases to agree by chance alone. This generates a kappa value of -.0065 (p=.56). Thus if we take 
two rankings of the same teacher in the same year in English, the value-added rankings correlate 
no better than if they had been assigned by chance. 
 
Table 10: Math teachers’ within-subject, within-year rankings with kappa statistic  
 
Classroom 1 
/Classroom 2 
Low Below 
Average 
Average Above 
Average 
High Total 
Low 1 4 4 0 0 9 
Below Average 2 19 35 5 3 64 
Average 5 49 101 32 13 200 
Above Average 2 4 29 16 6 57 
High 1 0 7 8 0 16 
 
Table 10 shows that 137/346 cases (40%) agree across classrooms. We would expect 127 cases 
to agree by chance alone. This generates a kappa value of .0450 (p=.09). Thus if we take two 
rankings of the same teacher in the same year in mathematics, the value-added scores correlate 
no better than if they had been assigned by chance. 
 
Schools Matter – The Persistence of School-level variables in VA rankings  
 
The third set of findings concerns the charge that school characteristics continue to affect value-
added scores even though the scores themselves are meant to account for school-level variables 
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in the models. We begin with ANOVA tests to get baseline estimates of whether or not there is 
significant variation in value added ranking changes between schools.  
 
Table 11: ANOVA tests on change in value added ranking between 2005 and 2006 with school 
as the grouping variable 
 R2 SST SSB SSW F  Sig.  N 
Elementary Math .419 1070027.8 448096.2 621931.6 1.63 <.001 1,999 
Elementary ELA .474 997759.1 463056.8 514702.2 1.90 <.001 1,883 
Middle School Math .359 483900.2 173552.9 310347.3 1.52 <.001 986 
Middle School ELA .391 625158.7 244639.6 380519.1 1.79 <.001 912 
 
Tables 11 through 13 report the results of a series of ANOVA tests. The groups are individual 
schools and so the hypothesis tested is: do changes in value added ranking vary by school? For 
table 11, in each subject and school level, we have a statistically significant F-value of between 
1.5 and 1.9. We can interpret this as suggesting that changes in value added ranking between the 
2005 and 2006 school years did indeed vary by school. In all cases the Sum of Squares Within 
(SSW) was greater than the Sum of Squares Between (SSB), which suggests that there was more 
variation in value-added ranking changes within an individual school than between schools. 
 
Table 12: ANOVA tests on change in value added ranking between 2006 and 2007 with school 
as the grouping variable 
 R2 SST SSB SSW F  Sig.  N 
Elementary Math .409 1033390.7 422667.4 610723.3 1.57 <.001 1,999 
Elementary ELA .427 1018344.2 434627.3 583717.2 1.58 <.001 1,883 
Middle School Math .359 572425.5 205717.1 366708.5 1.52 <.001 986 
Middle School ELA .368 602509.5 221398.7 381110.8 1.62 <.001 912 
 
Table 12 again shows all statistically significant F statistics, which suggest that changes in value 
added ranking between the 2006 and 2007 school years did indeed vary significantly between 
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schools. Again SSW values were greater than SSB values, which suggest that there was more 
variation in value-added ranking changes within individual schools. 
 
Table 13: ANOVA tests on absolute change in value added ranking between 2005 and 2007 with 
school as the grouping variable 
 R2 SST SSB SSW F  Sig.  N 
Elementary Math .415 1096626.8    455066.9     641559.9    1.61 <.001 1,999 
Elementary ELA .4299 1045034.1    595762.3    449271.8     1.60 <.001 1,883 
Middle School Math .389 583267.03     227036.5     356230.5     1.73 <.001 986 
Middle School ELA .3701 704391.42     260718.3     443673.2     1.63 <.001 912 
 
The results in table 12 are consistent with the prior two tables. All of the F statistics are 
statistically significant. In one case – middle school mathematics – there was more variation in 
value added ranking changes between schools than within them (SSB>SSW). The larger point of 
the three preceding tables is that there is significant variation in the changes in teachers’ value-
added rankings between the schools in which they work. This suggests that there may be sorting 
of teachers into schools, not that schools themselves have an impact on how teachers are rated.34 
Alternatively, it implies that schools (as the larger unit within which classrooms are contained) 
independently affect student performance, and therefore VA scores. We now move to see 
whether or not there are school characteristics which significantly impact teacher rankings above 
and beyond their own “abilities.” 
Table 14 below presents the results of OLS regression models predicting teachers’ 2007 school 
year value-added rankings at different grade levels and in different subjects. Only two covariates 
are included in the models. The first is the teacher’s value added ranking from the 2005 school 
                                                             
34 Indeed Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2005) note that non-random assignment of teachers to 
schools is one of the key problems with estimating value-added.  
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year. The second is a “sheaf coefficient35” composed of a group of school characteristics – the 
percentages of Black and Hispanic students in the school, the percentage of students eligible for 
Title I funding, the percentage of students classified as Special Education students, and a 
composite school environment score.  
Table 14: Predicting 2007 teacher VA rank using 2005 teacher VA rank and a school-level 
variables Sheaf coefficient, OLS Regression 
 Elementary Math Middle School 
Math 
Elementary ELA Middle School 
ELA 
VA_2005 .362 (.37) .477 (.39) .240 (.22) .151 (.14) 
School Sheaf .999 (.09) 1.00 (.12) 1.00 (.14) .999 (.18) 
Model R2 .148 .172 .070 .054 
N 1,988 965 1,872 898 
Note: Beta weights in parentheses. All coefficients are statistically significant at p<.05 or higher. 
 
The results presented in the table are consistent across grade levels and subjects. A teacher’s 
ranking in 2005 is a statistically significant predictor of her ranking in 2007, which would be 
expected. But the sheaf coefficient of school characteristics is also significant in all four 
regression models; this suggests that these school characteristics do have significant impacts on 
teachers’ rankings. This is an important observation, especially given that, at least in New York 
City, the VA model is supposed to remove school level influences, including all those listed 
above (New York City Department of Education, 2011). Further, if we examine the beta weights 
connected to each coefficient we see that the relative importance of the sheaf coefficient is not 
inconsiderable in any case, and in one case – middle school English Language Arts – the school 
characteristics have more relative weight than does the teacher’s prior ranking.  
 
                                                             
35 Heise’s sheaf coefficient is a standardized multiple partial regression coefficient which treats 
two or more variables as if they were one, allowing researchers to summarize the effects of 
multiple indicators (Whitt, 1986).  
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This chapter attempted to demonstrate some of the empirical limitations of value-added models 
in identifying effective and ineffective teachers. We find that there is a significant instability in 
VA rankings using actual data from the NYC public school systems pilot of VA assessment. 
Specifically, VA rankings tend to “bounce” over time, suggesting that these measures are 
impacted both by variation in student and teacher performance from year to year. Given that 
standardized tests are imprecise measures of student learning, this should be expected.36  We 
further find that even within a single year, VA rankings can vary for a single teacher who teaches 
in two classrooms. This horizontal swaying suggests that VA is not capturing a stable trait of 
teaching, but rather heavily influenced by the mix of students in the classroom. Finally, we find 
that teacher VA rankings are persistently affected by school characteristics like race and 
socioeconomic composition and indicators of school environmental conditions. This finding calls 
into question the idea that VA holds teachers accountable only for factors they can control, a 
fundamental tenet of VA proponents.  
 
Taken together with the previous chapter, which analyzed the theoretical assumptions of value-
added alongside well-known practical realities of schooling, it is perhaps surprising to see that 
value-added and related types of assessment are being pushed as a cornerstone of education 
reform. This enthusiasm pervades through federal, state and local governments as well as private 
grant-giving foundations and many education advocacy groups.  But logical consideration of 
evidence is not the only, or even the primary, engine of change. So we now turn to the history of 
education policy and assessment technology to understand the politics of reform over more than 
                                                             
36 Papay’s (2011) study of different VA using different test instruments, and the Gates’ 
Foundations Measures of Effective Teaching Project (Kane & Cantrell, 2010) both show that 
even in a single year, different assessments can generate different results.   
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a century of public schooling. We then proceed to trace the development of value-added 
assessment from its genesis in the 1970s through its ascendance in policy circles by the 
beginning of the 21st century.  
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Chapter 4: Value Added in Context: A Technological History of Educational 
Politics, or a Political History of Educational Technology  
 
It’s perhaps unsurprising to conceive of the history of educational evaluation as bound up with 
“moral panics” over the state of schooling.37 From its outset, mass schooling in the United States 
has been described by some as grounded in the anxieties of the upper classes over the integration 
of working class and immigrant populations (Schultz, 1974). In the beginning of the 19th century 
in Massachusetts, high schools were proposed among a menu of options for the containment of 
restive youth which also included day-prisons (Katz M. B., 2001). These concerns were 
underlain by the prerogative of many industrialists that the working population of the future 
needed to be adequately disciplined for the new factory system of production (Nasaw, 1979). 
But from the start, panics over schooling seem to be complemented by contemporary 
technologies of assessment and their inherent logics. The sources of anxiety about schooling are 
generally constant – problems of equity and quality are the regular themes. But in another way, 
the cart drags the horse as techniques create the content anew in successive eras. What the 
precise object of an educational moral panic will be depends on what and who new techniques 
are used to assess.  
I propose here that educational reform movements, beginning with attempts at test-based 
accountability in the mid-19th century, through the “cult of efficiency” in the early 20th century 
and other movements of so-called administrative progressives, draw on technological 
                                                             
37 Stanley Cohen (2002, p. 1) defines a moral panic as when “A condition, episode, person, or 
group of persons comes to be defined as a threat to societal values or interests…presented in a 
stylized or stereotypical fashion by the mass media…” 
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innovations of the day for their legitimacy and capitalize on panics over perceived national 
decline. Furthermore, with the development of assessment techniques, the object of focus for 
reform efforts shifts. What Stanley Cohen (2003) calls the ‘folk devil’ – is influenced both by 
ideological narratives of the time and by the available scientific/technological state of the art.  
1830-1850: Horace Mann, Samuel Gridley Howe, and the ‘Testing Wars’ of the mid-19th century 
 
Perhaps the first instance of a technologically-informed panic over schooling involves the first 
comprehensive public school system in the United States. In 1845, the Boston Schools 
Committee, led by Samuel G. Howe and influenced heavily by Massachusetts school 
superintendent and fellow Whig reformer Horace Mann, administered the first system-wide 
assessment tests to students of the city’s public schools. These exams, and the report generated 
from them, had a profound effect on both the structure of schooling and the trajectory of testing 
in American education (Reese, 2013).  
Before the creation of the public primary school system in 178938, and for much of that system’s 
early history, Boston’s schools were locally funded and evaluated, usually through a system of 
‘exhibitions,’ in which selected students would perform recitations of school material in public. 
A sort of talent show, students who gave the best performances won awards and honors. The 
purpose of these exhibitions was to garner financial support for the schools, particularly those 
                                                             
38 The city of Boston had five “free schools,” one for each of the city’s five main sections, since 
the early 18th century. Those schools were regarded as among the best in the country, and their 
consistent funding by the communities reflected a widely shared belief in the need for schooling 
among the population. The Revolutionary war interrupted the continuity of the Boston free 
school system, as it did schools across the American territories. Massachusetts was the first state 
to pass a comprehensive schooling bill in 1789, and the city of Boston followed suit in the same 
year (Schultz, 1974, pp. 11-15). 
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which served poorer students and therefore relied on charity39. Critics of the exhibition system 
suggested that it encouraged rote memorization and “spouting” instead of substantive learning, 
and that its competitive nature was morally suspect (Reese, 2013, pp. 21-23).  
More importantly, some critics wondered whether the system promoted a false impression of 
school quality; after the formation of the public system, most Boston residents felt their schools 
were superior to those of other states and that their schools were generally improving each year. 
Boston’s grammar schools – at the time led by educator-administrators known as schoolmasters 
– operated autonomously under the traditional one-room schoolhouse model. Both Howe and 
Mann, borrowing from the school reform trends they saw first-hand in Europe, which Mann 
published to great fanfare and heavy criticism in his Seventh Report, sought substantive reforms 
to the traditional operation of schools. Among these were the curtailment of corporal 
punishment; the introduction of an age-graded system with a standardized curriculum that did 
not favor any religious denomination or political party. Most importantly, reformers called for 
the centralization and professionalization of school leadership and evaluation. Each of these was 
at odds with the interests of the schoolmasters, who until then had relatively unchallenged reign 
over their institutions. But the masters had managed to avoid any major changes to the schooling 
system despite annual evaluations by state-appointed visiting committees (Schultz, 1974).  
But the push for reform was abetted by two emerging trends in Europe espoused by both Horace 
Mann and Samuel Howe: phrenology and the nascent science of statistics. Phrenology, now 
discredited as a pseudoscience with racist overtones, was at the peak of its popularity in the mid-
                                                             
39 Nasaw (1979) points out that the public school system in Boston, unlike those in Philadelphia 
and New York, served children from relatively diverse social backgrounds. Public schools 
required most families to pay tuition or ‘rates’ as they were then called, but poor families could 
apply for rate exemptions. 
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19th century40 and was seen by some as having socially progressive potential, specifically for 
education and corrections.41 Perhaps the most appealing feature of the Phrenology movement 
was its emphasis on empirical investigation and objective verification of mental traits, which 
until then had been left to the relatively subjective techniques of philosophy (Parssinen, 1974). 
This served as an important mark of rigor for the scientific community, but took on a quasi-
religious fervor when Phrenology was presented to the larger society (pp. 8-9).  
Howe’s Reading Committee tests and the resulting report were more directly influenced by early 
statistical analysis, which was also imported from Europe. The Manchester and London 
Statistical Societies were founded in 1833 and 1834 respectively, and some have directly 
suggested that they were founded to distance the collection of statistics from politics and 
establish it as a disinterested science (Cullen, 1975). Both Howe and Horace Mann were 
founding members of the Boston Statistical Society, the first in the United States, in 1839. Their 
fascination with statistics and belief that they provided objective facts about not only school 
performance, but social and political life more generally, served as the catalyst for using paper-
                                                             
40 By 1823, England had twenty-four phrenological societies (Parssinen, 1974). By the time the 
chief spokesperson of Phrenology’s social applications, George Combe, came to lecture in the 
US in 1938, there were phrenological societies throughout the United States (Schwartz, 1952). It 
is also of considerable importance that Howe was one of Combe’s closest acquaintances and his 
greatest promoter in the US. 
41 Popular education and expanded penal institutions were intertwined questions in 19th century 
Massachusetts. Both were seen as potential solutions to the problem of a rapidly growing 
working class population. Before becoming fully immersed in school reform, Horace Mann 
devoted a great deal of time to the cause of prison reform (Nasaw, 1979). Michael B. Katz 
(2001) points out that “Educational reform was one aspect of a widespread effort of government, 
both local and state, and private philanthropy to create a network of institutions capable of 
restraining the effects of the onset of large-scale manufacturing and increasing urbanism (p. 
164).” Among these institutions were reform schools which more closely resembled prisons or 
forced labor camps, including the Boston Asylum for Indigent Boys which was modeled after the 
Mettray Penal colony in France. In Discipline and Punish (1977), Michel Foucault places the 
birth of the modern prison system with the opening of Mettray.  
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based examinations which would be assigned numerical grades which could be aggregated, 
averaged and illustrated in charts and tables (Reese, 2013, pp. 56-57). 
The 1845 Boston Schools Committee, which first convened in January after a bitterly contested 
election, was divided between committee members aligned with the schoolmasters and those 
aligned with Mann, Howe and other early administrative progressives.42 When the committee 
first met, the members were mainly divided over the overuse of corporal punishment and the 
quality of schools serving African American children – the latter issue was important to many 
progressives, who were also abolitionists. Of course, these particular concerns came in the 
context larger discord over the competence of the school masters and the efficiency of the system 
in general, especially given the acrimony surrounding Mann’s Seventh Report (Schultz, 1974). 
Testing and school comparison statistics were not on the agenda for the first half of the year, but 
would become a central point of contention thereafter. 
The exams were administered in the last week of June, 1845. They were designed in private, 
away from the publicized debates over corporal punishment and school segregation; as such, the 
exam format and questions took the school masters by surprise. An indication of the examiners 
                                                             
42 I borrow this term from David Labaree (2010) and David Tyack (1974), who use it to refer to 
one of two strands of the educational reform movement in the early 20th century. Educational 
progressivism, part of the larger progressive era, had two competing factions which espoused 
different solutions to the problem of inadequate public schools. One was the child-centered 
progressives, followers of John Dewey’s education philosophy who generally believed that 
education needed to be improved at the level of pedagogy by shifting away from rote instruction 
and toward what is now referred to as a constructivist approach. Administrative progressives, 
best represented by Edward L. Thorndike, believed the solution was to standardize the 
educational system and to differentiate instruction according to students’ proficiency. The history 
of schooling in the US suggests that the latter strand of progressivism was more successful and 
continues to carry the day. I use the term deliberately in reference to Mann and his adherents 
because I believe their influence created the strategic mold which Thorndike and others 
successfully deployed nearly a century later. 
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derogatory purposes, vocabulary questions asked students to define obscure words such as 
‘thanatopsis’; others asked trivial and ambiguous questions on geography. The exam’s primary 
authors were Howe on the Reading committee, and William Brigham, a fellow member of the 
Statistical Society, on the writing committee.  Both men were committed to using the tests as 
evidence to push forward their favored organizational reforms in the schools. Since the tests 
were administered to all students in the first class of each school, and given the new format – 
written essays – and unannounced content, performance was predictably poor at many schools. 
But the effect of the examinations was amplified when the committee published comparative 
test-score data in tabular form in the committee report. Behind the scenes, Mann also “primed 
the public” for an attack on the school masters by having articles published and letters written in 
the newspapers which began to make a case for the necessity of favored school reforms (Reese, 
2013, pp. 69-96).  
The report of the reading committee was completed in early August of 1845, primarily by Howe, 
but with assistance from Mann, who was more proficient with mathematics and statistics43. It 
painted a picture of schools which were not nearly as good as residents believed and of 
significant variation among the schools44. Students across schools were classified as lacking 
knowledge in most subjects, a fact which the report linked both to prevailing instructional 
practices and to individual school masters. Inevitably, since the schools were ranked based on 
student grades, some schools were found to be at the bottom of the pack. The reading 
                                                             
43 In comparison to Howe’s 50-page report, Brigham wrote a much shorter 17-page report for the 
writing committee. 
44 The only comparison with another town successfully completed by the Committee was an 
examination of an all-girls school in Roxbury, MA. The school scored higher on average than 
any of the Boston schools, but also had the second highest average age, second to another all-
girls school within Boston (Reese, 2013, p. 138). Against the objections of some committee 
members, this comparison was heavily leveraged in the final report.  
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committee’s findings, including numerous statistical tables, were first presented as a working 
draft to the full committee on August 7th; the draft, which contained many mathematical errors, 
was only distributed to the entire committee three weeks later. Beyond the novelty of these data, 
however, the reports criticisms and recommendations were congruent with the basic demands of 
the reformers. Some of the results immediately reached the press along with the proceedings of 
the meetings, but the schoolmasters’ faction on the committee staunchly opposed printing and 
distribution of the full report beyond internal copies for committee members. The faction aligned 
with Howe recommended wide dissemination of the report, enough copies for every Boston 
family. 
On September 11th, the committee voted to print and distribute 10,000 copies of the report, the 
first publication of its kind on issues of education. Because of its wide circulation, and because 
statistics and quantitative reasoning were a hot topic in the mid-19th century, the report received 
a great deal of attention in the press (Reese, 2013; Schultz, 1974). Based on the general 
presumption that the test score data provided factual evidence on the state of the city’s schools, 
reformers used the opening created to attack all aspects of the schools, not least of all the school 
masters. Their opponents criticized both the tests themselves and the conditions of their 
administration. But the reformers achieved substantial success in their crusade, in large part due 
to the implications of the 1845 summer exams; by 1851 Boston’s schools were headed by a 
superintendent, the dual-headed system was ended, and written exams became the standard of 
evaluation displacing the exhibition system. Given the city’s pioneering nature and Mann’s high 
regard nationally, many of the reforms pioneered in Boston were adapted across the country. 
Dubious or not, this early use of an ascendant technology affected substantial change in early 
public school governance and practice.  
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1900-1920: Taylorism, Classroom Management, and the ‘Cult of Efficiency’ 
 
Decades later at the turn of the 20th century, evaluation technology would again play a major role 
in a frenzied period of education reform. The reformers would again come from the ranks of the 
social elite and from outside of educational quarters, but both the nature of the school system and 
thus the favored reforms changed substantially. In the era of the Boston controversy, migration 
and urban expansion were only beginning to create the need for mass schooling. But between 
1870 and 1900, owing both to further population growth45 and to changes in laws regarding 
school attendance46, the number of pupils in public schools more than doubled from fewer than 7 
million to about 15.5 million; school expenditures had likewise increased from $63 to $215 
million dollars. Particular progress had been made in terms of the enrollment of black children in 
schools: whereas less than 10 percent were enrolled in 1870, over 40 percent were in 1900; in the 
same period, the percentage of white children enrolled fluctuated between 50 and 60 percent (US 
Bureau of the Census, 1975).    
This growth in both school attendance and expenses corresponded with a period of suspicion 
about large institutions which accompanied rapid industrialization, urbanization, and 
consolidation of wealth.  Thus in the period beginning in 1900, American society began to react 
                                                             
45 Even in this period, population growth was driven by immigration from Europe, with an 
increasing proportion from poorer Eastern and Southern regions (US Bureau of the Census, 
1975). Most of these migrants remained in East Coast US cities, assuring that the problems of 
perceived school underperformance would be concentrated in large urban systems.  
46 By 1870, only three US territories – Massachusetts, Vermont and the District of Columbia – 
had enacted compulsory schooling legislation. But many such laws – with widely varying 
specifications – were passed in the next 30 years. The limitation of the legislation in many states 
was that they often lacked both the means to enforce attendance and sufficient school 
accommodations for all children (Katz M. S., 1976, pp. 17-20). Indeed, one of the concerns of 
reformers in this era was the need to improve compulsory attendance laws to prevent dropout 
and bolster retention, particularly in secondary school. 
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against various perceived excesses and abuses in industry and municipal government, including 
schools. Suspicion, and in some cases full-scale panic, was instigated by a number of journalists 
and publications collectively known today as muckrakers47. But while the best exemplars of this 
tradition, including Ida Tarbell and Upton Sinclair, saw their painstaking journalistic efforts lead 
to positive changes in labor and housing regulation, environmental conservation, and anti-trust 
legislation; other figures of the muckraking tradition were neither so diligent in their 
investigative practices nor so scrupulous in their choices of targets (Callahan, 1962). Jal Mehta 
(2013) notes that perhaps the first critique of public schooling in the muckraking tradition came 
in 1892 when physician Joseph Mayer Rice lambasted rote pedagogical methods in a series of 
nine articles in the magazine The Forum.48  
Ironically, while much muckraking journalism and progressive reform efforts were being 
directed at the exploitation of labor and the environment by large industry, business values such 
as organization and efficiency were in a period of ascendancy among the American public. 
Corruption and vice among businessmen were viewed as episodic rather than systemic. The 
influence of business values on schooling was buttressed by powerful industrialists themselves. 
Andrew Carnegie frequently railed in speeches and in print against the impractical education – a 
reference to the traditional liberal arts curriculum –received by American schoolchildren 
                                                             
47 The most sophisticated of the muckraking publications was McClure’s magazine. But in terms 
of popular influence, the most widely circulated magazines which contained critical stories about 
municipal school systems were Ladies Home Journal and The Saturday Evening Post, which 
each circulated more than 1 million copies per year at their peak (Callahan, 1962, p. 3). 
48 Rice collected data from around 30,000 students, and found no relationship between time spent 
on spelling instruction and students’ later performance on spelling tests. His findings were not 
well received by school leaders, but such painstaking empirical data collection would become the 
trend in subsequent decades (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). Rice would 
later go on to publish a collection of his essays in a volume titled Scientific Management in 
Education and, suggesting a pecuniary motivation apart from his muckraking work on the 
subject, a spelling textbook for use in elementary schools titled The Rational Spelling Book .  
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(Callahan, 1962, pp. 8-9). Henry Ford was no kinder to academic study, famously quipping in 
1916 “I wouldn’t give a nickel for all the history in the world. It means nothing to me. History is 
more or less bunk.” John D. Rockefeller founded the General Education Board in 1901, whose 
first project was to create a program of ‘practical education’ for African Americans in the South 
– a program which was questioned by prominent Black intellectuals like W.E.B. DuBois and 
Carter G. Woodson (Marshall, 2011). More directly, many businesspeople would end up 
influencing municipal education policy by joining local school boards. 
School administration was the primary target of education reform efforts. Both the criticisms of 
the liberal arts curriculum49 and the problem of increased costs were laid at the feet of 
professional schoolmen. Much of the discussion centered on the high schools, which were 
expanding at the most rapid pace, and which would be of most acute interest to business leaders 
and their government counterparts. Indeed, the key document which lays out the “social 
efficiency” vision of administrative reformers comes from the NEA Commission on the Reform 
of Secondary Education (Labaree, Someone Has To Fail: The Zero-Sum Game of Public 
Schooling, 2010, pp. 25-26).  
The atmosphere of distrust and suspicion created in the early muckraking period reached a fever 
pitch regarding schools with the aid of proclaimed scientific research which deemed schools 
                                                             
49 The high school liberal arts curriculum was articulated by the preceding generation of common 
school reformers. Its last expression was to be found in the 1893 Report of the NEA Committee 
of Ten on Secondary School Studies – which consisted of six university presidents (including 
Harvard’s Charles Eliot), three high school principals, and the US Commissioner of Education. 
The report was very detailed in its recommendations for what should constitute a secondary 
school curriculum, addressing all major academic subjects (Dexter, 1906). Labaree (2010) notes 
that the report is very bureaucratic in its tone, arguing for a common program of study for all 
secondary students regardless of social class of college aspiration, but lacking the passionate 
appeal to values (e.g., democracy, citizenship) found in either Horace Mann’s common school 
reports or the Cardinal Principles report of 1918.  
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inefficient and with the prominence of a technique seen as a potential remedy. The research came 
in the form of a 1909 report by Leonard Ayres entitled Laggards in Our Schools50. Drawing on 
municipal school records, the report addressed two issues, students attending school below age-
grade level (‘retardation’) and school dropout before eighth grade.51 Overall, the report deems 
one-third of all public school children retarded and cites an average dropout rate of fifty percent 
by the eighth grade (Ayres, 1909). Each could be considered obvious byproducts of the era: non-
English speaking immigrants – and emancipated slaves who were denied literacy for centuries – 
would enter school below grade level as a matter of course, but were categorized as laggards for 
the simple fact that they were not in the appropriate grade. Similarly, dropout was often a 
symptom of the economic circumstances of families; most migrants were poor when they arrived 
and remained so thereafter, making work a necessity for many teenagers. Likewise, many 
African American families in the south were toiling under the highly exploitative sharecropping 
system. But Ayres’ report placed blame for these problems at the feet of the school systems:  
“There is no teacher but will recognize the picture of this boy, and indeed, with some 
modifications, it fits many girls just as well. These are the boys and girls with whom this 
book deals. They are not the mentally deficient, exceptionally dull children. They 
constitute a large part of all of the school children in most, but not all, of our school 
                                                             
50 Leonard Ayres was a major figure in the history of Educational statistics, and an unapologetic 
promoter of education as a scientific discipline. In 1920 he was founding co-editor of in the 
Journal of Education Research, along with Lewis Terman and George Strayer. The journal was 
at the forefront of the movement to use scientific methods in the promotion of efficiency in 
education. He published numerous articles in the journal which dealt with topics including the 
computation of correlation and regression coefficients. His editorial work in the journal generally 
derided educators who opposed the use of science and testing as ‘the professionally moribund’ 
(Ayres, 1920a) who, ‘one wonders…notwithstanding the scholarly attainments which they 
sometimes possess, have not after all a fundamental intellectual defect’ (Ayres, 1920b).   
51 A testament to its wide impact, Laggards was reprinted three times after its initial publication, 
including twice in the year 1910 and again in 1913.  Ayres was a firm believer in the power of 
educational statistics – a later chapter of the book bears the title “Reform in and Through School 
Records.” He was also a believer in generating public attention for educational statistics; when 
he directed a 1916 school survey in Cleveland Ohio, educational news displaced war coverage 
on the front page of many Cleveland newspapers (Lagemann, 2002). 
 74 
 
systems. These are the children that too many of our schools are confirming with the 
habit of failure (Ayres, 1909, p. 220).” 
Ayres deemed these systems inefficient through a formula – the index of efficiency – which 
directly likened schools to factories, in which students were considered the raw material 
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 15-18). 
The accountability technique that revealed both the problem and the solution was Frederick W. 
Taylor’s system of scientific management. Though he had been developing his ideas since the 
1880s, Taylor’s most well-known elaboration of the concept came in eponymously titled 
Principles of Scientific Management which was published in 191152. Scientific management 
emerged as a result of Taylor’s experience as a gang manager at Midvale Steel Works, where he 
discovered the problem of ‘ordinary management’ and from his later work researching and 
experimenting with his famous ‘time and motion’ studies (Braverman, Labor and Monopoly 
Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 1998). The four basic principles of 
scientific management were: 1) that managers must gather, study, tabulate, and codify all the 
traditional knowledge of the particular labor process into a set of the most efficient practices; 2) 
that managers must then match workers to jobs based on capability and train them to work for 
maximum output; 3) that work performance should be assiduously monitored to ensure 
application of efficient practices; and 4) that management should handle all planning and 
conception of work tasks in advance.  
It is important to note the amount of research, and the resultant practices, required to practice 
scientific management.  Taylor’s studies aimed at finding not only the most efficient methods for 
                                                             
52 Taylor’s first book on the subject, Shop Management, was published in 1903, and could have 
had a great deal of influence in the first decade of the 20th century among those beginning to 
criticize schools on the grounds of efficiency. 
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every function of the worker, but also the best tools and materials for the job. Requiring this 
level of rigor, his work at Midvale Steel took over 25 years. It is thus no accident that such a 
system coincided with the development of large production industries, since smaller firms would 
have had no way of paying for such intense studies. Even in the public consciousness, the Taylor 
system was associated most closely with the stopwatch (Callahan, 1962, p. 28). It is usually said 
that the original system of scientific management failed because it was both hated by labor and 
superseded by other schools of managerial thought. That is false both because scientific 
management succeeded in changing the basic assumptions of productive occupations (cf. 
(Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 
1998; Howard, 1985; Littler, 1978), and because in addition to resistance from workers, firms 
were unwilling to make the necessary research investments or to increase compensation for 
increased productivity.  
Taylorism generated great, even mythical interest in the first decades of the twentieth century. 
The system became the subject of national attention in 1910 owing to congressional hearing of 
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). A group of manufacturers moved to sue railroad 
owners over what were felt to be unfair increases in shipping rates. The railroads contended that 
increased wages for their employees made the rate increases necessary; lawyers for the plaintiffs 
called expert witnesses who testified that scientific management would make it possible to both 
raise wages and lower consumer prices without decreasing profits. The testimony was described 
as follows:  
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“Theirs was the firm faith of the apostles: it was a philosophy which worked, and they 
had the figures to show it (Callahan, 1962, p. 20).”53 
In the end, the commission sided with the Merchants, but not due to the evidence presented 
regarding the Taylor system, which was regarded by the commission as still in an experimental 
phase; the ruling was based on other more verifiable claims. Nonetheless, interest in scientific 
management – a term originally coined by one of the lawyers from the hearing, Louis Brandeis – 
grew throughout the 1910s. Hundreds of papers were published on the subject, applying the 
concept to nearly every facet of life. Efficiency societies formed and proliferated among the 
public, as did the ranks less rigorous yet ‘certified’ efficiency experts. An observer at the time 
remarked that ‘scientific management shingles have gone up all over the country’ without 
‘standards or requirements, private or public… by which…the goats can be separated from the 
sheep.’  
Given the existing suspicion of municipal institutions and corporations that emerged from the 
Muckraking periodicals and the growing fervor for all things efficient, especially scientific 
management, the school systems were an inevitable target for reforms. In the years immediately 
following the ICC hearing that brought Scientific Management to the fore, the primary venues 
for criticism were popular magazines. Sensational and polemical articles would stir anxiety 
among readers – a middle class clientele already stricken with the reform mindset – who would 
then express their frustrations at school board meetings and elections. The Saturday Evening Post 
featured stories with titles such as “Our Medieval High Schools,” and “Medieval Methods for 
Modern Children;” these stories criticized schools both for antiquated teaching methods and for 
                                                             
53 The use of expert witnesses and their often sensational testimony is a recurring story when we 
arrive at value-added assessment in the early 21st century. 
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administrative inefficiencies.54 Ladies Home Journal was more virulent in its criticism of the 
schools, and more focused on efficiency. The editors cited the four-hundred million dollars spent 
annually on public schooling nationwide alongside dropout figures and literacy rates without any 
contextualization of either figure. Further stories described the public school system as: 
“not only ineffective in its results but also actually harmful in that it throws every year 
ninety-three out of every one hundred children into the world of action absolutely 
unfitted for even the simplest tasks in life.”  
 “…it has grown antiquated and will not meet our present needs; it has indeed become a 
positive detriment…all traceable to its one great and crying defect – inefficiency 
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 51-52).”  
Educational entities at various levels began responding to these early calls for efficiency first by 
putting scientific management on the agenda for discussion. The 1912 meeting of the National 
Education Association (NEA) featured panels dedicated to the idea of efficiency in schooling 
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 55-61)55; the 1913 Superintendence Department meeting of the NEA was 
entirely devoted to the topic. At the federal level, the US Office of Education’s Commission on 
the Reorganization of Secondary Education report entitled The Cardinal Principles of Secondary 
Education hinted at the need for the reorganization of secondary education based on the presence 
of students of varying aptitudes (Horn & Wliburn, 2013, p. 18). But as with Boston in the mid-
19th century, it would be outsiders to educational practice who would make the moral crusade for 
reform armed with an existing technology. Among the key figures were Ellwood Cubberly, 
                                                             
54 The effects of John Dewey’s child-centered pedagogy were clearly also being felt in articles 
such as these. But as Labaree (2010) points out, Dewey’s attempt to transform pedagogy was not 
as successful as the efforts of administrative progressives. This may be attributed to the 
durability of what Tyack and Cuban (1995) refer to as “the grammar of schooling” – that is day-
to-day classroom practice. 
55 The speakers on school efficiency who appeared at the 1912 NEA meeting ran the gamut 
between the prescient and the absurd. Some attempted to define the problems of applying 
scientific management to the education of children, while others gave attempted to define the 
“Material, Civic and Social dividends” to the public and “Janitor Efficiency.”   
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George Strayer, and Franklin Bobbitt; all three were from prominent schools of education and all 
focused their attention on the school systems in the largest American cities (Mehta, 2013, p. 45).   
Some prominent educators and those directly involved with the schools made their suspicions of 
efficiency-driven reforms known from the outset. Education professor and former elementary 
school teacher William Bagley remarked in 1912 that “nostrums, panaceas and universal cure-
alls in education are snares and delusions…we must give up the notion of solving all of our 
problems in a day.” Edward Hartwell, a statistician for the Boston schools, made a much more 
direct criticism, noting that “we should discriminate in our investigation and consideration of 
educational matter between methods and criteria that are applicable to living mechanisms and 
their activities and those which pertain to the realm of the inventor, the engineer, and the 
manufacturer (Callahan, 1962, p. 124).”   
The attempt to reform schools in the mode of the Taylor system was fraught from the outset. 
Firstly, while the desired outputs of jobs such pig iron hauling, bricklaying and metal cutting 
were easily ascertained and checked for quality, the same was not the case for schools. Lacking a 
clearly defined output, school administrators who attempted to apply scientific management to 
their ‘school plants’ instead picked easily measureable objects of suspect validity which were 
either tangential to schooling, over-determined by out-of-school forces, or both. Among these 
were enrollment rates, average number of days attended by each student, and the number of 
students “inspired” to pursue higher levels of schooling56. Secondly, lacking a single decisive 
                                                             
56 These sorts of ‘efficiency’ mirror the problems and remedies laid out by Leonard Ayres. He 
suggests that the primary causes of ‘retardation’ were late entry and irregular attendance. His 
primary remedies for these problems and for dropout (‘elimination’ in his terminology) were 
more rigorous implementation of compulsory attendance laws (Ayres, Laggards in our schools; a 
study of retardation and elimination in city school systems, 1909, pp. 5-7). The other primary 
cause of retardation cited by Ayres was ‘physical defects’ among students, but these defects – the 
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output, few if any school systems attempted anything approaching a Time-and-Motion study to 
determine best practices.57 Nonetheless, the ethos of measurement-based school management 
remained strong. As a result, many reforms clothed existing concerns over school finances 
through novel ‘data-driven’ methods. In one case, Newton Massachusetts superintendent Frank 
Spaulding58 claimed to have made his schools more efficient by calculating the cost per hour of 
various school subjects to determine which were the most efficient uses of resources (Mehta, pp. 
42-43). Spaulding’s approach was tantamount to “clothing business philosophy with the mantle 
of science.” (Callahan, p. 73) 
As the push for school efficiency matured through the period of World War I and into the 1920s, 
it had two distinct threads, which Callahan refers to as the school surveyors and the efficiency 
testers (p. 99). The surveyors followed the lead provided by Leonard Ayres and defined 
problems of efficiency in terms of student flow, building use, and financial accounting more 
generally. The approach of Frank Spaulding described above exemplifies this version of school 
efficiency. Efficiency Testers more directly addressed questions of the educational process – 
teaching and learning – by relying on the developing field of standardized testing and 
psychometrics. Franklin Bobbitt emphasized the need to create external standards to determine 
whether, in a given school, teachers were capable and students were actually learning (Mehta, 
                                                             
most common of which were poor vision and hearing, skin diseases, and defects of the nose and 
throat – would be today understood as consequences of poverty and child labor (Ayres, Laggards 
in our schools; a study of retardation and elimination in city school systems, p. 118).  
57 Much breath and ink were wasted on the possibility. Franklin Bobbitt was probably the most 
articulate spokesman for applying Taylorism directly to the work of schooling, but even his 
writings only suggest the most basic experimental approaches to discovering best practices 
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 86-92). The emphasis throughout this period was devoted to rating teacher 
efficiency ex post facto rather than making ‘capital investments’ to discover the most efficient 
methods.  
58 Spaulding would subsequently lead school systems in Minneapolis and Cleveland, where he 
would institute data-driven administration practices (Lagemann, 2002, pp. 86-87). 
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2013, pp. 44-45).59 As for the source of these external standards, Bobbitt suggested that ‘the 
commercial world’ ought to determine what should be taught in schools, since students were 
destined to become workers. Bobbitt further recommended that school systems create or adapt 
measurement scales for every product of schooling, which one city superintendent suggested 
would require school systems to maintain record-keeping systems many times more elaborate 
than even the largest corporations at the time (Callahan, pp. 83-86).  
The importing of standards from business and from science was criticized by important 
educational figures, most notably John Dewey. In Education as Engineering he argues that 
efforts to found a science of education are doomed to failure without first pioneering new 
educational methods in the mode of science.60 Using an extensive analogy to bridge building, 
Dewey’s point is that if education is to be reinvented in any significant way, the reinvention will 
have to take place in practice before a new theory or science can be articulated. By contrast, if 
engineering or managerial methods are superimposed upon the educational sphere: 
“Let it not be supposed that there is really any advance in the science of education merely 
because there is a technical improvement in the tools of managing an educational scheme 
conspicuous for its formation prior to the rise of science. Such ‘science only rationalizes 
old, customary education while improving it in minor details.” (Dewey, 2009, pp. 3-4)   
The pressure for scientific management-based reforms of both sorts described above became 
institutionalized in a number of ways. Some large urban school systems established ‘efficiency 
                                                             
59 Among the architects of these original standardized tests in Mathematics, reading and other 
subjects was Edward L. Thorndike of Teacher’s College. Thorndike first developed his theories 
of learning through experiments with animals (Burke, 2013). His human intelligence tests, Alpha 
and Beta, were adapted by the US Military to classify soldiers during World War I, and were 
further transformed into the original Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) by Carl Campbell Brigham 
(Lemann, 1999). 
60 Elsewhere, Dewey bemoaned the fact that although production industries use this prototype 
model of innovation regularly, schools lack the financial resources to do anything similar 
(Callahan, 1962, p. 94).  
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bureaus,’ internal offices which designed (or adapted) tests and scales to rate their teachers, 
students, and principals. Other municipalities hired efficiency experts, temporary consultants to 
conduct surveys and/or construct and administer rating instruments. For the most part, these 
surveying efforts were done in reaction to external organizations claiming inefficiency.61 But 
given budgetary constraints in many school systems, and the widely varying abilities of the 
‘experts’ they hired, these surveys focused primarily on financial accounting version of 
efficiency, and only the most superficial aspects of the classroom situation. This was a marked 
change in the nature of the school survey, first initiated in Boston over a half century earlier. 
School administrators in this era much more closely resembled accountants than educators. 
It is important to note that accountability in this period did not hold teachers solely responsible 
for student outcomes. Leonard Ayres’ Laggards in Our Schools emphasized the presence of 
mentally defective children in classrooms as a decisive factor in producing school inefficiency. 
In the language of moral panics, the victims would be gifted children whose learning was being 
held back by a tide of laggard youth now flooding the school system. Some attempted to develop 
measures of teacher efficiency based on student test scores (Conor, 1920; Elliot, 1915; Sears, 
1921; Buckingham, 1920), while others stressed their primary function as measures of student 
abilities which could inform teaching and placement (Monroe, 1920; Willing, 1920). But the 
overwhelming emphasis of this early push for efficiency was on the classification of children as 
gifted, normal, or subnormal, which comes out of the emphasis on intelligence testing.62 In the 
                                                             
61 For example, the 1915 Cleveland school survey was a reaction to a claim by the Cleveland 
Engineering Society that schools were operating below 50 percent efficiency. In California and 
New York, surveys were initiated due to pressure from commercial interests and taxpayer groups 
(Callahan, 1962, pp. 115-116). Chauncey and Dobbin (1963) note that: ‘Early in the twenties, 
more than one-hundred bureaus of educational research were established.’ 
62 An illustrative quote from a 1921 Journal of Educational Research Editorial: “Conservation of 
power and reduction of waste is an important social ideal. A lot of the brain power in our schools 
 82 
 
years 1920 and 1921, for example, one journal – The Journal of Educational Research – featured 
no fewer than thirty articles concerning the use of intelligence tests in schools compared to 
between five and ten on the subject of teacher efficiency. Another, The School Review, which 
was decidedly less interested in issues of measurement, had at least ten articles concerning 
intelligence tests in comparison with only two connected with teacher evaluation. Intelligence 
testing will thus be the focus of the next section of the chapter.  
By the late 1920s, public attention had shifted away from school efficiency in the mode of the 
Taylor system. Indeed, Taylorism as a managerial theory was eventually overshadowed by Elton 
Mayo’s Human Relations approach. But the impact of the scientific management era in schools 
would last for decades. Ellwood Cubberly’s Public School Administration, first published in 
1916, remained a primary text in schools of education even after his death in 1941, ensuring that 
school efficiency would remain a highly influential paradigm.63 Indeed, the prominence of 
school surveys in later decades’ efforts at school reform is a direct result of Cubberly’s influence. 
Thus the salient legacy is not that schools were forever changed into factory plants – schools that 
attempted such models did not last long – but rather that schooling came under the influence of 
the logic of business and industry without careful consideration of its utility for educational 
purposes (Callahan, 1962). Thus in the early 20th century, both the panic over schooling and the 
                                                             
is daily going to waste because it is idling far below its normal working capacity. Genius which 
spends itself on inferior work is wasted. Our educational practice needs a severe earthquake that 
will shake us loose to the recognition of this waste.” The ideal is a recapitulation of Taylorism, 
but here the student is considered the worker, rather than the teacher. The general editor of the 
journal makes similar comments about the selection function of schools in a later editorial 
(Buckingham, The School as a Selective Agency, 1921) 
63 Cubberly was a pioneer not only in school administration per se. He was also one of the most 
successful school surveyors of the era, conducting investigations in Baltimore, New York City, 
Oakland, Portland, and Salt Lake City (Eagle Shutt, nd). His history of schooling, elaborated in 
Public Education in the United States (Cubberly, 1919) offered a teleological and functionalist 
reading of American schooling which also remained dominant for decades. 
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promised solution were bound up with the assessment technology of the day; despite strong 
rhetorical resistance on the part of educators, public and interest group pressure fundamentally 
changed school administration.    
1920-1950: Educational Testing Service, the SAT, and the rise of Mass Educational Testing 
 
It was mentioned above that part of the push for educational efficiency was connected to the 
early development of psychometrics. Indeed, the entire concept of external educational standards 
requires that someone outside of the school design and apply measures of school performance. 
At the beginning, much of the impetus for developing tests of mental aptitude was clothed in a 
discourse of institutional efficiency. The focus then shifted to intelligence itself - invoking 
panicked tones about the state of the nation which would culminate in the passage of restrictive 
immigration legislation in 1924. As the fervor for mental testing and the labeling that came with 
it dissipated, mental testing underwent a change and became scholastic aptitude. It is this 
sequence of events to which we now turn.  
While Horace Mann and Samuel Howe were among the first to administer externally created 
exams, standardization of assessment took a giant leap at the turn of the 20th century with the 
work of Alfred Binet in France and a group of US researchers who adapted his work64. Binet, 
along with his colleague Theodore Simon, developed a series of tests and a resulting scale for the 
French school system to measure the intellectual capacities of French schoolchildren so that they 
could be placed in appropriate grade levels65. The Binet-Simon scale was first released in 1905, 
                                                             
64 Attempts at developing ways of differentiating mental ability began as early as the late 19th 
century with the work of Sir Francis Galton and J. McKeen Cattell. The latter is credited with 
coining the term mental test in 1890 (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992).  
65 It is important to note that Alfred Binet did not share the beliefs of those who adapted his scale 
in the United States. He was a disciple of John Stuart Mill, perhaps the most ardent early critic of 
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and was revised again in 1908 and 1911 after further field testing by the authors. Though they 
were not employed by the French government until after his death, Binet’s tests were put to more 
immediate use by two Americans. Henry Goddard, who is regarded by some as the father of 
intelligence testing in the United States, translated the Binet-Simon scale into English in 1908 
and worked diligently to distribute copies to public schools. Lewis M. Terman revised the scale 
for American use in 1916; his version became known as the Stanford-Binet intelligence test and 
was the first to use the now-famous IQ scale (Plucker & Esping, 2013b; Plucker & Esping, 
2013a). From the outset, both Goddard and Terman viewed intellect as an innate human 
capacity, and linked the quantification of intellect with notions of efficiency. Terman remarked 
in his 1916 book, The Uses of Intelligence Tests that: 
It is safe to predict that in the near future intelligence tests will bring tens of thousands of 
these high-grade defectives under the surveillance and protection of society. This will 
ultimately result in curtailing the reproduction of feeble-mindedness and in the 
elimination of an enormous amount of crime, pauperism, and industrial inefficiency 
(Terman, 1916, pp. 6-7).66 
Goddard expressed similar sentiments in more strident terms in his Human Efficiency and Levels 
of Intelligence: 
                                                             
native intelligence. As such, Binet held that intelligence was, within limits, conditioned by 
environmental factors (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 113). Given his 
environmentalist position, he envisioned his tests to be used as full diagnostics which would not 
only classify children, but also be used to inform approaches for developing their capacities, thus 
increasing access to education rather than making it more exclusive. This is in contrast to 
American adaptors, especially H.H. Goddard and Lewis Terman, who used the Binet scale to 
advance eugenicist arguments (Minton, 1998). Lemann (1999, pp. 24-25) suggests that E.F. 
Lindquist’s Iowa Every-Pupil Testing Program was much closer to Binet’s intentions, as they 
were grounded in tests of achievement rather than aptitude. 
66 Illustrative of the connection between educational efficiency and intelligence testing, it is of 
note that Terman’s book was one in a series of education textbooks edited by Ellwood Cubberly. 
Terman was also a founding co-editor of the Journal of Education Research along with Leonard 
Ayres. 
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Testing of Intelligence is no longer an experiment or of doubted value. It is fast becoming 
an exact science. The facts revealed by the army tests cannot be ignored. Greater 
efficiency, we are always working for. Can these new facts be used to increase our 
efficiency? No question! We only await the Human Engineer who will undertake the 
work (Goddard, 1920, p. vii). 
The ‘army tests’ referred to by Goddard were the ‘Alpha’ and ‘Beta’ tests used to screen draftees 
during World War I.67  Alpha was designed for recruits literate in English, while Beta was for 
illiterate or immigrant recruits. Goddard and Terman served on the design committee for the test, 
which was chaired by Harvard psychologist Major Robert Yerkes. The Alpha test, which was 
completed in the summer of 1917 and was largely based on the Stanford-Binet scale, was 
administered to over 1.5 million men by the end of the war. This constituted the largest instance 
of mass standardized testing at the time and provided invaluable data for intelligence test 
promoters to argue for their more general utility (McGuire, 1994; Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery, nd). It was also the first major application of the multiple-choice testing 
format, the development of which was credited to Arthur Otis, a student of Terman’s who 
created the first group intelligence tests (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963, p. 6). The design committee 
emphasized the ease and efficiency (i.e., low labor costs) with which exams could be scored (US 
Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, p. 124). Internally however, the value of the 
test was questionable: it correlated poorly with officers’ assessments of recruits’ capacities and 
was perceived by high-ranking military officials as making little contribution to the success of 
the war (Fancher, 1985, pp. 126-127). 
                                                             
67 Educational philosopher Jacques Barzun notes that “The vogue for this type of test began after 
the first world war” in his foreword to Banesh Hoffman’s The Tyranny of Testing (1963/2003, p. 
7). E.L. Thorndike, a psychologist at Columbia’s Teachers College, was a primary constructor of 
early versions of the alpha, but his more complex view of intelligence conflicted with Robert 
Yerkes who believed intelligence was one quality that should be measured on one scale (Carson 
J. , 2007).  
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The results of the alpha tests were kept secret until the end of the war. The National Academy of 
Arts and Sciences published the findings in 1921 under the title Psychology Examining in the 
United States Army (Army Alpha and Beta Tests, 2014). Like the school surveys conducted by 
Leonard Ayres, the test results provoked panic about the state of the nation’s intellect, though at 
first only indirectly about its schools. The official summary of findings stated that the average 
mental age of white draftees was approximately 13 years old and added that by this fact half of 
the white draftees would be classified as “morons” (Yerkes, 1921). Based on the results of the 
test, many authors bemoaned the menace of ‘racial impoverishment68’ which they believed 
threatened to destroy American civilization (McDougall, 1921; Stoddard, 1922; Wiggam, 1922). 
A review of Henry Goddard’s 1920 book stated that the results of the army tests placed the 
                                                             
68 The significance of eugenics in the history of psychometrics is hard to overstate. Eugenics was 
introduced as a theory of social management by Sir Francis Galton, who also pioneered the 
concept of mental measurement in its service – though he failed to create an effective exam 
(Fancher, 1985). Most of the psychologists who helped to design the Army alpha exams – 
including Yerkes, Goddard, Termin and Bingham – subscribed to the idea native intelligence. 
Brigham’s A Study of American Intelligence loudly proclaimed that the nation was imperiled by 
a decline in intelligence owing to the presence of non-Nordic racial groups, a conclusion 
endorsed by Yerkes in his foreword (Brigham, 1922). Even though E.L. Thorndike differed with 
Yerkes on the nuances of mental measurement, he wrote unambiguously in support of native 
intelligence (Thorndike, 1913; 1940). The College Board’s decision to create a universal entry 
exam based on the alpha tests represented the interests of their elite clientele, which was 
concerned with increased applications from non-white – that is non-Nordic – students (Saretzky, 
1982; Karabel, 2005). In 1948, reacting to an article which criticized the use of the SAT for 
college admissions, Educational Testing Service President Henry Chauncey reacted in a 
eugenicist tone: “If ability has any relation to success in life parents in upper-socioeconomic 
groups should have more ability than those in lower socio-economic groups. And if there is 
anything in heredity one would expect children of high socioeconomic group parents to have 
more ability than children of low socioeconomic group parents” (Lemann, 1999, p. 67). Even as 
late as 1963, Chauncey makes no distinction between intelligence testing and scholastic aptitude 
testing, though he distances himself from the native intelligence hypothesis, saying that although 
such a capacity is believed to exist, current instruments do not measure it (Chauncey & Dobbin, 
1963, pp. 21-22). 
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science of mental testing beyond reproach before going on to advocate a national campaign of 
intelligence testing in the pursuit of greater national efficiency (Popenoe, 1921).  
The Army alpha and the accompanying rising status of intelligence testing were not without 
strong criticism. Anthropologist Franz Boas challenged the racial impoverishment claim by 
stressing the importance of the social environment. He argued that in any supposed racial type 
are found a wide variety of individual traits conditioned by at least as much by social location as 
by anything inherited (Boas, 1922). As such, the findings of eugenics must be considered part of 
their political agenda rather than anything objective. Specifically addressing intelligence tests, he 
suggests they can provide no definitive answers in themselves: 
…cultural environment is a most important factor in determining the results of the so-
called intelligence tests. In fact, a careful examination shows of the tests shows clearly 
that in none of them has our cultural experience been eliminated…I suspect strongly that 
such influences can always be discovered and that it will be impossible to construct any 
test in which this element is so completely eliminated that we could consider the results 
as an expression of purely biologically determined factors. (Boas, 1931, pp. 12-13)  
Walter Lippman’s series of essays in The New Republic not only criticized the fever-pitched 
interpretations of the alpha exam results, but also the arbitrary methods by which the tests were 
constructed (American Social History Productions, 2012).69 Lippman notes that Alfred Binet had 
shied away from attempting to define intelligence as such, opting to focus on the practical 
problem of identifying children who would need special attention in school, which he did by 
constructing arbitrary scales based on his own common sense attempts at defining aspects of 
mental ability (Lippman, Mental Age of Americans, 1922). By contrast, the Americans who 
adopted Binet’s approach – and worse still those who interpreted their research – treated exams 
                                                             
69 Lippman’s essays appeared between July and December of 1922 and were titled ‘Mental age 
of Americans,’ ‘Mystery of the A Men,’ ‘Reliability of Intelligence Tests,’ ‘Abuse of the tests,’ 
‘Tests of hereditary intelligence,’ and ‘Future for the Tests.’ 
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constructed by the same methods as if they measured an uncontested, heritable quality in humans 
(Lippman, The Abuse of the Tests, 1922). The numerical format in which the results appear – the 
quotient – further abstracts the results from their arbitrary basis and gives them an “illusion of 
constancy” which test promoters all-too-eagerly endorse. In the end, he attributes the eagerness 
of intelligence testers and their interpreters to overstate both the extent and the implications of 
the findings from the Army tests to a desire on their part for greater social power rather than any 
scientific commitment: 
But of course no student of human motives will believe that this revival of predestination 
is due to a purely statistical illusion. He will say with Nietzsche that “every impulse is 
imperious, and, as such, attempts to philosophize.” And so behind the will to believe he 
will expect to find some manifestation of the will to power (Lippman, A Future for the 
Tests, 1922).70   
Despite the fact that later criticism showed the army tests to be roundly biased in favor of native-
born whites71 – or perhaps because of it, given their eugenicist views – many psychologists who 
were involved with the testing program both touted and began adapting them for use in civilian 
life. Most notably, Robert Yerkes published the National Intelligence Test, which was widely 
administered. Walter Bingham, another design committee member, focused on using intelligence 
tests in industry and emphasized their role in increasing firms’ efficiency (Bingham, 1937). 
Lewis Terman, an educational psychologist with particular interest in gifted children who had 
                                                             
70 Even given his sharp criticisms, Lippman believed both: a) that the tests in use at the time 
would be superior to standard methods of classification used in schools (Lippman, The 
Reliability of Intelligence Tests, 1922) and b) that they could be usefully developed for a variety 
of applications, but for the pretensions that they measure intelligence (Lippman, A Future for the 
Tests, 1922).  
71 In an article which defends the psychological research community of the 1920s against claims 
of racism, Snyderman and Herrnstein (1983) summarize criticisms of the Army tests from within 
and outside of academia. Specifically, they argue that the Army test results did not play a 
decisive role in the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, as is argued by Stephen J. Gould 
(1981). 
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been working on the Stanford-Binet scale since 1916, used the results of the Army tests to 
promote widespread use of intelligence testing in schools.72  
But in the long term, it was Princeton University professor Carl Campbell Brigham who had 
perhaps the greatest impact on standardized testing in education. Brigham was an assistant 
administering the Army Mental Tests during World War I. At first a strident eugenicist, Brigham 
contended that the tests proved the superiority of “Nordic” Europeans (Brigham, 1922). Upon 
returning to civilian life, he tried to make intelligence testing mandatory for admission to 
Princeton.73  By 1926, he had converted the alpha test into the first version of the Scholastic 
Aptitude Test (SAT). In the same year, after being appointed chairman of the testing committee 
at the College Board, Brigham administered his test to a group of college-bound high school 
graduates, just over 8,000 students. For the next decade, he was an influential member of the 
College Board and remained in charge of the exam. The early administrations of the SAT were 
not of consequence; the exam given to fewer than 20,000 students each year throughout the 
1930s, and the College Board still made admissions decisions primarily based on its essay exams 
which had been in use since its founding 1901 (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 
1992). But like earlier IQ tests, these initial pilots of the SAT provided later legitimation for the 
exam (Saretzky, 1982; Blackwell, 1999; Lemann, 1999).  
                                                             
72 Terman’s Stanford Achievement Test (which would now be considered a misnomer for what 
was essentially an intelligence test) popularized the use of the intelligence quotient (IQ) – 
defined then as mental age divided by chronological (Terman, 1916, p. 17). Terman borrowed 
the concept from German psychologist William Stern, who coined it in 1912 (Plucker & Esping, 
2013). 
73 At the same time, E.L. Thorndike was making similar attempts to introduce mental testing into 
the admissions criteria at Columbia and Cooper Union. Thorndike’s student, and Brigham’s 
fellow Alpha test assistant, Ben Wood would go on to develop the New York State Regents 
exams and the Graduate Record Examination (GRE). 
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The intervening years saw technological and political changes which would allow for the mass 
administration of college admissions testing. The technology was machine scoring. The SAT was 
a multiple choice test, but it still needed to be graded by hand. Ben Wood, another testing 
enthusiast and a student of E.L. Thorndike, had been working with the IBM Corporation to 
develop a machine to grade exams quickly and with fewer errors (Lemann, 1999, p. 35).  They 
were unsuccessful, but did manage to purchase the rights to a scoring machine developed 
independently in 1933 by a Michigan high school teacher named Reynold Johnson.  IBM 
released the first commercial scoring machine in 1937, and the SAT began using the machines in 
1939 (Hadhazy, nd). 
Concurrently in 1933, newly-appointed Harvard President James Conant, in collaboration with 
his new assistant Dean Henry Chauncey, was looking for a scholarship test to use to admit 
students from outside the university’s usual clientele of elite northeastern families. This goal led 
him to prefer the idea of an IQ or aptitude test over an achievement test, which he felt would 
only reinforce the existing prep school pipeline. Owing to Brigham’s claim that the tests 
predicted academic achievement and Chauncey’s promotion of the test, he chose the SAT and 
employed it to select ten scholarship students into the class of 1934 and again the following year. 
In 1937, with the cooperation of other testing advocates, Princeton and Yale each created similar 
programs which utilized Brigham’s SAT and a battery of multiple-choice subject tests designed 
by Ben Wood (Lemann, 1999, pp. 38-40).   
From the outset, Conant’s aspirations were much larger than admitting a few Midwestern 
students to Harvard. On the heels of the 1937 administration of the scholarship exam, he 
proposed the idea of a national testing agency which would administer these exams as a national 
census of abilities for the purpose of discovering the country’s most talented minds. Taking his 
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inspiration from Frederick Jackson Turner, who had bemoaned the loss of America’s unique 
social levelling with the settlement of the western frontier; and from Thomas Jefferson’s notion 
of a natural aristocracy selected based on merit, Conant believed that a massive campaign of 
testing and sorting would turn back the tide of class stratification and national decline through 
the mechanisms of equal opportunity and enlightened leadership.  Public education would 
provide the site for mass testing and consequently the place in which equal opportunity would be 
realized. And channeling those with the highest test scores into positions of social stewardship 
would ensure the best possible future for the nation74.  
But Conant’s immediate plans for the SAT as a college entrance exam met opposition from what 
would seem an unlikely source. Carl Brigham had begun recanting his views on intelligence 
testing in the late 1920s during his tenure at the College Board. This was in no small part due to 
the zeal with which many intelligence testers had pursued their expansion, which Brigham felt 
came at the expense of rigorous evaluation of the tests themselves (Saretzky, 1982). Brigham’s 
criticisms of the tests were public and harsh, and his position at the College Board placed a major 
roadblock in front of Conant’s campaign75. But Brigham’s failing health and early death in 1943 
                                                             
74 Conant’s ideas of discovering a Jeffersonian ‘natural aristocracy’ and fostering equal 
opportunity by means of the SAT was similar to remarks by Thorndike with reference to IQ 
tests: “It seems entirely safe to predict that the world will get better treatment by trusting its 
fortunes to its 95- or 99-percentile intelligences than it would get by itself. The argument for 
democracy is not that it gives power to all men without distinction, but that it gives greater 
freedom for ability and character to attain power” (Thorndike, 1920, p. 235) 
75 Contrasting with his earlier book title “A Study of American Intelligence,” Brigham’s 1932 
book on the SAT was titled “A Study of Error.” By 1934 he wrote that “The (intelligence) test 
scores very definitely are a composite including schooling, family background, familiarity with 
English, and everything else, relevant and irrelevant. The native intelligence hypothesis is dead.” 
(Saretzky, 1982, p. 16) His public comments on the potential effects of widespread intelligence 
testing were equally harsh, and suggested that such exams would have a deleterious effect on 
teaching and learning in schools (Lemann, 1999, pp. 40-41). Lee Cronbach differs about 
Brigham’s legacy, suggesting that his retractions were made on technical grounds rather than 
personal epiphany (Cronbach, 1975). 
 92 
 
allowed it to move forward. The first step came with the onset of the Second World War; the 
College Board decided in 1941 that the essay exams would be too administratively complex to 
administer during war time, and opted to use the SAT instead – though this was still only of 
consequence at prestigious institutions. At the same time, Henry Chauncey was selected to adapt 
the SAT and administer it as a placement test for incoming recruits to the Army and Navy. The 
tests were given to over 300,000 high school students on April 2, 1943.76 This large scale, one-
day administration of the Army Navy College Qualifying Tests proved that such tests could be 
efficiently and securely administered in a single day to vast numbers of students (Lemann, 1999; 
Horn & Wliburn, 2013). Over the course of the war, these exams were administered to roughly 
10 million army recruits (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). This brought 
the SAT to the larger population of students for the first time in its history.  
The final decisive step in the ascendance of the SAT as a national exam came in 1947 when the 
College Board and the American Council on Education – another large national agency 
concerned with educational testing – were merged into one unit. The merger, opposed by both 
organizations for different reasons, was a direct result of Conant’s political power at the time. At 
the same time, the College Board handed over the task of administering its new primary exam, 
the SAT (the essay tests were never resumed after 1941) to a newly founded organization in 
Princeton, New Jersey – the Educational Testing Service (ETS). Henry Chauncey left Harvard to 
become the first ETS president in 1948.   
                                                             
76 The test was in fact a college admissions test; selected recruits were sent for advanced training 
at college campuses across the country. Similar tests were also given to enrolled college students 
for placement in the same programs.  
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James Conant saw college admissions testing as a means to a political end; Henry Chauncey saw 
testing as the end itself. Like the scientific managers before him, he was convinced that the 
rational information provided by test scores could replace the fraught decisions made based on 
tradition and sentiment. His immediate goal after the establishment of ETS was to administer a 
massive census of intellectual capacity to the entire country – an eerie similarity with avowed 
eugenicists twenty-five years earlier. Though this effort never materialized, ETS was provided a 
substantial government contract (nearly $1 million) to administer the Selective Service College 
Qualification Test (SSCQT) following the outbreak of the Korean War77. Moreover, during his 
twenty-two-year tenure as its president, ETS created innumerable tests and expanded the 
administration of its best known device, the SAT, from around twenty thousand to over one 
million each year. In 1983, ETS was contracted to administer the National Assessment of 
Educational Progress (NAEP), a role which it continues to play today (National Center for 
Education Statistics, 2013).  
More generally, the success of massive test administrations such as the Alpha and ANQT 
provided the model for states to begin large-scale testing of pupils as New York did with the 
Regents Exams. Perhaps the most notable statewide testing program was E.F. Lidquist’s Iowa 
Every Pupil Test of Basic Skills, which was first administered to elementary grade students in 
                                                             
77 The SSCQT exam – which like the ANCQT was based on the SAT - was one of two criteria 
which decided whether male college students would be allowed to continue attending college or 
be sent to the battlefield – the other was class rank in college. ETS administered the exam to over 
500,000 students over the course of the war. Though about 60 percent of test-takers qualified for 
exemptions based on either or both criteria, the percentage scoring above the threshold score of 
70 on the SSCQT varied greatly by region; reflecting the racial bias of the exams, those in the 
Northeast passed at a far higher rate (73%) than those in the Deep South (42%) (Freeman, 2009; 
Frusciano, 1983). Nonetheless, the debate over conscription at the time did not focus on the use 
intelligence tests in determining deferment, but on the idea of exempting college students in 
general.  
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1935 and high school students in 1942 (Peterson, 2007).78 From the outset, results of the Iowa 
tests were being used to evaluate the performance of students and schools. The exams became 
very commercially successful, and Lindquist eventually began marketing them to school systems 
outside of Iowa (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992, pp. 122-123). Another 
milestone achieved by Lindquist was a more advanced automated scoring machine, though this 
would not be realized until the 1950s.The use of mass-produced achievement tests like the ITBS 
in school systems paralleled and eventually overtook that of aptitude testing. 79 In an interesting 
parallel with the application of scientific management techniques, test-makers pointed out that 
school systems and end-users (meaning principals and teachers) would ideally engage in 
intensive study of the tests they wished to use in their schools to make sure the tests align with 
the content being taught in their classrooms: 
No one outside the school can do the job of stating what the school wants to 
measure…the job is wholly one for the teachers and administrators…Without it, 
achievement testing is scarcely more than random activity and contributes little to the 
work of the school…for the most part, the greatest benefit for the most students will 
result through the use of tests that have been chosen by committees of the students’ own 
teachers (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963, pp. 57-64).  
But the centralizing tendencies that came along with the introduction of these measurement tools 
made it unlikely that schools would get to choose the tests that best fit their instructional goals. 
Katz (1975) suggests that this process began in the late 19th century, and Wise (1979) argues that 
this centralization has a generally detrimental effect on educational quality. Further, as was the 
case with the proliferation of efficiency experts, many test publishers sprang up with the vogue 
                                                             
78 Because they did not come along with the sort of social labeling associated with aptitude tests, 
Lindquist’s achievement tests were not subject to the same level of criticism as were aptitude 
tests such as the SAT.  
79 Between 1900 and 1932, there were more than three times as many published achievement 
tests available on the market as there were aptitude or mental capacity tests (US Congress Office 
of Technology Assessment, 1992). 
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for achievement testing and created what Chauncey calls “the quick-and-dirties that infest the 
darker part of the educational forest,” meaning hastily constructed exams which make sweeping 
and unsupported claims about their usefulness.  
In the period encompassing the two World Wars, intelligence testing both unearthed the 
supposed problem of innate mental deficiency and became its apparent solution as a sorting 
mechanism at all levels of schooling. From the outset, mental testing as an educational policy 
tool had its critics. In addition to Walter Lippman’s criticisms noted above, William Bagley 
(1925) worried over the potential for mental testing to lead to a sort of social determinism – 
which presaged critiques of educational tracking decades later (Gamoran, 1992; Gamoran, 1987; 
Oakes, 1985). Banesh Hoffman made one of the most famous critiques of testing using the SAT 
as the representative in his 1962 book The Tyranny of Testing, arguing that professional testers 
relied on the perceived objectivity and numerical precision of their products to displace other 
forms of evaluation. Criticisms of the uses to which tests were put came from within the testing 
camp as well: ETS vice-president Henry Dyer said in 1971 that IQ tests and grade- equivalency 
scores used by schools often lead educators to “succumb to what Alfred North Whitehead called 
‘the fallacy of misplaced concreteness,’” meaning that the numerical score is taken as an 
empirical fact rather than an imprecise indicator (Stevens, 1971).80  
As with the Taylor-infused school efficiency movement, the focus of mass testing remained on 
groups of students and on large units such as school systems rather than individual schools or 
teachers. It would take further innovation to refine the targets of educational reformers. 
Furthermore, between their initial appearance and the end of World War II, testing proponents 
                                                             
80 Dyer went further and said that attempts to use such tests for ‘professional accountability’ 
were “absurd, wrong and misleading.” 
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shifted their emphasis from “classification for assignment” to “classification for allocating 
resources” in response to public criticism. Many – including Brigham, Terman, and Chauncey – 
also retreated (at least in public) from their explicitly eugenicist views. This is part of the reason 
why Lindquist’s achievement tests, and others like it, were able to ultimately gain more traction 
than many of the aptitude tests created in the same period. Though one cannot be sure, it is 
plausible that these were pragmatic shifts of position made to preserve the relevance of their tests 
and not genuine changes of heart or mind. Contemporary arguments for native intelligence, 
including those of Arthur Jensen and Herrnstein and Murray indicate the continuing appeal of the 
hypothesis. 
But this is not the place to discuss the nature/nurture debate. What is salient is that large-scale 
standardized testing became a permanent feature of the American school system. The 
administration of the Army Alpha and later the SAT can be seen as blueprints for the program of 
national testing which begins in the 1970s. More directly, SAT scores themselves have been 
routinely editorialized as indicators of national educational progress from President Reagan’s 
wall charts through the present day.  This sea change was in no small part due to the early and 
energetic efforts of test promoters who made outsized claims both about extant problems with 
schooling and the capacity of the tests to address them. These claims were buttressed by the 
scientific pedigrees of the testers, which allowed them to displace critics as luddites or 
traditionalists, and to gain influence among policymakers.    
1966-1975: The Coleman Report, Systems Analysis, and the discovery of “bad schools”  
 
Around the same time as his critical essays on the Army Alpha exams were being published in 
The New Republic, Walter Lippman’s Public Opinion was released. Prophetic in many ways 
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throughout the book, he gives some attention to the role of social science in public policy. 
Aligning with the book’s general thesis that individuals only indirectly experience most the 
world (and therefore political life), he suggests that social science was poised to fulfill a great 
need “among the directing men of the Great Society.” He observes that at the time social science 
was still limited by the ad hoc ways in which their primary data were collected and by the 
inability to approximate experimental methods. But the increasing importance of a class of 
accountants, statisticians and other experts to people in power, he believed represented a 
fundamental shift analogous to that which happened to engineers and chemists – and therefore 
physical science generally – during industrialization. Increased contact between practical social 
scientists with decision-makers throughout society would result in more purposive data 
collection and steady advancement of theory (Lippman, 1997, pp. 235-237).  This development 
would be further reinforced because: 
…all large forms of association must, because of sheer practical difficulty, contain men 
who will come to see the need for an expert reporting of their environment…In the 
exchange of technic and result among expert staffs one can see, I think, the beginning of 
experimental method in social science. When each school district and budget, and health 
department, and factory, and tariff schedule, is the material of knowledge for every other, 
the number of comparable experiences begins to approach the dimensions of genuine 
experiment (Lippman, 1997, p. 237).  
The American public school system expanded in both size and reach between 1950 and 1970. In 
1950, there were 25 million public school students, with 83 percent of 14 to 17 year-olds 
attending (US Bureau of the Census, 1961). By 1970, those figures had climbed to 46.5 million 
and 94 percent respectively (US Bureau of the Census, 1970). A larger proportion of the 
population was completing primary and secondary education; the median number of years of 
school completed rose from 9.3 to 12 (US Department of Education, 1993).  The growth in 
school attendance and completion was distributed across segments of the population, though the 
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gaps between races and regions of the country remained noticeable (Fischer & Hout, 2006, pp. 
11-13). Mostly owing to the educational component of the GI Bill, postsecondary enrollment 
experienced perhaps the most remarkable growth, expanding more than three fold in the same 
period from 2.6 million to 8 million (US Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). As 
in the time frames already discussed, immigration was the major force impacting K-12 school 
expansion during this period. But incorporation of previously excluded populations, specifically 
African Americans and rural populations, also contributed to this growth. As would be expected, 
the incorporation of new groups into the school system would again raise questions about school 
quality. Furthermore, given the achievement of near universal access to educational services, 
debates about social equality began in this period to shift from the issue of equity of access to the 
issue of differences in quality (Rivlin, 1971, p. 66).    
Sociologist Arthur Wise also notes an important trend in the nature of educational policy in this 
period. Demands relating to education, both in terms of equality and overall quality, were 
directed at governments (state and federal) instead of at individual schools or school boards. 
Under increased pressure, legislative bodies attempted to address these grievances through 
legislation. Intentionally or not, these solutions changed both the operations and the public 
conception of the school system. Wise argues that while legislative solutions were the proper 
mechanism for addressing school equity issues, the same sorts of solutions are incapable of (and 
perhaps degrading to) addressing school effectiveness (Wise A. , 1979).  
There were two major catalysts for school-related panic between 1950 and 1970. The one that 
more immediately conjures up images of a panic was the Cold War – and more particularly the 
launch of the Sputnik satellite by the Soviet Union on October 4th, 1957. Though the United 
States successfully launched its own satellite less than four months later, the fact that its main 
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political and ideological competitor was the first to achieve such a milestone in space exploration 
created a sense of physical and ontological insecurity throughout the country.  Critics – who 
were convinced of the failure of the schools long before Sputnik – capitalized on the opportunity 
it provided to advance their positions.  
Historian and Constitutional scholar Arthur Bestor, who published a manifesto on the question of 
school quality in 1953 titled Educational Wastelands, was interviewed in January of 1958 by US 
News and World Report on the question “What went wrong with US schools?” His argument 
was in that progressive school reforms – implemented by a group of “professional educationists” 
– had failed to produce the needed mathematics and science talent for the United States to be 
competitive with the Soviet Union (Tyack & Cuban, 1995, pp. 52-53).81  Life magazine further 
stoked panic over the state of the nation’s schools with a five-part series titled “Crisis in 
Education.” Accompanying essays articulating national educational decline were photo spreads 
comparing two high school students – Alexei Kutzkov (Russian) and Stephan Lapekas 
(American) – in a way that depicted Soviet education as academically serious and American 
education as diluted by socialization and too concerned with trivial matters (Bracey, 2007)82. 
Another influential trumpeter of educational decline following the launch of Sputnik was 
Admiral Hyman Rickover, who is also credited with the development of the first nuclear 
submarine. The admiral published a series of books beginning with Education and Freedom in 
                                                             
81 Interestingly, University of Illinois Education professor Harold Hand calls Bestor’s take on 
American schooling a “Devil Theory” (Hand, 1958) in an argument which predates the theory of 
“folk devils and moral panics” outlined by sociologist Stanley Cohen in the 1970s (Cohen S. , 
2002).  Hand notes that Bestor’s argument about the effects of progressive education on the 
American space program would have been minimal at best – since recent high school students 
would not have been working on the space program – and that his indictment of an ill-defined 
group of educational decision-makers did not withstand investigation. 
82 The first installment of the ‘Crisis’ series appeared in the March 24th, 1958 issue, and featured 
an essay by novelist Sloan Wilson titled It’s Time to Close Our Carnival. 
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1959, and continued with two comparative studies of US schools with those in England and 
Switzerland (Ducros, nd). Each volume leveled similar criticisms about the content of American 
schooling, charging that it has been leveled toward the less capable students by emphasizing “life 
adjustment education” rather than fundamental content, particularly math and science.  83  
The major response to Sputnik came in the form of the National Defense Education Act 
(NDEA), which was signed into law in September of 1958. The majority of the law’s impacts 
were at the postsecondary level, but it did turn a new page in the story of education reform at the 
K-12 level, as federal funding was used to leverage changes in state education policies. A 
multitude of new subject-area initiatives were started following the NDEA, resulting in new 
textbooks and curriculum protocols (Buxton, 2009; Rudolph, 2002). Notably, in 1959 the US 
Office of Education fully funded an already existing study by the University of Pittsburgh and 
the American Institutes of Research, known as Project TALENT, which was charged with 
assessing the quality of education in US high schools. 
While the Cold War and the panic over Sputnik initiated a struggle over US high school 
curriculum, the nascent Civil Rights movement simultaneously drove another set of reforms in 
the school system aimed at desegregation and school equity. Mandatory desegregation of public 
schools began with the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954. As schools attempted to 
integrate in the years that followed, focus shifted to the tasks of educating diverse populations 
                                                             
83 Based on an interpretation of the work of John Dewey and other child-centered progressives, 
‘life adjustment education’ aimed to increase schools’ emphasis on the practical applications of 
learning (McFarland, 1954). The move toward this practical-skills curriculum began to take hold 
in 1945 in response primarily to a high dropout rate and a generally low college-going rate 
among US high school students. By the time Sputnik was launched, critics of life adjustment had 
already gained traction in undermining it (Breault, 2009). Lawrence Cremin (1961) regards the 
Life Adjustment movement as a key misstep of educational progressives.   
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and the problems of school equity (Weiner, 1993; Mehta, 2013). On the one hand, some 
education scholars used terms like ‘culturally deprived’ and ‘disadvantaged’ to refer to students 
from working class and poor backgrounds, whose values and capacities did not accord with those 
purported in school (Reissman, 1962; Passow, Goldberg, & Tannenbaum, 1967). These terms 
and the approaches to schooling associated with them became controversial as a result of the 
“culture of poverty” thesis advanced by Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1965) in The Negro Family: A 
Case for National Action. Other writers focused on the drastic inequalities between the schools 
serving black and white students (Kozol, 1967; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Stanley Aronowitz 
(2000, pp. 114-115) suggests that increased investment in education coincided not only with 
fears of Soviet competition, but also with trepidation about rising rates of crime following the 
economic boom of the postwar years. Elsewhere, Moynihan (1970) suggests that concerns over 
juvenile delinquency – especially among urban Blacks and Puerto Ricans – were reigniting a fear 
of proletarian violence that was common in the 19th century.84 Linking the threads of the Cold 
War and fears related to minority communities, some have suggested that the War on Poverty 
programs of the 1960s were an attempt to buttress the poorest American communities so that 
they wouldn’t provide fuel for Soviet propaganda abroad (Balogh, 2004).  
Bolstered by the broader civil rights movement and Cold War fears, and thus incorporated as part 
of Lyndon Johnson’s ‘War on Poverty’ agenda, the question of racial inequality in education 
became more pressing than that of educational standards. The introduction to the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act of 1965 makes clear that the intention of the legislation is to “… 
                                                             
84 Moynihan notes that the rates of crime and poverty in New York in the late 1950s and early 
1960s were lower than those in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but that 
expectations had changed such that relative to what people expected, there was a perception of a 
real and growing problem of juvenile delinquency (Moynihan, 1970, pp. 43-46).   
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contribute particularly to meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived 
children.” The fact that Project TALENT had far less public impact than the government report 
on ‘Equality of Educational Opportunity’ (the Coleman Report) gives evidence to which issues 
dominated the period.  
But as the story below suggests, Cold War rhetoric and the techniques developed to prepare for 
both armed and ideological warfare would find their way into the sphere of domestic issues, 
including education. Part of the strength of this school equity agenda in the period came from a 
technical innovation which had been developing in the military since World War II: Systems 
Analysis.  
Systems Analysis (SA) encompasses a wide variety of mathematical and statistical techniques, 
including multivariate modeling and simulations, but is generally oriented toward generating 
‘optimal’ solutions to administrative problems by defining and quantifying the inputs and outputs 
of a given situation.85 The story of Systems Analysis begins with Operations Research (OR). As 
a formal discipline, OR originated in Great Britain as the country prepared to deploy radar 
systems to combat aerial bombing campaigns by the German Luftwaffe. This original application 
concerned the best uses of machines, although it was quickly adapted to the analysis of human 
systems in the military context (INFORMS, nd).  
                                                             
85 A report from the RAND corporation describes Systems Analysis succinctly: “By a ‘system 
we mean a set of interrelated factors that are used together to produce an output…All of these 
systems produce some sort of output…[which] are typically difficult to quantify…[and] also 
have costs associated with them…[and] have various ways of combining the elements or inputs 
in order to produce outputs…In a successful systems analysis, the analyst can vary the inputs, 
note the effect on both cost and output, and then decide that one system is better than another…if 
you tell him what output you want, he can tell you how to get it at minimum cost (Kershaw & 
McKean, 1959).” 
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Branches of the US military, primarily the Navy and Air Force, began separately using OR 
techniques to inform bombing campaigns and anti-submarine warfare in 1942.86 Among those 
contracted to teach these techniques in the military was former accounting professor and future 
Defense Secretary Robert McNamara (Mehta, 2013, p. 69). In 1945, following the conclusion of 
the war, the US government established Project Research and Development (RAND) under a 
contract to the Douglas Aircraft company, with the intention of applying OR-style techniques to 
identify and solve long-term military problems (Gass & Assad, 2005). The project’s reputation 
and staff grew rapidly over the next three years. In 1948, Project RAND’s government contract 
was transferred from Douglas Aircraft to the newly established nonprofit RAND Corporation 
(RAND Corporation, nd). Among RAND’s first objectives as an independent entity was to refine 
OR to deal with military problems which involved more uncertainty than radar or bombing. The 
stated goal was to create a comprehensive ‘science of war’ which considered a variety of 
outcomes, and Systems Analysis was the methodological basis. But the techniques proved 
incapable of this optimization given the various contingencies of war. Though RAND continued 
to be influential in military planning during the 1950s and 1960s, Systems Analysis and its 
applications to social welfare research are considered its most far-reaching contribution to 
American policy-making (Jardini, 2000). But the key to understanding RAND’s transition to 
domestic and civil affairs lies in the discipline of economics. 
Economics was a small branch at the RAND Corporation in its early years. But by the mid-
1950s, it came to occupy a central place in the organization because economists’ notion of cost-
                                                             
86 At the same time as OR methods came into use in the US military, sociological methods were 
also being utilized for the first time in the Army. Samuel Stouffer’s study of army life, which 
made use of developing survey research methods, was commissioned around the same time 
(Bulmer, 1996). One could characterize the 1960s as a period when sociology and economics 
competed for influence on policymakers, with economists emerging as the victors.   
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effectiveness became the outcome of choice for systems analysis techniques.  Cost-effectiveness 
was not only an appealing goal for the military; it also suggested a way to apply SA other 
problems (Jardini, 1996, pp. 107-113). RAND Corporation’s first statement on the applicability 
of Systems Analysis to education came in a 1959 memorandum to the Ford Foundation – which 
provided them a small grant of $35,000 – outlining potential difficulties of studying schooling in 
terms of the relationship between inputs and outputs.  The lack of an adequate definition of 
school output should, the validity and reliability of tests as measures, and the problem of finding 
school systems which are ‘similar in all respects except one’ are among the problems discussed 
by the authors (Kershaw & McKean, 1959). The paper presages much of what James S. Coleman 
found in his report – also discussed below – including the relatively small role played by schools 
in educational outcomes and the important role of “peer effects” (pp. 20-27). Ultimately, 
however, the authors conclude that even if the prospect of comparing school systems is a ‘long 
shot,’ it is the “only hope of providing a systematically better basis for intelligent choices in 
education.”  As Jardini (1996, pp. 359-360) points out, this study was RAND’s first foray into 
the field of domestic policy research, though they would not put the full force of their 
organization into this line of inquiry until the late 1960s.87  
Prior to Systems Analysis, government interest in using economists’ tools for policy planning 
had already made an impact. H. Thomas James (1968, pp. 4-6) notes in the The New Cult of 
                                                             
87 RAND Corporation’s most high-profile attempt to move in this direction was an attempt to 
create a domestic policy think tank with the same relationship to the federal government’s 
department Housing and Urban Development that it had with the Air Force. This attempt failed, 
as the Ford Foundation backed other interests in the founding of the Urban Institute, but RAND 
was still able to gain footholds in social research through a program on Middle East studies 
(1967-1973) and by establishing an independent institute in New York City (1968-1975). Even 
during this early period, the use of independent consultants as evaluators of city programs led to 
significant criticism of the mayor’s office (Jardini, 1996).    
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Efficiency and Education that the work of the 1947 Hoover Commission exemplified a growing 
importance of economic analysis and a renewed interest in efficiency in the federal government. 
Following the commission’s 1949 Report, President Truman submitted over thirty reorganization 
plans for various executive offices. President Eisenhower also promoted efficiency-driven 
reforms, including the National Defense Reorganization Act of 1958. But this reorganization was 
only put into practice in 1960 under the new Secretary of Defense. 
When Robert McNamara became Defense Secretary, the influence of Systems Analysis on US 
national policy increased dramatically. Between 1961 and 1963 – what was known as the 
“McNamara revolution” in Office of the Secretary of Defense – military concerns of all sorts 
were redefined as economic problems reducible to the efficient allocation of resources. 
McNamara, who had been an accountant for the Ford Motor Company immediately after the 
war, sought to implement in the Department of Defense the top-down management techniques he 
had implemented at Ford, collectively known as “statistical control.88” He found willing 
colleagues at the RAND corporation, who shared his mindset with regard to efficiency and 
management and who were growing frustrated in their partnership with the US Air Force 
(Jardini, 1996). McNamara brought many former RAND employees into his office; his hope was 
to change DoD operations without changing the organizational structure of the military.  
                                                             
88 Statistical (Quality) Control methods originated with the work of Walter Shewhart in the 
1920s. They utilized sampling to ensure consistent quality of manufactured goods and to find 
variations in quality which could be remedied by improving aspects of the production process 
(Deming W. E., 1982). The techniques were adapted for use during World War II largely based 
the efforts of W. Edwards Deming, who proceeded to have a long career as a business consultant 
especially in post-war Japan. Perhaps ironically, Deming opposed setting numerical goals for 
employees.  
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The outcome of the reforms of the Department of Defense under Secretary McNamara was 
Planning, Programming and Budgeting, or PPBS (West, 2011). The principles were based 
largely on the work of two RAND economists, Charles Hitch and Roland McKean’s, in The 
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. As with Taylorist efficiency experts in the early 20th 
century, Systems Analysts made the analogy between their intended object, the conduct of 
warfare, and the efficient manufacture of raw materials: 
“…the problem of combining limited quantities of missiles, crews, bases, and 
maintenance facilities to ‘produce’ a strategic air force that will maximize deterrence of 
enemy attack is just as much a problem in economics (although in some respects a harder 
one) as the problem of combining limited quantities of coke, ore, scrap, blast furnaces, 
and mill facilities to produce steel in such a way as to maximize profits” (Hitch & 
McKean, 1960).  
PPBS became the standard for military planning at the highest levels shortly after McNamara’s 
appointment as Secretary. Charles Hitch was among the lead architects of the transformation of 
the DoD to the system. Its implementation had disastrous consequences for the conduct of the 
Vietnam War, during which goals were defined in quantitative terms. Donald Campbell (1975) 
retells the notorious ‘body counts’ as an example of his famous law about the corrosive effects 
that follow from the ‘worship of a quantitative indicator.’ McNamara later expressed regret over 
the excessive faith he had placed in rational management on camera in The Fog of War (Mehta, 
2013, pp. 70-71). Perhaps the film would have been more aptly titled “The Fog of Statistics.” But 
at the time, enthusiasm for PPBS and Systems Analysis generally was running high in 
Washington. 
The migration of PPBS to domestic policy took place amid political controversy over the Great 
Society programs. When the initial attempt to implement the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act 
through direct funding to locally-administered Community Action Programs proved divisive, the 
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Johnson administration reorganized the program along the PPBS model (Jardini, 1996, pp. 326-
340). In retrospect, the central problem with the Great Society programs was that, given a 
stretched federal budget due to the mounting costs of the war in Vietnam, the Office of 
Economic Opportunity was never able to implement its programs at an appropriate level to meet 
the problems of urban poverty (Walinsky, 1969). Furthermore, the collapse of these programs 
coincided with a backlash against such policies by working class whites who felt their benefits 
went overwhelmingly to African Americans, and who were being actively courted by Johnson’s 
challenger, George Wallace89 (Bush M. , 2004; Kaufmann, 2004). Nevertheless, its failure was 
attributed to the community action framework (Moynihan, 1970), which was largely phased out 
when the law came up for renewal in 1967.    
McNamara and systems analysis were influential among federal officials in charge of Great 
Society programs. The director of the Office of Economic Opportunity, Sargent Shriver, was in 
close communication with McNamara during the planning of the Economic Opportunity Act. 
Other McNamara supporters included economists in the Bureau of the Budget who had worked 
with Charles Hitch in the implementation of PPBS at the Department of Defense. When Shriver 
was relieved of his position at the OEO in 1968, he was replaced by a former Budget Bureau 
analyst (Moynihan, 1970, pp. 4-5). In August of 1965, President Johnson signed a directive 
ordering the implementation of the PPBS across all federal cabinet departments. Though 
outcomes in the domestic sphere were much more difficult to define, RAND employees and 
alumni were hired to work in various federal offices to manage the transition to the Systems 
                                                             
89 Additionally, many whites in both the north and the south began to respond negatively to a 
change in the character of the Civil Rights movement, which up until 1964 focused primarily on 
issues of integration, but shifted focus toward Black Power and Black Nationalism in the late 
1960s (Bush R. , 1999).  
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Analysis approach (Jardini, 1996, pp. 341-343). Moynihan later remarked that PPBS “colonized 
the federal establishment” (Mehta, 2013, p. 71). In the same year, the original Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act was passed, which allocated $3 billion for federal education funding. 
The vast expansion of systems analysis techniques at the federal level filtered down to state 
governments as well.  Alice Rivlin’s Systematic Thinking for Social Action crystallizes the PPBS 
approach outside of the military, and shows the degree to which the logic and practice of systems 
analysis were accepted in the halls of government.90 In her own words, “Missionaries no longer 
need to be sent to convert the heathen to the virtues of systems analysis” (Rivlin, 1971, p. 6). 
Other authors spoke about the potential of Systems Analysis in tones reminiscent of efficiency 
experts and intelligence testers: 
“(Systems Analysis) enables one to raise probing questions in a universal language. 
Systematic thinking is logical thinking…The range of potential applications…is nearly 
unlimited…Its major virtue is the enhancement of human judgment.” (Hartley, 1968, p. 
28) 
“The argument for systematic experimentation is straightforward: Information necessary 
to improve the effectiveness of social services is impossible to obtain in any other way.” 
(Rivlin, 1971, p. 108) 
With the application of PPBS and cost-benefit evaluations across the domestic policy spectrum, 
many compensatory programs were found to be ineffective or too expensive (Rossi & Freeman, 
1993). With regards to compensatory education programs, results were particularly dismal; 
                                                             
90 In 1968, Rivlin was appointed Assistant Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare in charge of planning and evaluation. The Secretary at the time was William Gorham, 
who began his career at the RAND Corporation, and would go on to found the Urban Institute 
based on a federal contract to evaluate President Johnson’s social welfare programs. In this way, 
the same procedure that gave rise to RAND in the military brought economics-driven 
policymaking to civilian life. Systematic Thinking was published based on a series of lectures 
given by Rivlin to the Brookings Institution in 1970. The two previous speakers in the same 
series were Charles Hitch and Charles Schultze; the latter was the director of the Bureau of the 
Budget in the Johnson Administration.  
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Levin (1972) notes that of 1,200 such programs evaluated by the Office of Education, only 10 
were shown to be successful. 
Systems Analysis in education saw its most notable exponent in 1966 with the publication of a 
report commissioned by the US Office of Education. The report – titled “Equality of Educational 
Opportunity” – was mandated by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and quickly became associated 
with its primary author, sociologist James S. Coleman, earning the nickname ‘The Coleman 
Report.’91 Based on a massive study involving nearly 650,000 students and teachers in over 
3,000 schools92, it examined the impact of school segregation in terms of “inputs” and “outputs.” 
The report found that most students attended racially segregated schools; white students attended 
the most segregated schools, while Black students were the most segregated among minority 
groups. Schools with mostly black students had fewer resources and were staffed by less 
credentialed and less educated teachers. Racial gaps in achievement – measured by ETS-created 
standardized tests of mathematics and verbal ability – were significant and increased with age. 
But the most notable finding regarded the relationship of school characteristics (inputs) to 
                                                             
91 The Coleman Report was not the first large-scale attempt to measure educational inputs and 
outputs and relate the two. Researchers at the American Institutes for Research (AIR) and the 
University of Pittsburgh, led by John C. Flanagan, conducted a national survey of high school 
students called Project TALENT. But as Rivlin notes, the study focused only on high school 
students, did not collect race data, and did not lend itself to socioeconomic comparisons (1971, p. 
13). Flanagan was associated with Air Force aptitude testing during World War II and founded 
AIR shortly after. The study was fully funded by the US Office of Education only after the 
Soviet launch of Sputnik.      
92 An important link to the previous section is that although the principal investigators, Coleman 
and Ernest Campbell, were both university academics, the survey coding and much of the 
analysis were conducted at the offices of Educational Testing Service. This is consistent with the 
increasing role of private research firms in conducting early social policy research in the 1960s 
(Bulmer, 1996). Perhaps more relevant, the director of the National Center for Education 
Statistics, Alexander Mood, had been a researcher with RAND Corporation from 1950 to 1955 
before founding his own OR firm. Mood supervised the Coleman Report and played an 
important role in computerizing the statistical arm of NCES (INFORMS, nd; Mosteller, 2009).    
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measured achievement (outputs): the report found that students’ family backgrounds and the 
characteristics of their peers in school played far greater roles in determining achievement than 
did any measure of school quality. The implication of this finding was that efforts to improve 
student achievement by increasing school resources – one of the intentions of the Johnson 
Administration – would do little in terms of educational output.93 For our purposes what is most 
important here is that the school was conceptualized in the language of the systems analyst. 
The general finding in Coleman that students’ outcomes varied significantly by school, ignoring 
the report’s important caveat regarding the broader social context, raised the issues of school 
performance and a new specter: accountability94. By 1971, states from New York to Kansas to 
California were calling for schools to be held responsible for student performance. Fred 
Hechinger called accountability the ‘great current controversy across the nation’ (Hechinger, 
1971).95 President Nixon’s Message on Education Reform included a section on “New 
Measurements of Achievement” which began with the question “What makes a good school?”; 
                                                             
93 Beyond the reports’ political impact, its repercussions for the community of researchers 
concerned with education were enormous. The shift in focus from educational inputs – facilities 
and resources material and human – to outputs like test scores marked a decisive change in the 
nature of discussions about what matters in schooling. In another chapter, I examine the 
evolution of Value-Added Assessment techniques, a story which begins with responses to and 
critiques of the Coleman Report.         
94 There is a complexity which should be mentioned at this point. On the one hand, the concerns 
over school equity indeed had factual grounding; Coleman brought a large amount of data to 
bear on a problem which was likely obvious to casual observers and social scientists alike. The 
point about moral panics and moral crusades is not that they create problems out of thin air, but 
rather that they mark a focal point for public outcry. As Tyack and Cuban (1995) and Labaree 
(2010) point out, the educational system has frequently been visited with reformers using moral 
outrage as a tool. What I attempt to add to this discussion is the observation that the chosen 
target depends heavily on the state of social science and its techniques. 
95 Ironically, in the same article, Hechinger quotes former RAND economist and Systems 
Analysis pioneer Charles Hitch – then serving as University of California President – in 
opposition to Governor Ronald Reagan’s call to impose accountability metrics on the UC 
system. Such measures, Hitch said, ‘would reduce our flexibility to make best use of our 
resources.’ It’s rough when the axe swings in the other direction.  
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therein, he advocated a shift in focus from educational ‘inputs’ to ‘outputs’, emphasized the need 
to develop ‘more sensitive measurements’ of school quality, and called for accountability, 
though in vague terms (Nixon, 1970).  
As with Systems Analysis in general, its application to school accountability was trumpeted by 
supporters as the antidote for all the ills of public education. “Educational Engineering,” as 
Assistant Education Secretary Leon Lessinger called it, would facilitate educational 
accountability for results. Without specifics, he suggested that accountability in itself had the 
capacity to affect change in every aspect of education from curriculum to student boredom to 
school segregation (Lessinger, 1970; 1971).96 
Some of the first experiments with school accountability went under the heading of performance 
contracting, in which outside firms were brought in to teach underperforming students and were 
paid on the basis of students’ growth on standardized achievement tests. Beginning with a 
program in Texarkana, Texas in 1969, by 1972 there were around 150 performance contracts in 
effect throughout the country. Teachers’ and Administrators’ unions reacted harshly to the 
introduction of performance contracts; “Hucksters in Our Schools!” was the title of a 1970 article 
in American Teacher addressing the issue; teachers in Gary, Indiana threatened to strike in the 
same year over a performance contract in that city. Some test-makers also reacted unfavorably 
toward this use of standardized tests in performance contracting, as it became clear that the tests 
were directing instruction (Mecklenberger, 1972; Ascher, 1996). The push for performance 
                                                             
96 Lessinger was perhaps the most vocal spokesperson for educational accountability of the era. 
His 1970 book, titled Every Kid a Winner: Accountability in Education was described as the 
“bible of accountability,” and many authors followed suit with more specific accountability titles 
in the next five years. 
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contracting ultimately ended in controversies over contractors’ ‘teaching to the test’ and the 
lackluster results of program evaluations (Rosenthal J. , 1972).97 
The first major municipal effort at school accountability was initiated in New York City. Mayor 
John Lindsay was enamored with the McNamara approach to government administration, and 
had the cooperation of Albert Shanker, the head of the United Federation of Teachers. The 1969 
contract between the union and the city explicitly notes a joint agreement on professional 
accountability (Lessinger, 1971, p. 63). The $100,000 contract to design the system was awarded 
to ETS; reflecting the concerns of the teacher’s union, ETS intended to construct a system which 
controlled for students’ background characteristics, a point which was criticized by educational 
psychologist and civil rights activist Kenneth B. Clark. Echoing claims of the ‘soft bigotry of 
low expectations” 30 years later, Clark contended that this sort of system would “formalize and 
give sanction to negative expectations for poor and minority children” (Buder, 1971). Both the 
New York City Board of Education and the schools Chancellor emphasized that the program 
would not be used in a punitive fashion against individual teachers or administrators, and that 
evaluation would be of school performance in the aggregate (Hechinger, 1971). Other 
accountability designs provoked much resistance among educators. In 1973, the issue of 
evaluation provoked a six week-long teacher’s strike in Detroit (Stevens, 1973). Shortly after the 
New York City plan was instituted in 1974, the Schools Chancellor was urged by the president 
of the Board of Education to address a potential cheating scandal (Buder, 1974). Ultimately, the 
                                                             
97 The contractor in Texarkana, TX – Dorsett Educational Systems Inc. – was found to be 
instructing students on the same items contained in the evaluation exam (Stake, 1971). In 1970, 
the Office of Economic Opportunity conducted an 18-site experiment with Performance 
Contracting. Batelle Laboratories was the first evaluator to release its results, which showed no 
differences between students taught by contractors and those taught at public schools. The 
RAND Corporation, which further evaluated the experiment, found no evidence of better 
achievement at any of the sites (Ascher, 1996). 
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accountability program was overshadowed by greater concerns surrounding the decentralization 
of school control and later by the city’s fiscal crisis. 
By 1975, accountability was ceasing to be a buzz-word in discussions of educational policy. 
Schools in large American cities were more actively coping with budget crises as their tax bases 
migrated to the suburbs.  Concerns about educational equity persisted, but were generally 
expressed in questions of school funding. Three major cases in the California Supreme Court, all 
titled Serrano vs. Priest, were focused on this question; similar cases were argued in many states 
under headings of ‘funding equity’ and ‘funding adequacy’ (Bollinger, 2003).98 But perceptions 
of the concept of school quality were dramatically altered by the application of systems analysis, 
a change which would set the stage for education reform battles in the 21st century. Because SA, 
aided by standardized testing and school surveys (each products and producers of previous moral 
upsurges, as documented above) made possible the direct comparison of schools, the notion of 
good and bad schools and the distinction between the two became important.  
But as school accountability faded into the relative background of educational policy efforts, new 
technological innovation and political framing was already underway. One educator in 1975 
presciently wrote: 
“Teachers know all about panaceas. Accountability was the most recent remedy for the 
ills of American schools. After some obligatory grumbling and retooling, teachers made 
their peace with it… This interesting notion has useful possibilities. But teachers may not 
be able to develop them, for a newer panacea is upon them. Productivity has surfaced.” 
(Miller F. , 1975) 
                                                             
98 State and federal courts have heard many school funding equity cases in since the 1970s, but 
there has been one generally constant feature: the expert testimony of Value-Added pioneer Eric 
Hanushek. He has testified on behalf of the state in twenty such cases, and his research even 
informed the Supreme Court decision in the 2009 Horne v. Flores decision, where the majority 
opinion suggested, in Hanushek’s language, that school performance measures should focus on 
output rather than input. This will be revisited in the final chapter.   
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The next chapter traces the developments of both the technology of evaluation and the attendant 
political context in terms of teacher productivity. It also leads us to the state of the art with 
Value-Added Assessment. 
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Chapter 5: Value-Added in Private: Developing techniques to measure teacher 
productivity 
 
The last chapter discussed the relationship between educational politics and assessment 
technology since the earliest days of public schooling.  This chapter will resume immediately 
where the last left off and take us directly through the development of value-added assessment. 
The focus will be the development of value-added as theoretical model, practical technology and 
policy tool, as well the discursive and political shifts which accompanied this development.  
One of the pioneers of value-added research crystallized the shift in the approach to studying 
educational systems in a presentation to the American Education Research Association in 2000. 
Though his reference is the Dallas school district, it could easily be applied to the country as a 
whole: 
For many years the District and Department followed what was the classical evaluation 
approach of the late 1960s and early 1970s…Good program evaluation was the key…In 
the 1980s we tried a comprehensive program to identify and reward effective 
schools…from 1997 conducting research using teacher effectiveness data (Mendro & 
Bembry, 2000, pp. 2-3).  
Beyond data and technology, how can we understand the last 20 years of education reform from 
a political/ideological perspective? Anthony Picciano and Joel Spring’s (2013) work on the 
“Education-Industrial Complex” posits a network of actors which has taken shape in the last 20 
years of education policymaking in the US. In seeking to understand how technological changes 
have been (often uncritically) pushed into American schooling, the authors utilize two important 
concepts: “flexians” and shadow government. The former term refers to individuals who move 
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between for-profit, nonprofit, and government employment. Flexians develop networks which 
take advantage of the executive power of governments, the influence of non-profits, and the 
economic power of corporations to promote their personal agendas and often to enrich 
themselves. In an era when governments, particularly at the state and local levels, are in financial 
trouble and increasingly turning functions over to private firms – what Wedel calls ‘Swiss-
cheese government’ (Picciano & Spring, p. 18) –  opens many doors for flexians to become part 
of government networks without being accountable to elected officials or the public. In this way 
flexian networks – including unaccountable private companies and non-profit foundations – 
come to constitute a shadow government which can promote its favored ideology. 
Picciano and Spring argue that technology is the primary ideology for so-called flexians 
operating in the education system. However, they are not the only scholars to observe this 
unbridled enthusiasm for all things digital and algorithmic. Evgeny Morozov (2013) offers a 
wide ranging critique of such ambitious number-crunchers – many of whom make money 
working for Silicon Valley firms – who believe that better algorithms and accessible data can 
solve problems that have challenged the political process for generations. He names this 
phenomenon ‘technological solutionism’ and suggests that their quest to remake the world in the 
image of computer software and “the internet” is misguided. Further he argues that if successful, 
technologically managed politics would undermine the very human freedom that it seeks to 
enhance. In this chapter, we will see how an exponential growth of computing power coincides 
with political developments in education and thus enabled value-added to flourish in policy 
circles. 
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From Coleman to A Nation At Risk: Economic competitiveness and the narrative of school 
failure 
 
By the middle of the 1970s, research on schooling had begun to move away from the program 
evaluation model and systems analysis, even as school systems at all levels continued to rely on 
these methods. As we have seen, these techniques were deployed partly in reaction to the 
massive Great Society programs begun under Lyndon Johnson (Moynihan, 1970; Jardini, 2000).  
Perhaps the most important piece of education research in that era, the 1966 Coleman Report, 
advanced a controversial position: for student outcomes, in-school factors matter substantially 
less than out-of-school factors such as students’ home environment and peers.  Despite this 
major finding, the Coleman data’s unique feature of linking students to schools and teachers 
provided the first opening for research on so-called educational productivity.  Among the 
reactions to that finding lay the seeds of the present debate over teacher quality, though it would 
take 40 years to appear in its current shape. 
Before discussing the details of how assessment technology developed, certain contexts need 
consideration. First, the Cold War and real or perceived competition with the Soviet Union ebbed 
as the Vietnam War ended.  The end of this ideological conflict may have dampened American 
policymakers’ appetites for progressive reforms, as they were no longer necessary to maintain 
capitalism’s appeal among a restive public99. Thus, even though the envisioned ‘Great Society’ 
                                                             
99 It could be argued that the decline and eventual demise of the Soviet Union opened up space 
for the resurgence of neo-Classical economic theories which argue against government 
interference and in favor of so-called ‘free markets’ in all aspects of social life. Neo-classical 
resurgence animated many educational reform efforts throughout the 1980s and 1990s, most 
notably the educational voucher and school choice movements, which can be traced back to 
Milton Friedman’s writings in the early 1960s. John Chubb and Terry Moe’s (1990) Politics, 
Markets and America’s Schools popularized the argument for privatization by arguing that more 
autonomous private schools outperform public schools which are weighed down by the 
democratic political process.  
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was never achieved, the pragmatic reasons for pursuing it were gone. At the same time, 
continued demographic shifts in the nation’s urban centers – “white flight” – accelerated in the 
wake of attempts to desegregate public schools. These shifts placed great financial strains on 
many cities, making it unlikely that local leaders, even if they were interested in progressive 
school policies, would be able to afford them. The fights over school funding in the Serrano v. 
Priest cases in California were partly a result of the fiscal choices of cash-strapped cities.  
So public schooling again found itself under duress, but shifts in the nature of the economy also 
made a dramatic impact on education discourse. The 1970s marked the beginning of the post-
Fordist period which was characterized by deindustrialization, decreased reliance on skilled labor 
in manufacturing, an increase in service sector employment, and technological upgrades to 
certain occupations. These changes served to increase emphasis on education as an economic 
growth engine both at the societal and individual level100. Human Capital theory, though 
traceable to the work of Adam Smith, is more commonly associated with economists of the 
1960s, particularly Theodore Schultz, Gary Becker and Jacob Mincer. The theory posits 
education as a form of capital investment; just as upgrades to machinery render production more 
efficient, so do upgrades to the educational level of the workforce. Formal schooling is offered as 
the key example of a human capital investment, and is said to offer returns to both individual 
workers who upgrade their skills and to societal groups that expand access to schooling. Despite 
substantial challenges to its central tenets (the relation between education and the labor force, 
and the rational decision-making of individuals), human capital continues to occupy a central 
                                                             
100 This link between educational expansion and economic growth was first theorized by 
Economist Gary Becker in 1962 in his book Human Capital. The shift away from manufacturing 
in the most developed countries makes it easier to argue for this connection, whether or not it 
actually exists.  
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place in educational policy-making in the US. Simply put, education is conceived of as an 
economic imperative both for individuals and groups and for the nation as a whole. This 
conception has helped fuel panic over schooling since the 1980s.  
A related technical innovation was the introduction of a number of international education 
assessments, which sought to compare the knowledge of students from industrialized countries. 
The International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, which has existed 
in some form since 1958, began attempting to measure and compare educational progress among 
countries in the early 1980s with its Second International Mathematics (SIMS) and Science 
(SISS) studies. In 1991 the organization administered its first Reading Literacy Study.  The Third 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS), conducted in 1995, became the first 
regular international assessment of educational performance, now repeated every four years, 
along with the Progress in International Reading Literacy Study (International Association for 
the Evaluation of Educational Achievement, nd).  The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) followed suit in the late 1990s with its own comparative test of all 
subjects, the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). It is important to note that 
both the impetus for and technology of national assessment originated in the US – the TIMSS 
program was largely adapted from the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) 
which has been administered in the US in some form since the 1960s (Beaton, et al., 2011).101   
                                                             
101 One motivating force behind the expansion NAEP was the annual release of ACT and SAT 
test scores. In the 1970s, reaction to media panic over the declining scores on college entrance 
exams – which tested only those students interested in attending college – crystallized the need 
for a complete national indicator. The NAEP also underwent significant changes in the 1980s; 
before 1983, the exam did not allow for comparisons of states or school districts. But technical 
innovations including Item Response Theory scaling and new sampling techniques allowed for 
such group comparisons and for tracking of trends in performance (Beaton, et al., 2011). 
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Concern over educational quality from the mid-1980s forward was first crystallized in a 1983 
report commissioned by President Ronald Reagan, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for 
Educational Reform (ANR). The report framed deficiencies in the US school system in the 
context of rising international economic competition and stagnating domestic social mobility, 
and likened existing educational policy to “unilateral disarmament.” The claim that a “rising tide 
of mediocrity” was threatening America’s economic dominance was based primarily on reported 
declines in SAT scores and the results of international assessments of academic achievement, 
which frequently placed the US low among industrialized countries. Given that the federal 
government does not directly control education policy, ANR urged policymakers in the states to 
focus on basic competencies and to devote particular attention to science and mathematics 
education.102   
Notably, the report does not name teachers as the source of the problem, but emphasizes a need 
to change school policy from the outside – meaning by interest groups not immediately 
connected to schooling. As during the Cold War, emphasis was on the rigor of coursework, 
especially in high schools.  Other cited issues were the amount of school time spent on studying 
(as opposed to extracurricular activities) and lowered selectivity among colleges. Teachers are 
placed among the victims of the school systems and are said to be necessary partners in efforts to 
change the schools.103 The only problem attributed to teachers directly is a lack of qualifications 
in needed subject areas such as mathematics, natural sciences, and computer technology. But the 
                                                             
102 Although ANR read more like a manifesto than a policy research report, it was supported by a 
detailed analysis of students’ high school transcripts, prepared by noted education policy 
researcher Clifford Adelman.   
103 A Nation at Risk is a political document and so one could regard the emphasis on school 
systems rather than individual teachers as an attempt to prevent a backlash by teachers’ groups. 
But later reform reports go much further in positioning teachers as an obstacle to the desired 
changes to the school system.  
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blame for this is placed at the feet of schools of education, which were charged with emphasizing 
methodology over content.104 
ANR resonated among policymakers and business leaders. Mehta (2013)notes the proliferation 
of reports by various state education agencies echoing its sentiments. ANR juxtaposed stubborn 
educational insiders pursuing their narrow interests with external reformers acting on behalf of 
the public good. The more important shift in language was a contrast to the Coleman Report’s 
suggestion that schools were unlikely to overcome larger social forces; here, schools were held 
solely responsible for a perceived decline in American global economic standing and for 
stagnating social mobility. Similarly, ANR’s emphasis on economic competiveness and higher 
level skills required for the jobs of the future raised the stakes of education reform to no less than 
the future of the country.   
Three years later, the focus on the schools in general would be narrowed to educators by another 
government report. In August of 1986, the National Governor’s Association published and 
adopted Time for Results, which urged state governments to “make it clear to teacher 
organizations, administrators, and school boards that they must consider new ways of doing 
business” (Kean, 1986). Like A Nation at Risk, it emphasized a connection between education 
reform, economic competitiveness and social mobility. In a summary of the report’s findings, 
one author states that the governors’ “highest priorities are jobs and economic development” 
(Nathan, 1986). But taking the claims of ANR as given, Time for Results moves to suggest 
accountability strategies to measure student learning and reward or punish schools for their 
                                                             
104 Teacher education was a major focus of many other reports that appeared in the 1980s. 
Specifically, a number of reports called for a five-year teacher education program and increased 
efforts to attract and retain mathematics and science teachers (Sadker & Zittleman, 2007).  
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results. The task force on school management – headed by then governor Bill Clinton –urged 
school systems to tie certification of principals to student outcomes (Clinton, 1986). Other NGA 
task forces raised issues of educational technology, school choice, and efficient use of school 
buildings. Like most educational reform efforts of the 20th century, the outline of the Governors’ 
action plan stressed educational efficiency – defined as the most progress on test scores and 
graduation for the least additional cost. 
The report’s section on teaching reform stops short of calling for teacher evaluation based on 
student results, but raises a specter of unionized teachers as an obstacle to reform. The NGA 
chairman’s overview claims that governors have had to battle with educators to secure real 
reforms (Alexander L. , 1986). In co-chair Thomas Kean’s summary of the teaching task force 
report, the “total school” is the chosen unit of analysis in order to “foster faculty and staff 
cooperation.” At the same time, however, the task force repeatedly referred to “organized 
education groups” and “educational interest groups” whose agendas conflict with “broad public 
concern.” Specifically, Kean challenges educators to justify calls for increased funding and 
professional discretion by delivering results, which are only defined in the report by standardized 
tests. The task force recommends using these measures unless educators can come up with other 
ways of assessing progress (Kean, 1986, pp. 206-207). Broadly speaking, Time for Results offers 
teachers and schools autonomy only at the price of accountability.  
Not every commissioned report on education advanced the same claims of educational decline, 
economic peril, and needed accountability. In 1990, the U.S. Department of Energy‘s Sandia 
National Laboratory reported on historical indicators of school performance and projected 
technological needs of the nation’s workforce. In the first case, the report finds no evidence of a 
decline in educational quality, though the authors are careful to suggest that improvement was 
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possible and necessary. SAT score declines were found to be well-explained by a changing 
population of test-takers, and National Assessment of Educational Progress test scores showed 
no evidence of decline in mathematics or science (Carson, Huelskamp, & Woodall, 1992, pp. 
270-271). On the latter question, the report runs counter to the human capital narrative advanced 
in A Nation At Risk and Time for Results.  Citing data from a number of surveys, the authors 
argue that technical skills are not in demand among employers and that, if anything, the 
production of science and engineering degree-holders is in excess of demand. Further, the 
authors suggest that even if American students are performing relatively poorly on international 
standardized tests, their later outcomes such as college attendance, degree attainment, and skilled 
technical employment are comparatively high. In sum, the Sandia Report shows that critics of 
the American school system at the time were wrong on points of fact. But, as Berliner and Biddle 
(1995) note, these findings were suppressed by the administration of George H.W. Bush, as they 
contradicted its education reform agenda.  
Critiques of the Coleman Report and the ‘Education Production Function’ 
 
In 1966, immediately following the release of Coleman, a group of education researchers was 
convened to discuss the survey and its findings. These meetings, called the Harvard Seminar on 
the Equality of Educational Opportunity Report (SEEOR), sought to reanalyze the vast data 
collected and further interrogate the main findings.  In general, these seminars confirmed what 
the original report had said about the relationship between school inputs and outputs, that 
variation in academic performance was higher within schools than between schools and thus 
more attributable to student characteristics than to anything that could be easily changes about 
school resources, including staff.  
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But one group of critics suggested that the report’s data on school quality and its analytic 
methods were inadequate for discovering the relationship between school quality and student 
academic achievement. They further argued that the data and methods systematically favored the 
‘no school effects’ conclusion. Among the problems, these critics suggested that teacher 
characteristics should have been included in the group of school input variables (Hanushek & 
Kain, 1972). Eric Hanushek, at the time a graduate student at MIT, was one of the participants 
arguing this position.105 His doctoral dissertation was his first attempt to revise the Coleman 
analysis. Therein, he further developed the ‘teacher effect’ concept in regards to racial 
differences in academic achievement. Shortly thereafter, building on an argument which couldn’t 
be directly tested with Coleman Report data, Hanushek used longitudinal data to estimate teacher 
effects (Hanushek E. , 1970). In a subsequent article, he used achievement gains between the 
first and third grades as an outcome measure (Hanushek E. , 1971). This change in approach 
marked the birth of value-added assessment in education.106  
Other researchers saw problems with the measurement of educational productivity similar to 
those of the systems analysis approach. In a 1970 paper, Samuel Bowles discussed the theoretical 
and practical issues with attempting to quantify what and how well schools produce. At the 
conceptual level, researchers lack a clear theory of student learning with which to specify the 
production process. Similarly, even if learning outcomes are accepted as one goal of schooling, 
                                                             
105 Hanushek also figures into the last part of the story in the previous chapter. He was a 
consultant for the RAND corporation from 1969-1973, during which time he published a report 
titled “The Value of Teachers in Teaching.” In his expert witness testimony in Vergara v. 
California, examined in the next chapter, we learn how this research figured into his first expert 
witness testimony in the 1973 Serrano v. Priest case (Mar 24 AM, 0h18m). 
106 Even at this early point, the policy implications of Value-Added were quite clear. The author 
suggests that swapping teachers at the bottom of the verbal ability scale for those at the top 
would produce dramatic achievement gains (Hanushek E. , 1971, p. 286). 
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there are certainly others. Bowles called school output “multidimensional with a vengeance” 
(Bowles, 1970, p. 23). Practically, researchers could not control variation in the school situation 
or the schooling process. Further, schools do not behave in the ways efficiency-driven 
researchers would like them to, frequently making decisions based on criteria other than the 
maximization of output.  Bowles argued that available data are not precise enough to support 
even an approximate model of student learning. Beyond this, he follows Coleman and others in 
stressing that given how much learning takes place outside of school, the potential productivity 
of schools is likely to be overstated by those interested in interrogating the concept of 
educational production (pp. 40-41).  
But to move beyond simulations and secondary data analysis, Value-Added assessment would 
require massive data collection projects. The city of Dallas and the state of Tennessee were the 
first testing grounds for such efforts. 
Early Value-Added Systems: DVAAS and TVAAS 
 
Dallas, Texas was the first municipality to evaluate education using value-added techniques 
(Stone, 2000). Beginning in the late 1960s, and accelerating after a lawsuit in 1971, the Dallas 
Independent School District was charged with assessing the effectiveness of its desegregation 
initiatives. As was shown in the previous chapter, accountability was a policy buzzword at the 
time, and was enmeshed with desegregation efforts. William Webster was in charge of research 
and development for the Dallas schools and was responsible for compliance with state-mandated 
accountability (Cunningham, 1997). He is regarded as primarily responsible for the Dallas 
Value-Added Accountability System (DVAAS). 
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In 1984, the district began using a version of value-added based on regression techniques to 
evaluate schools.107 That system was abandoned and replaced in 1990 by another which used 
hierarchical linear modeling; another iteration of DVAAS, which could be used to evaluate 
individual teachers, was field tested in 1996.108 Despite the ability to assess teachers, the 
Commission which created the system emphasized identifying effective schools and merit pay 
(Webster & Mendro, 1997).   
By this time, many researchers had expressed concern about the use of student achievement data 
in evaluation of teacher performance, owing to the fallout over merit pay policies in previous 
decades (Webster & Mendro, 1995, p. 393). Technically proficient auditors expressed 
reservations about the Dallas system, noting that its estimates of teacher effects would be 
unreliable (Thum & Bryk, 1997). More holistic critics suggested potential unintended 
consequences of an evaluation system based on high-stakes multiple choice tests – including 
widespread cheating, narrowing of the curriculum, and negative impacts on school culture 
(Sykes, 1997). The architects of the system responded that despite its limitations, the value-
                                                             
107 Dallas’ move to evaluate schools based on test results was followed by Texas as whole in 
1990, when the State Board of Education implemented the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills 
(Cruse & Twing, 2000). Jennings (2005) notes that Texas schools in this period began to 
emphasize data-driven decision-making.  
108 An important feature of the Dallas accountability process was that it included various 
stakeholders – including teachers and parents – in deciding how to weight various student tests 
and which demographic controls (“fairness variables”) to include in the prediction equation. The 
teacher evaluation pilot was politically contentious, particularly the creation of a Teacher 
Effectiveness index which ranked teachers into Tier 1 (top 40% effectiveness across a school 
district), Tier 2 (next 50%), and Tier 3 (bottom 10%). This index was dropped from the final 
teacher evaluation reports (Webster W. , Mendro, Orsak, Weerasinghe, & Bembry, 1997).  
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added assessment system would be a fairer means of assessing schools and teachers than other 
systems currently in use. 109 
Dallas’ foray into Value-Added assessment is important not only for its novelty. The model of 
accountability created there would substantially influence the Texas model implemented by 
George W. Bush, which would then be replicated in NCLB. Sandy Kress, a Democratic Party 
operative in the 1970s and 1980s, was president of the board of trustees for the Dallas Public 
Schools and a zealous believer in the power of accountability (Donald, 2000). Before becoming 
its president, he led the board’s Commission for Educational Excellence which recommended 
Mendro’s Value-Added system and gave it consequences for schools and teachers (Bembry, 
Bearden, & Mendro, 1997). After four divisive years serving on the school board, Kress 
resigned, and quickly became engaged in promoting educational accountability across Texas. He 
earned the favor of George W. Bush, and despite partisan disagreements, was the chief promoter 
of the “Texas miracle” – overall test score gains and a closing of the racial achievement gap 
                                                             
109 Representative of the status of ‘rigorous science’ in educational research discussed in the next 
section, Webster and his colleagues devote careful attention to the technical criticisms of Thum 
and Bryk, while regarding Sykes’ thoughtful and perhaps more relevant critique of the Dallas 
Value-Added System as ‘Pie in the Sky.’ 
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attributed to the Texas accountability system110 – during Bush’s presidential campaign and 
became the key architect of NCLB’s accountability provisions.111  
The first state to implement data collection for value-added assessment was Tennessee, which 
has never been shy about novel education policy. In 1983, the state enacted a merit pay system 
called the Career Ladder System. Two years later, it hosted perhaps the largest randomized 
educational experiment in US history, Project STAR, to assess the effects of class size on student 
achievement. Ceperly and Reel (1997) note that Tennessee was pushed into accountability 
reform by a 1988 lawsuit over school funding equity112. As a result of the lawsuit, legislators 
needed business support to raise taxes and equalize school funding. In return, they promised the 
state’s business roundtable that schools and teachers would be held accountable for performance.  
William L. Sanders of the University of Tennessee113 had begun pilot studies of a value-added 
assessment system as early as 1982 with funding from the state’s department of education (Ball, 
                                                             
110 The “Texas miracle” is now widely regarded as a myth and a case study in how testing 
regimes can pervert the educational process. Many point to Texas as the archetype of 
“educational triage” – focusing instruction on students who are on the verge of being ranked 
proficient by a test – while ignoring both those who will definitely pass and definitely fail 
(Booher-Jennings, 2005). The parallel in studies of social service accountability is “creaming” – 
prioritizing the easiest cases when one is rated on the number of successful outcomes (Miller, 
Roby, & van Steenwijk, 1970; Cohen N. A., 2014). Others note that Texas saw a dramatic 
increase in the number of special education placements as average scores were on the rise – 
special education students’ scores did not count in accountability metrics (Haney, 2000). 
Observers likened this practice to a form of creative accounting which bolstered Texas’ 
reputation without improving its educational quality (Bernstein J. , 2002). 
111 Illustrative of the Picciano and Spring’s ‘flexians,’ Kress now works as a lobbyist for a 
number of private education firms including Pearson, Teach for America, and Wireless 
Generation (Vasquez-Heilig, 2013).   
112 The lawsuit, Tennessee Small Schools v. McWherter, went through a number of appeals 
which concluded in 2006. 
113 Before his research moved to education, Sanders was an agricultural statistician in Tennessee 
whose research focused on reproduction in livestock, specifically how to parse out the influence 
of genetics from that of environment. In the late 1970s, then Governor Lamar Alexander wanted 
to use student achievement data for the state’s merit pay program. Amid controversy over the 
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2013; Sanders & McLean, 1984). The result of these efforts was the Tennessee Value-Added 
Assessment System (TVAAS). The system was immediately popular with state lawmakers, and 
Sanders became a popular lecturer both inside the state and elsewhere. The primary argument for 
its superiority over other means of test-based evaluation was that it used gain-scores or student 
achievement growth, rather than raw test score data, to compare school effectiveness. As in 
Dallas, Tennessee regarded this as fairer because it seemingly levels the playing field between 
schools by not punishing those that serve low-scoring students.  
When Tennessee passed its Education Improvement Act in 1991, Sanders’ system was the 
centerpiece of the legislation. The law specifically mandated the use of TVAAS. The system 
made use of norm-referenced tests the state’s Comprehensive Assessment Plan (TCAP) for its 
annual data.114 Between 1991 and 2003, the state paid over $5 million to Sanders’ research outfit 
just to cover the data analysis contract (Smith, 2004). The first few years of data collection still 
focused on school-level analysis, but in 1994 student and teacher information were linked in the 
database, allowing for Value-Added measurement of individual teachers. Since 1993, value-
added reports on schools and school systems have been part of the public record in Tennessee; 
teacher reports only commenced in 1996 and are only distributed to teachers and administrators 
                                                             
appropriateness of using such data, Sanders used agricultural value-added methods with data 
from Knox County to make the case that the technique was viable. The initial study, concluded 
in 1984, failed to gain the attention of legislators (Archer, 1999).   
114 A departure from earlier education evaluation laws, the Tennessee EIA specified that TVAAS 
would be used to evaluate individual teachers’ contributions to student achievement. TVAAS’ 
use of norm-referenced tests is also a significant detail. Norm-referenced tests are not designed 
to reflect mastery of content areas; they instead seek to rank students by using small batches of 
questions covering broad areas of knowledge. The SAT is an example of a norm-references test. 
Tennessee’s norm-referenced tests compared Tennessee students with other students around the 
country. Criterion-referenced tests are designed to assess mastery of specified curriculum goals. 
Tennessee’s criterion-referenced exams were aligned with its state curriculum (Baker & Xu, 
1995, p. 3). Thus, the tests used to assess teacher quality were not actually based on what 
teachers were expected to teach. 
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(Kupermintz, 2003). Furthermore, the state placed limitations on which student achievement 
scores could be used to determine teachers’ value-added scores (Baker & Xu, 1995).   
 Sanders’ team collected annual data on all of the state’s public school students. Sanders 
recognized that in addition to the evaluation function the data would serve within Tennessee, the 
scope and nature of the data would have effects on educational research well beyond state 
borders. Many of the conclusions drawn from early analysis of Tennessee data have become 
recurring themes regarding the merits of Value-Added methods, most notably the claim of 
residual effects of ‘highly effective’ teachers in subsequent years (Sanders & Horn, 1998). But at 
this stage, Sanders was still careful to note that while VAA data could be valuable for 
understanding how teachers impact student learning, it should not be used to make high-stakes 
decisions: 
“We hope the data are used for diagnostic purposes…This is about trying to improve our 
schools, not about embarrassing teachers (Hill D. , 2000).” 
“To my knowledge, no teacher has been fired where the reports were the justification for 
it. This is not about firing people. This is about measurement, about producing what I call 
the river of diagnostic information to show individual teachers where their relative 
strengths and weaknesses are (Clowes, 1999).” 
Echoing the wisdom of Coleman, Sanders also remarked that schools and teachers should not be 
held to account for societal problems beyond their control (Archer, 1999). 
Used for consequence or not, TVAAS was subject to criticism early on because it did not 
account for student background variables in the determination of teacher effects, and for its 
questionable handling of missing data (Darlington, 1997). The method used in the early Dallas 
system did include background measures, similar to systems currently in place in New York and 
Los Angeles. But Sanders devoted much time to arguing that background characteristics were 
superfluous to a model which included individual students’ prior test scores (Sanders & Horn, 
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1994; Sanders & Horn, 1998).115 Another important criticism focused on the complexity of the 
statistical techniques, which rendered the assessment incomprehensible to nearly everyone 
directly affected by it (Baker & Xu, 1995; Popham, 1997). The TVAAS system provided an 
important model for this method of teacher and school evaluation, but subsequent political 
developments would push Value-Added into the education reform spotlight. 
Clinton, Bush, and NCLB:  Education Science and the Focus on Teachers 
 
While much criticism is leveled at No Child Left Behind (NCLB), the educational program 
enacted by President George W. Bush, its emphasis on measurable outputs and accountability 
has its root in the educational agenda of President Bill Clinton.116 The Improving America’s 
Schools Act (IASA), Clinton’s reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 
for the first time tied Title I funding to schools’ adoption of testing programs, and required 
districts to take corrective action against schools not meeting improvement standards (Education 
Week, 1994; Thomas & Brady, 2005). Clinton’s ‘Goals 2000’ legislation, signed just before the 
IASA, included a grant program intended to leverage state-level cooperation with the president’s 
                                                             
115 The general consensus among VA researchers is that the models should include controls for 
background characteristics. I’ve already shown in chapter 2 how background characteristics at 
the school level impact teacher VA rankings.  
116 Some trace this lineage back even further to the convening of the Charlottesville Education 
Summit by President George H. W. Bush in 1989. But the goals set by this summit were only 
given any legal force after Clinton, himself a key architect of the summit, was elected in 1992. 
Clinton had also been influenced by his experience in the National Governor’s association – 
during which he was a contributor to the above-mentioned Time for Results. Bush’s legislative 
attempt, America 2000, failed due to opposition from conservatives in his party, who argued it 
was an incursion on states’ legislative territory. Nonetheless, the bill was notable for its emphasis 
on uniform national academic standards (McDonnell, 2005).  
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education agenda (Heise, 1994) – bearing much resemblance President Barack Obama’s Race to 
the Top program 15 years later.117  
But the overlap among the education policies of two Republicans and one Democrat itself needs 
explanation. Goals 2000’s emphasis on standards-based reforms was mirrored in No Child Left 
Behind, as was its emphasis on the expansion of educational technology. In their similarities we 
can see the long shadow of A Nation at Risk, both Bushes and Clinton made use of the rhetoric of 
an underprepared workforce in need of experience with new technology. Looking at the evolving 
role of the federal government in education, McDonnell (2005) suggests that the common 
experiences of Lamar Alexander (the elder Bush’s secretary of education), Bill Clinton, and 
George W. Bush as governors in southern states helps explain their similar attraction to 
standardized testing as a means of measuring academic progress. As we have already seen, two 
of the three southern states (Texas and Tennessee) gave birth to Value-Added Assessment.  
Rudalevige (2003) contends that in Congress, Republicans and many Democrats had grown 
frustrated with the lack of results – however defined – from money spent on education. In her 
analysis of the same period, Elizabeth DeBray (2006) notes that in the 1990s, conservative think-
tanks began to take clear positions with respect to education policy – specifically promoting 
school choice, vouchers, and other market-based reforms. Organizations like the American 
Enterprise Institute, the Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, and the Hoover Institution began 
drafting education policy platforms, which until then had been the province of more centrist and 
                                                             
117 After the election of a Republican majority in the House of Representatives under Speaker 
Newt Gingrich, congressional Republicans fought Goals 2000 – particularly its emphasis on 
national education standards.  
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liberal groups (pp. 24-26).118 This active conservative influence drove education policy further to 
the ideological right and fostered a hostility toward both public schools and unionized teachers.  
This hostile climate took one form in the push for scientifically based research in education. The 
first attempt in this direction came with the 1999 Reading Excellence Act. Another competitive 
grant program for the states, the REA defined ‘scientific reading research’ as “grounded in 
rigorous, systematic and objective procedures…employ[ing] systematic, empirical methods that 
draw on observation or experiment, involve rigorous data analyses that are designed to test the 
stated hypotheses and justify the general conclusions drawn” (Baez & Boyles, 2009, p. 6). 
Another piece of legislation, drafted in 2000, aimed to reform the Department of Education’s 
Office of Educational Research and Improvement (now the Institute for Education Sciences), 
included a similar definition of scientific research, but in the context of a bill which would affect 
the practice of research (Eisenhart & Towne, 2003).119 But these were precursors to a much more 
wide-reaching debate over what constitutes scientific research in education. 
In November 2001, the National Research Council released a report titled Scientific Research in 
Education. In its treatment of what constitutes rigorous research, the council was carefully 
ecumenical on questions of methodology – making sure to note that non-experimental and 
qualitative methods could be deemed rigorous. Yet certain inconsistencies are apparent.  At the 
outset of the report, they argue that science can be value-free and insulated from political and 
                                                             
118 Before the 1990s, conservatives espoused Ronald Reagan’s position on federal education 
policy – the abolition of the Department of Education and the total handoff of schooling to the 
states. Clinton’s re-election in 1996 further confirmed to many in the Republican party that such 
an anti-education agenda was not palatable to the American electorate. 
119 The “Castle Bill” also contained standards for qualitative research methods, but which 
proscribe them to only those questions are not amenable to quantitative analysis (Eisenhart & 
Towne, Contestation and Change in National Policy on 'Scientifically Based' Education 
Research, 2003, p. 32).  
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sociological forces, yet they use the history of standardized testing (discussed at length in the 
previous chapter) as an example of the steady – and apolitical – accumulation of scientific 
knowledge in education ( National Research Council, 2002). Perhaps more significantly, the 
examples of rigorous research offered in the report are overwhelmingly quantitative and 
experimental. Furthermore, the council report emphasizes that scientific research ultimately aims 
at establishing cause-and-effect, implying (and devoting considerable attention to) the sort of 
experimental and quantitative methods that have been ascendant in public policy since the 1970s 
(p.101; p.110-126). 
But it was two successive pieces of legislation, No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 and the 
Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, which unequivocally enshrined experimental and 
quantitative methods as the standard for educational research.  Scientifically based research is 
defined in NCLB as “using empirical methods that draw on observation or experiment” and 
“evaluated using experimental or quasi-experimental designs…with a preference for random-
assignment experiments, or other designs to the extent that those designs contain within-
condition or cross-condition controls (NCLB 2001, 2002).” The full text of the law refers to 
scientifically based research over 100 times, mostly in the sections concerning disadvantaged 
students and their schools, and those outlining “teacher quality” (Manna & Petrilli, 2008).120 
What this meant in practice was that schools and districts would be obliged to choose services 
and programs which were vetted using experimental and quasi-experimental design research if 
they were to receive funding from the federal government under the Elementary and Secondary 
                                                             
120 Notably, the sections of the law which pertain to expansion of charter schools and educational 
technology contain almost no references to scientifically-based research (Manna & Petrilli, 2008, 
pp. 67-68). Apparently, the standard of experimental design was not meant to be equally applied 
to the favored projects of the Bush administration. This provides additional evidence of the 
influence of Picciano and Spring’s (2013) educational flexians. 
  
135 
 
Education Act. Thus, indirectly, education researchers who wanted to influence educational 
practice would have to meet this standard (Barhouse-Walters, Lareau, & Ranis, 2009a). 
The Education Sciences Reform Act (ESRA) went further in establishing what kinds of research 
the federal government would fund based on similar criteria to those of NCLB. The act abolished 
the Office of Educational Research and Improvement and replaced it with the Institute of 
Education Sciences (IES).121 The force of the law for education research was that the Department 
of Education would only fund projects which adhered to its definition of scientifically valid 
research. While the ESRA definition is slightly broader than NCLB, it shows a clear preference 
for experimental and quasi-experimental designs and emphasis on questions of causality and 
program evaluation (Barnhouse-Walters, Lareau, & Ranis, Appendix B: The Definitions of 
"Scientifically-Based Research" in the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002, 2009b). A 
related development was the What Works Clearinghouse, an initiative of the IES which evaluates 
research on educational interventions based on strict methodological criteria – meaning only 
randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental quantitative studies – with the intention of 
helping “students and schools meet high standards…by providing educators with credible and 
reliable evidence…to make informed decisions” (Institute of Education Sciences, nd). The 
WWC was based on an earlier effort by Chester Finn – Ronald Reagan’s Assistant Secretary of 
Education – to strengthen the practical utility of education research. Walters (2009) suggests that 
these successive redefinitions of scientific research are a culmination in the effort to reign in 
certain tendencies which had gained currency among education researchers since the 1960s – 
                                                             
121 Perhaps reflecting President Bush’s intentions for the IES, he chose Grover “Russ” 
Whitehurst, an experimental child psychologist, as founding head of the institute. Whitehurst is a 
fellow at the conservative Hoover Institute, and until recently was director of the Brookings 
Institution’s Brown Center for Education Policy. During his tenure in 2012, he terminated Diane 
Ravitch as an unpaid senior fellow. 
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postmodernism, critical theory and interpretivism. In 2004, IES also provided $760,000 in 
startup money to found the Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness (SREE), an 
organization committed to “applying the procedural norms of science to the study of educational 
problems” and focused on the “cause-and-effect relations important for education” (Society for 
Research on Educational Effectiveness, nd). 
What makes such an effort hostile toward educators is its emphasis on distinguishing legitimate 
“scientific” knowledge from other sorts of discourse about education. When education is turned 
into a problem to be solved by scientists, it implies that those presently responsible for the 
practice of education are not equipped to the task – or are not producing the desired results. 
Thus, while some randomized field trials may produce valuable insights about how to reform 
educational practice: 
“one cannot ignore the politics associated with constituting knowledge as scientific, 
particularly the boundaries created around who and what can be said to constitute such 
knowledge and the differentiating status such boundaries ensure. For monopolizing 
knowledge, any knowledge, but particularly scientific knowledge, restricts opportunities 
for others to think, in effect ensuring a large class of “unskilled” workers (which is all 
that teachers and other mere practitioners will become)…” (Baez & Boyles, 2009, p. 30). 
 
In this way, the attempt to define education policy as an “evidence-based field” can be seen as an 
attempt to wrest control away from educators themselves and into the hands of a group of 
analysts operating in a particular paradigm.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this portion of NCLB easily passed through a normally contentious 
Congress. Legislators have long been enamored with social engineering strategies – turning 
complex processes into simple indicators of causality and efficiency. James Scott observes the 
phenomenon in his classic work Seeing Like a State (Scott, Seeing Like A State: How Certain 
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Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed, 1998). Looking specifically at American 
schooling, Wise (1979) notes the tendency toward and limitations of administrative solutions to 
educational problems. But beyond this push for ‘education science,’ NCLB directly targeted 
educators through its emphasis on teacher quality. Indeed, ‘highly qualified teachers’ are the sole 
focus of Title II of the law, and the phrase features prominently throughout the entire 
document122.  
Manna and Petrilli (2008) suggest that three think tanks were significant in crafting this focus: 
Education Trust, the Fordham Foundation, and the National Commission on Teaching and 
America’s Future (NCTAF). Each provided summaries of research on teacher quality during 
legislative hearings prior to the passage of NCLB. EdTrust and Fordham focused their 
summaries on research which favored Value-Added Assessment as a means of measuring teacher 
quality. EdTrust relied heavily on Sanders’ work on the long-term impacts of effective teachers, 
featuring a chart from his 1996 study on the cover of their research summary123. They also cite 
research by Erik Hanushek, the early proponent of education production function research 
discussed above. The conservative Fordham Foundation - then headed by Chester Finn – cited 
many of the same sources as EdTrust, including Sanders and Hanushek, in order to emphasize 
the connection between teacher quality and student achievement. What distinguishes the two is 
that Fordham Foundation cited other research which advocated deregulation strategies to address 
                                                             
122 The ‘highly qualified teacher’ provision specified that by 2005-06, all teachers covered under 
the ESEA would be required to possess a Bachelor’s degree and full certification in the state 
where they were teaching, in addition to meeting requirements for subject matter expertise.  
Notably, the provision did not apply to charter schools, and a 2002 modification to the law 
exempted trainees in alternative certification programs – such as Teach for America –from the 
requirement (NCLB 2001, 2002; Zeichner, 2013).  
123 The Sanders paper cited in the EdTrust and Fordham research summaries (Sanders & Rivers, 
1996) makes an argument very similar to that of another high profile study done in 2013 by 
Harvard economist Raj Chetty, discussed below. 
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the teacher quality problem. NCTAF, directed by Linda Darling-Hammond at the time, focused 
primarily on upgrading teacher credentials and improving teacher preparation programs, an 
approach which the Fordham Foundation directly attacked (Manna & Petrilli, 2008, pp. 77-80).   
Ultimately however, VAA methods were not mandated in the accountability provisions of 
NCLB, likely due to the influence of congressional Democrats (perennially reliant upon the 
support of Teachers’ unions), who were crucial in its passage.124 George W. Bush had to break 
with the right wing of his party, which opposed the law’s mandated federal testing requirements.  
Nonetheless, much like the Interstate Commerce Commission hearings had done for Scientific 
Management, the attention of federal hearings gave Value-Added Assessment currency among 
education reformers and policymakers.  Perhaps more importantly, NCLB’s impossible mandate 
for “100 percent proficiency” for all students and its requirement for annual testing in multiple 
subjects gave the Obama administration leverage to push outcomes-based teacher assessment on 
the states. Further, according to the expert testimony of Harvard economist Thomas Kane in the 
2014 Vergara v. California case – discussed in detail in the next chapter – this testing 
requirement also created the volumes of data value-added researchers needed to study year-to-
year achievement gains. This leads to the early research promoting value-added as a policy tool.  
The Widget Effect, NCTQ, and Political Research on Value-Added 
 
As noted above, the annual testing mandates set out by No Child Left Behind facilitated a flood 
of new student test score data like those produced in The Coleman Report. Researchers interested 
in Value-Added assessment could begin to analyze state testing data, which could now generate 
                                                             
124 DeBray (2006) notes, for example, the key role played by Democratic Senator Ted Kennedy 
in the passage of NCLB. Connecting the history of accountability policy in Texas, Sandy Kress 
played a key role in persuading Kennedy to support NCLB (Stanford, 2013). 
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the gain-scores for the models. As one might expect, one of the first major post-NCLB value-
added studies was conducted by Eric Hanushek.  
Hanushek and colleagues relied on a large set of data (over 400,000 students across two cohorts 
in grades 3 through 7) from the Texas schools system (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Kain, 2005). From 
the outset, the paper is conceived as a counter to education research since Coleman, and 
specifically to the enthusiasm for class-size reduction policies since the 1983 Tennessee STAR 
experiment. They make a bold claim for value-added, stating that because it utilizes individual 
student test scores in multiple years, the models “are able to identify the impacts of schools and 
teachers uncontaminated by the many unobserved family and other influences that have plagued 
past research” (p. 419). The authors do note that the “central estimation problem” with VA 
methods is that the processes of assigning teachers and students to schools and classrooms are 
not random and thus subject to bias (p. 423). This caveat anticipates criticisms offered by Jesse 
Rothstein (2009)and others which have already been discussed in chapter 1 above. A further 
limitation of the study is that students were not linked to individual teachers, thus the analysis 
relies on differences between grade-levels to infer teacher quality differences.125  
Hanushek and his colleagues use teacher turnover events to demonstrate the existence of teacher 
effects on student achievement.126 Based on their analysis incidents of teacher turnover, they 
                                                             
125 Grade-level value-added is calculated by the difference between two cohorts test scores in the 
same grade. Grades (and by extension, teachers) are then compared in terms of grade-average 
value-added scores. Converting these grade-average value-added scores into a measure of the 
variability requires a number of very strict assumptions, including that the variation in teacher 
quality is the same for all grades and cohorts and that there are no strong complementarities 
between specific students and teachers (Hanushek, Rivkin, & Kain, 2005, pp. 426-427).   
126 Teacher turnover – incidents when a teacher moves from one school or grade to another – is 
exploited by Hanushek (and subsequent VA researchers) because in theory it provides an 
opportunity to show how changes in teacher quality correlate with changes in student 
achievement. If we assume that nothing else changes about the school, the students in it, or the 
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report that a one standard-deviation increase in teacher VA in a school grade results in a .11 
standard deviation growth in student achievement in reading and a .095 SD achievement growth 
in math. Subsequent analysis in the paper show that even these modest findings only apply to 
elementary school grades, and more consistently in math. Nonetheless, they contend that these 
are lower bound estimates of teacher effects and that “thus there can be little doubt that teacher 
quality is an important determinant of mathematics and reading achievement” (2005, p. 440). 
They further conclude by arguing that policy emphasis on teacher credentialing and class size 
reduction are misguided given their estimates of teacher quality effects exceed observed impacts 
of credentials or class size.  
Another important post-NCLB value-added study picks up on the conclusions advanced by 
Hanushek et al. In Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job, Robert Gordon, 
Thomas Kane and Doug Staiger (2006) begin their study of teacher effectiveness by positing:  
“ultimately, the success of US public education depends upon the skills of the 3.1 million 
teachers managing classrooms in elementary and secondary schools around the country. 
Everything else – education standards, testing, class size, greater accountability – is 
background…Without the right people standing in front of the classroom, school reform 
is a futile exercise” (p. 5). 
They propose that the evidence linking teacher credentials to student achievement is weak, and 
that policymakers need to require that teachers demonstrate minimum competency on the job. 
They define competency as student achievement growth and measure it using a value-added 
model which controls for students prior test scores and demographics (similar to the DVAAS 
                                                             
teacher herself when she arrives in her new position; it is possible to regard the increase or 
decrease in student performance as evidence of a change in teacher quality attributable to the 
new teacher. This approach is refined and utilized by economist Raj Chetty and his colleagues in 
a paper discussed in detail in the next chapter.   
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model above).127 Their study relies on data from the Los Angeles Unified School District from 
2000 to 2003. Although smaller than Hanushek et al.’s Texas data (only 150,000 students across 
four cohorts) the LAUSD data are in student-teacher linked format which Hanushek cited as a 
critical component. Yet, as opposed to Hanushek et al., who rely on numerous tables and model 
specifications, Gordon et al. presents only two figures. The first plots the distribution of teacher 
impacts on average student achievement by teacher credential level; the second plots teacher 
impacts by VA effectiveness quartile.128 The first figure shows largely overlapping distributions, 
suggesting that credentials are not related to teacher effects on test scores. The second shows 
four relatively distinct distributions, suggesting that prior measures of teacher impacts on student 
test score gains identify teachers who increase student achievement.129   
The presentation of evidence concludes on page 9 of the 30-page report. The majority of the 
paper focuses not on whether value-added identifies effective teachers, but on how VA could be 
leveraged as a policy for improving US public education. The first prescription they offer is for 
states to ‘reduce barriers to entering teaching’ by broadening the NCLB definition of high-
quality teachers and specifically through the use of alternative routes to certification. They 
buttress this point by pointing to the Teach for America program130 and by raising alarm of a 
                                                             
127 In their recommendations for improving teacher evaluations, they strongly advise that VA 
models control for background characteristics.  
128 Another figure is presented much later in the document, which plots teacher impacts by years 
of experience (p. 28). That is used to justify the two-year probationary period, but also suggests 
the negative impact of constantly replacing two-year veterans with brand new teachers. 
129 This is an early incidence of the all-too-common circular reasoning employed by VA 
proponents. If teachers impact gains in student test scores in prior years, chances are they will do 
so again in subsequent years. Even if one accepts that this is an unbiased measure, the question 
remains whether boosting test scores wholly constitutes teacher effectiveness.   
130 Teach for America is a two-year teaching program which has not been shown to generate a 
significant number of career educators. A recent rigorous study commissioned by Teach for 
America found that 87 percent of TFA recruits trained as teachers did not plan to remain in 
teaching (Clark, Isenberg, Liu, Makowsky, & Zukiewicz, 2015). 
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‘coming teacher shortage,’ suggesting that baby-boom generation teachers will retire in droves 
and that interest in teaching is declining (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying Effective 
Teachers Using Performance on the Job, 2006, pp. 10-12).131  
The second recommendation is that schools make it harder for the least effective teachers to be 
granted tenure. Specifically, they recommend that tenure be denied to teachers in the bottom VA 
effectiveness quartile after two years. Foreshadowing later research on the long-term impacts of 
effective teachers, the authors speculate that such a policy would lead to cumulative test score 
increases and lifetime earnings gains of up to $169,000 per high school graduate and up to $507 
billion dollars per year in nationwide earnings gains! (p. 15) Their third recommendation focuses 
on achievement gaps and what they refer to as maldistribution of effective teachers. They 
suggest that high-VA teachers be offered substantial pay increases for teaching in low-
performing schools. Since there is no conclusive research on the motivating effect of pay 
increases among teachers, the authors suggest that top quartile teachers be given at least $15,000 
per year if they are willing to teach in high-poverty schools.  
Their final two recommendations are more specific to teacher evaluation and more directly 
address the use of VA. The first of these is that teacher effectiveness needs to be defined by 
multiple measures. Here, the authors argue that, while imperfect, VA rankings based on 
standardized tests constitute the most important and only “objective” measure of effectiveness 
(p. 18). They propose that other measures – classroom observations and reviews of student work 
                                                             
131 As of this writing, there is little evidence that the “coming teacher shortage” ever arrived. 
Brenneman (2015) suggests that while there are subject area shortages in Math, Science, 
bilingual and Special Education fields, there is no national crisis in teacher supply. Shortages in 
Math and Science have causes well beyond teacher certification, and so changes those processes 
would be unlikely to resolve these specific problems. 
  
143 
 
– could supplement assessment of teachers, but that these subjective measures are of secondary 
importance. In their opinion, VA or some other measure based on student test scores should 
constitute the preponderant factor in teacher evaluation (p. 19). To facilitate evaluation of all 
teachers, they recommend that standards and related assessments be developed for all subjects in 
all grades so that testing can happen every year. Finally, they recommend that schools be 
provided funding to build the data infrastructure necessary to evaluate teachers based on student 
test score growth (pp. 22-23). Though Identifying Effective Teachers does not rely on much 
value-added data, it is politically far more important. This is perhaps the first incidence of 
proposing VA as a policy solution to perceived educational shortfalls.132 In its use of dramatic 
statistics ($507 billion dollars in national income) and dire warnings (The Coming Teacher 
Shortage), this report cast value-added as the cornerstone of a new strategy to transform 
American education. It also gained one of its authors, Thomas Kane, the attention of the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation. This relationship led to the largest educational policy experiment in 
American history – the Measures of Effective Teaching Project. 
But another subsequent study, although not about Value-Added specifically133, dropped a further 
bombshell on the question of teacher effectiveness. The Widget Effect was published in 2009 by 
an education policy advocacy group called The New Teacher Project (TNTP)134. Like Identifying 
Effective Teachers, Widget begins with an ominous quote (from 1936): 
                                                             
132 Further evidence of its intended policy impact, the report estimates the costs of implementing 
its recommendations ($3 billion per year), and provides answers to common criticisms from 
teachers’ organizations. (pp. 24-29).  
133 When The Widget Effect refers to the consequences of ineffective teaching, it utilizes VA 
studies conducted by William Sanders and Eric Hanushek.  
134 TNTP was founded in 1997 by former Washington DC schools Chancellor and notable 
education reformer Michelle Rhee. The Widget Effect research was supported by funding from 
the Gates and Walton Foundations, among others. 
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“There are at least ‘several hundred’ incompetents now in the school system [says the 
superintendent]. Other observers think there are several thousands, while still others insist 
that ‘several’ would be nearer the mark. Whether these incompetents were unfit to teach 
at any time, or have been rendered unfit by the passing years, is a matter of opinion. The 
question is, why are they allowed to remain?” (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & Keeling, 
2009)135   
This opening places The Widget Effect in a long tradition of doom-saying educational reports 
beginning with Laggards in Our Schools over a century earlier. Sounding much like A Nation at 
Risk, it characterizes the failure to identify and act on teacher effectiveness as a “national 
failure.” It defines the ‘widget effect’ as “institutional indifference to variations in teacher 
performance” and characterizes this as both “deeply disrespectful to teachers” and as a “gamble 
with the lives of students.” (pp. 4-6) The report relies on analysis of district teacher evaluation 
systems and on survey data from about 16,000 teachers and administrators in 12 school districts 
across four states (AR, CO, IL, OH).136 Based on the survey results, the authors point to five 
indications of the Widget Effect operating in schools: 1) nearly all teachers receive “satisfactory” 
or better ratings, 2) not enough is done to identify and reward the best teachers, 3) not enough 
feedback is given for teachers to improve, 4) new teachers are not given enough professional 
support, and 5) ineffective teaching goes unaddressed. It seems from the introduction of the 
                                                             
135 The story, from The New York Times, is far more banal than the quote suggests; it provides a 
history and description of the New York City teacher tenure system (as of 1936) and contains 
one (unfounded) suggestion from an assistant superintendent that there are “several hundred” 
incompetent teachers out of 36,000 in the NYC school system. The source of incompetence 
suggested in the story is that many teachers are on the job for too long; the article cites a 
recommendation that the Teacher Retirement Board takes steps to retire more teachers to make 
way for new recruits (Bernstein V. , 1936).   
136 Only ten of the twelve surveyed districts provided teacher evaluation system data which 
buttress the study’s major point – that most teachers are ranked satisfactory or better. DiCarlo 
(2014) points out that the surveys on which Widget is based were voluntary and that in the 
districts surveyed there were about 41,000 active teachers; about 15,000 teachers responded. 
This represents a 35% non-random response rate. A review of the study has also questioned the 
selection of school districts, arguing that they do not represent the full scope of approached to 
teacher evaluation (Pecheone & Wei, 2009). 
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report that this last point is the most important. The authors seem to set as their aim the removal 
of so-called incompetent teachers – even if couching this aim in a historical reference.137    
The Widget Effect’s first point is simple. Analysis of existing teacher evaluation systems shows 
that most teachers are rated satisfactory or better.138 In two of the districts studied, this holds true 
even when the schools themselves are faring poorly (pp. 11-12). However, the other points are 
not as solid. They are based on voluntary responses to an online survey. Further, many of the 
statistics refer to subpopulations of the 15,000 teachers or 1,300 administrators, making the 
voluntary survey results even seem even more dubious.139 Taken at face value, the surveys 
suggest that a substantial group of teachers and administrators feel teacher evaluation systems do 
not adequately capture the differences among teachers in terms of effectiveness. More 
importantly, a substantial majority of surveyed teachers did not receive feedback on how they 
                                                             
137 A similar tone is struck in another highly politicized piece of media. The documentary film 
Waiting for Superman, which is at heart an advocacy piece for the charter school industry, takes 
as one of its foci the inability of many US public school systems to fire ineffective teachers. The 
filmmakers describe what they term the “dance of the lemons,” in which tenured teachers 
deemed ineffective (though not incompetent) by administrators are moved from one school to 
another in over the years, often coming to rest at the most disadvantaged schools. It also notes 
the phenomenon of “rubber rooms” – formally called reassignment centers in New York City – 
where teachers accused of classroom misconduct are charged with minor administrative duties 
while they await dismissal proceedings. The film provides little context to evaluate the 
prevalence of these issues, it does point correctly to a sense of outrage in education reform 
circles over an inability to remove obviously ineffective teachers.     
138 As discussed briefly in the introduction (footnote 3, pg. 3), it is ironic that after decades of 
attempting to standardize teaching methods, reformers turn to grumble about the similarity of 
teacher effectiveness ratings.  
139 The report’s layout does not lend itself to systematic reading; charts and tables are presented 
in strange formats; some statistics are repeated in multiple places. The endnotes often refer to 
very substantial qualifications of statements. For example, expanded surveys were administered 
to four of the school districts (two in Arkansas and one each in Illinois and Ohio); these 
expanded surveys asked respondents about their specific experiences with evaluation and to 
report if they knew of tenured teachers who delivered poor instruction (Weisberg, Sexton, 
Mulhern, & Keeling, 2009, p. 32). These limited subsamples are used to support some of the 
reports boldest claims. 
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could improve their teaching. Finally, most surveyed teachers reported that there are poor-
performing tenured teachers at their schools. (pp. 13-18)  
The report then turns to consider the evaluation systems in the surveyed states. In this portion, 
they note that most teachers are subject to very little classroom observation time and that there is 
little relationship between observation time and the ratings teachers received in prior years (such 
that poorly rated teachers were observed no more than highly-rated teachers). Other statements 
made in this section are far too sweeping given the data behind them.  Most glaringly, the 
authors conclude this section by suggesting that evaluation policies create a dysfunctional school 
culture among teachers where feedback is not valued (p. 23). 
Widget finally turns to makes policy recommendations for reversing the widget effect. The first 
is to “adopt a comprehensive evaluation system that fairly, accurately, and credibly differentiates 
teachers based on their effectiveness in promoting student achievement.” The next three ask that 
administrators be trained to and held accountable for using such an evaluation system and that 
these policies be linked to teacher assignment, retention and efficient dismissal (pp. 27-30). 
While the authors do note in a lengthy sidebar that Value-Added methods could be viable as state 
testing systems evolve, they stop short of recommending VA outright. They instead stress 
stronger observation and feedback systems for teachers, rewards for effectiveness and sanctions 
for poor performance.140 
                                                             
140 What is missing from Widget is a consideration of the drastic changes that would need to be 
made to teachers’ and administrators’ working conditions to facilitate their recommendations. 
That administrators spend so little time observing or conferring with their teachers, and that 
teachers spend so little time collaborating on best practices, are themselves products of an 
underpaid and overburdened school labor force.   
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Widget’s basic finding is both valid and startling; it warranted and received much attention. 
Although much of it relied on somewhat dubious surveys and reporting methods, it addressed a 
fundamental question. While the report did not recommend value-added methods unequivocally, 
the alarm it raised on the state of existing systems made a strong case for upending the whole 
enterprise of teacher evaluation.  It is in this context that we ought to understand the mandate in 
Race to the Top to tie teacher evaluations to student achievement. 
These post-NCLB studies bring us to the point where we started in the beginning of this project. 
What is clear is that value-added research expanded greatly in scope as NCLB testing data 
became available. At the same time, greatly enhanced computing power facilitated the 
digitization and statistical processing of larger and more sophisticated educational data. 
Furthermore, the focus of school reformers shifted sharply toward teacher effectiveness. But 
value-added research in this period also set the stage for two even larger value-added studies – 
Long Term Impacts of Teachers and Measures of Effective Teaching. But given their centrality to 
a widely publicized court case focused on teacher tenure, these will be examined in the final 
chapter.  
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Chapter 6: Value-Added in Public: Evidence and Ideology in Vergara v. California 
 
Value-Added Assessment was originally conceived as a tool for academic research. However, 
since the turn of the 21st Century and particularly since the rollout of the 2009 Race to the Top 
program, this method of assessing school and teacher quality has become part of the national 
debate over education reform, and has been proposed as an evaluation policy. In the previous 
chapters, we’ve considered how the assumptions of VAA conflict with the practical realities of 
schooling, how innovations in evaluation have been applied to education historically, and the 
development of VAA from a research tool to a policy option. To explore the role value-added 
plays in educational politics beyond its role in research, I examine a recent court case – Vergara 
v. California. The case featured testimony from expert witnesses whose research relies on value-
added assessment. The goal here is to gain perspective on how VAA is interpreted outside of 
research circles. 
I begin by outlining some of the details of the case as well as key figures inside and outside the 
courtroom, focusing on the larger political forces they represent. Then I compare the academic 
work of key expert witnesses alongside their testimonies in the case. Finally, I assess press 
coverage following the decision.  
Background on the Trial  
 
In 2014, perhaps the most notable political platform for Value-Added Assessment was the 
proceedings and the decision handed down in Vergara et al. vs.  California. The case had nine 
students as plaintiffs against the state department of education and three school districts in 
California (Los Angeles Unified School District, Oakland Unified School District, and Alum 
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Rock Union School District). The plaintiffs charged that the state’s teacher tenure policies - 
particularly the two-year evaluation period before tenure is granted, due process protections 
related to dismissal, and “Last-In, First-Out” policies - left the districts’ poorest students with the 
worst teachers, thereby constituting a violation of the equal protection clause of the US 
Constitution. The California Federation of Teachers (CFT) and California Teacher’s Union 
(CTU) intervened as defendants, citing their interest in a case involving teacher tenure. Before 
the trial began, the three school districts were dropped as defendants.141 The suit was filed in 
2012; the trial took place over two months from January 27th to March 27th, 2014. On June 10th, 
Judge Rolf Treu ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, citing evidence that ineffective teachers harmed 
the educational and economic well-being of their students. The judge's 16-page opinion included 
references to the 1954 Brown vs. Board of Education decision, arguing that equal access to high-
quality teachers is among the fundamental educational civil rights issues of our time. The ruling 
was immediately stayed, preventing it from having any impact on teacher tenure policy until 
appeals by the defendants are complete.142 Those appeals were heard in April of 2016.143  
Although the named plaintiffs in Vergara were nine California public school students, the case 
was the product of an organization called Students Matter, which paid for the plaintiffs’ legal 
fees and the public relations team that handled the case. The organization’s website describes it 
as “a national non-profit organization dedicated to sponsoring impact litigation to promote access 
                                                             
141 It is important to note that, according to the procedural history in the judge’s decision, the 
districts were dismissed “voluntarily with prejudice,” meaning that the plaintiffs (Students 
Matter) dropped the charges against the districts. The superintendents of these districts became 
plaintiffs’ witnesses.    
142 http://cacs.org/research/vergara-v-california-case-context/ 
143 The unions’ appeals led to the overturning of the Vergara decision. The plaintiffs appealed 
that decision, but the California Supreme Court refused to hear any further appeals. 
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to quality public education.144” The group was founded and is funded by David Welch, an 
entrepreneur from Silicon Valley.   
Students Matter hired the corporate law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher to argue the case; the 
three co-lead attorneys were Theodore Olson, Theodore Boutrous, and Marcellus McRae.145 The 
firm, which ranked fifth nationally in a survey of corporate legal directors, is representing 
Chevron in an environmental harm case against the nation of Ecuador, and has represented the 
automobile industry against the Environmental Protection agency in both California and 
Massachusetts. It also represents New Jersey Governor Chris Christie in the scandal stemming 
from lane closures on the George Washington Bridge. As a member of the firm, Olson 
represented George W. Bush in 2001 dispute over the Florida election tallies and subsequently 
served as US Solicitor General146; Olson represented Citizens United in the Citizens United vs. 
Federal Election Commission case which declared that political spending constitutes free 
speech.147 Boutrous was the lead counsel for Walmart in their 2007 gender discrimination 
lawsuit, which was argued before both the Ninth Circuit Court and the US Supreme Court.148 
McRae is noted for defending corporations against workplace discrimination and environmental 
pollution lawsuits.149  
                                                             
144 http://studentsmatter.org/ 
145 Olson was named as the plaintiffs’ lead attorney, but did not participate actively in the trial. 
McRae handled the bulk of the proceedings; Boutros offered opening and closing statements. 
There were a number of other plaintiff attorneys who handled questioning of individual 
witnesses. The legal team for the defense was much smaller, consisting of one attorney each for 
the California public schools and the California Teachers’ Union. 
146 http://studentsmatter.org/legal-team/theodore-b-olson/ 
147 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/20/AR2011012005149.html 
148 It is notable that the Walmart case also involved expert witness testimony from a statistician 
and a sociologist. 
149 http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/mmcrae 
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Vergara is not the first lawsuit to dispute teach tenure protections in California. In 2010, Reed v. 
California challenged the Last-In- First-Out policy. That case was filed by the Southern 
California American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). However, in that case, the plaintiffs were 
able to establish specific harm to specific students in three middle schools where teacher 
turnover was particularly high. Reed ended in a settlement which was later nullified by the state 
appeals court for not allowing sufficient input from the teachers’ union.150  Vergara is also not 
the first case to make an issue out of test-based teacher evaluations in California. In the 2012 
case Doe v. Deasy, Judge James Chalfant ruled that the LAUSD had to make students’ test 
performance, and particularly Value-Added Models, part of teacher evaluations in compliance 
with the state’s 1971 Stull Act.151 Similar to Vergara, Doe was filed on behalf of a group of 
parents by EdVoice, a nonprofit founded by Netflix CEO Reed Hastings152 which strongly 
supports charter school expansion and received major support from the Broad Foundation.   
The ruling in Vergara, whether or not it withstands the appeal by both the National Education 
Association (NEA) and the California Teachers’ Union (CTU), may set off a series of similar 
cases in other states. Students Matter President David Welch has promised to promote similar 
cases in other states, and former CNN personality Campbell Brown has already begun filing a 
similar case in New York. Brown’s organization, the Partnership for Educational Justice, 
                                                             
150 http://articles.latimes.com/2012/aug/11/local/la-me-lausd-layoffs-20120811 
151 http://www.scribd.com/doc/96728121/Doe-v-Deasy-Tentative-Ruling-Compact-PDF The 
ruling left it up the school district to negotiate with the teachers’ union over how test scores were 
to be factored in to teacher evaluations, but as of 2015 no deal was reached (Fensterwald, 2015). 
152 Hastings is also a founding member of Green Dot Charter schools, one of the largest charter 
school management companies in the state.  
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includes executives from Students First and Democrats for Education Reform on its advisory 
board.153  
This list of expert witnesses’ affiliations in Vergara further indicates the interlocking network of 
private and non-profit interests that has gained power in US education policy. The key experts 
for the plaintiffs – those whose testimonies featured in the judge’s ruling – were three 
economists: Harvard’s Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty and the Stanford’s Eric Hanushek. Kane 
was the principal investigator for the Gates’ foundation-funded “Measures of Effective 
Teaching” (MET) study and is a strong advocate of using Value-Added Assessment to evaluate 
individual teachers’ effectiveness in the classroom. Raj Chetty was called as a witness based on 
his study of the long-term impacts of effective teachers. Eric Hanushek, also a senior fellow at 
the conservative Hoover Institute, has been writing about performance-based teacher and school 
evaluation since the 1970s, and has further argued that input-based schooling policies – those 
which focus on resources and teacher credentials – have little impact on educational quality.  
Hanushek was also a member of former California Governor Arnold Schwarzanegger’s 
Committee on Education Excellence, which received support from the Gates Foundation and 
whose other members include executives of Students Matter and the New School Venture fund – 
another corporately-funded non-profit organization. 
Other plaintiff experts included Dan Goldhaber, a labor economist at the University of 
Washington – Bothel; Arun Ramanathan of EdTrust – West154, a non-profit organization which 
lists “Accountability” and “Teacher Effectiveness” as two top items on their advocacy agenda 
                                                             
153 http://www.edjustice.org/about/board-directors-advisory-board/ 
154 As of April 2014, Ramanathan is now the CEO of Pivot Learning Partners, a company that 
works on the implementation of Common Core Standards.  
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and which has received funding from both the Gates and Walton foundations; and Sandi Jacobs, 
vice-president of the National Council on Teacher Quality (NCTQ) and a former program 
specialist with the US Department of Education. NCTQ receives funding from the Broad, Gates 
and Walton foundations; its advisory board includes former NYC schools chancellor and current 
News Corporation VP Joel Klein, founder of KIPP charter schools Michael Feinberg, Pearson 
executive Michael Barber, and fellow expert witness Eric Hanushek (National Council on 
Teacher Quality, nd).   
Among its experts, the defense called one economist, Jesse Rothstein of the University of 
California-Berkeley. Rothstein has been a vocal critic of value-added assessment, arguing among 
other things that its statistical assumptions are never met in practice in actual schools. He also 
wrote a critical analysis of the MET study findings for the National Education Policy Center 
(NEPC), where he is a fellow. The other expert witnesses for the defense were all education 
researchers: Linda Darling-Hammond of the Stanford Graduate School of Education; Susan 
Moore-Johnson a colleague of Kane’s at Harvard; Ken Futernick of California State University – 
Sacramento; and David Berliner, Professor Emeritus at Arizona State University and a researcher 
at NEPC. 
Other key witnesses were Oakland Schools Superintendent Tony Smith and Los Angeles Schools 
Superintendent John Deasy. Both Smith and Deasy testified for the plaintiffs, despite initially 
being named as defendants in the case.  Their testimony is not grounded in research, but becomes 
important when we consider the press coverage of Vergara. 
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Contextualizing Foundation Influences 
 
Students Matter is a relatively small player among nonprofits interested in education reform. But 
David Welch’s effort in Vergara was supported directly and indirectly by many of the largest 
players in educational “venture philanthropy155.”  The Broad Foundation was one of the earliest 
contributors to Students Matter. The David and Heidi Welch Foundation has made significant 
donations to NewSchools Venture Fund, which invests in both traditional and online charter 
schools, and to StudentsFirst, the education reform group founded by former Washington, DC 
schools’ chancellor and tenure opponent Michelle Rhee.  
Foundation influences are also evident among the school districts which were dropped as 
defendants. John Deasy, the Los Angeles School Superintendent and plaintiff witness, served as 
a director for the Gates Foundation and was a Broad Foundation Fellow156. Former Oakland 
Superintendent Tony Smith, a Students Matter advisory board member157 who also testified for 
the plaintiffs, was the director of the National Equity Project which, under its former name (Bay 
Area Coalition of Equitable Schools), was a recipient of Gates Foundation support for its 
emphasis on “small schools.158” Smith is now executive director of the Stone Foundation, which 
has made education grants to groups such as the Academy for Urban School Leadership – a 
school management organization which orchestrates school turnarounds and receives support 
                                                             
155 This term has been used by Diane Ravitch to describe a sort of 21st century philanthropy 
related to education. The term is described in her 2010 book The Death and Life of the Great 
American School System, where she refers to a particular group of foundations including the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation, the Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family 
Foundation as the “Billionaire Boys Club.”   
156 http://home.lausd.net/apps/pages/index.jsp?uREC_ID=178743&type=d&pREC_ID=367410 
157 http://studentsmatter.org/our-team/advisory-board/.Accessed July 13, 2014 
158 http://classroomstruggle.org/2013/04/08/tony-smith-leaves-oakland-in-shambles/ 
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from both the NewSchools Venture Fund and the Gates Foundation.159 He also heads Teach Plus, 
an advocacy organization for “reform-minded teachers” which promotes test-based teacher 
evaluations and merit-based compensation plans and receives support from both the Gates and 
Broad foundations160. 
Diane Ravitch (2010) notes the growing influence of what she calls the “Billionaire Boys club” 
of large philanthropic foundations. Ravitch points out that after a long hiatus following the 
‘School Wars’ of the 1960s, large philanthropies returned to education reform in the late 1990s, 
but with a radically different program. In contrast to the older foundation approach – which 
allowed grantees to spend grant money on their own priorities – new ‘venture philanthropists’ set 
their own agendas and sought out organizations and individuals aligned with their goals. She 
further points out that as the three largest education-focused foundations – the Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation, the Edith and Eli Broad Foundation, and the Walton Family Foundation – 
converged on similar priorities (along with many smaller funders), cash-starved school districts 
as well as state and federal education agencies began to align their agendas  with those of the 
foundations. Ravitch problematizes this state of affairs: 
“There is something fundamentally antidemocratic about relinquishing control of the 
public education policy agenda to private foundations run by society’s wealthiest people; 
when the wealthiest of these foundations are joined in common purpose, they represent 
an unusually powerful force that is beyond the reach of democratic institutions…The 
foundations demand that public schools and teachers be held accountable for 
performance, but they themselves are accountable to no one.” (Ravitch, 2010, pp. 200-
201) 
Although focused on India, Arundhati Roy (2012) gives an interesting historical perspective on 
corporate philanthropy in the US. She notes that when the first corporately-endowed foundations 
                                                             
159 http://auslchicago.org/about 
160 http://www.teachplus.org/page/partners-27.html 
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– the Carnegie Corporation and the Rockefeller Foundation – appeared in the early 20th century, 
critics raised serious questions about the legality and unaccountability of such institutions. Roy 
connects early corporate philanthropy with attempts to sway US foreign policy and to influence 
domestic policy in developing countries in ways that would favor corporate profits. Like 
Ravitch, she also notes the irony of opaque, unaccountable organizations demanding 
transparency from foreign governments. 
Picciano and Spring (2013) offer detailed description of this phenomenon in American education 
in their description of the ‘Education-Industrial Complex.’ They argue that control over 
education policy has become dominated by a network of individuals who move between posts in 
government, non-profit foundations and for-profit firms. These ‘flexians’161 use their influence to 
promote school reforms which emphasize private sector partnerships and the application of 
technology to education. As such, they tend to oppose teachers’ unions and support top-down, 
data-driven policies like Value-Added assessment. Picciano and Spring argue that the growing 
influence of foundations and the increasing privatization shift power away the democratic 
processes that have historically governed public schools. Instead, democratic governance is 
replaced by a ‘personalized bureaucracy’ in which school policy is determined by a closed group 
of individuals on a first-name basis with each other (Picciano & Spring, 2013, p. 38).  
As the above description of Students Matter and the roster of expert witnesses indicate, the 
tendencies toward privatization and foundation influences were on display in the Vergara v. 
California trial.  We now turn to consider the testimonies of expert witnesses in the trial 
alongside the research on which they were based.  
                                                             
161 Picciano and Spring borrow the term flexian from Janine Wedel (2009). 
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Research Basis of Two Expert Witnesses162  
Raj Chetty was the first expert witness, called by the plaintiffs on the third day of the trial.163 
Chetty’s co-authored paper with John Friedman and Jonah Rockoff focuses on the measurement 
of teacher quality and the long-term impacts of effective (and ineffective) teachers.  
The research for these papers first took shape as an Internal Revenue Service white paper on the 
impacts of income tax credits. Using New York City school records from the 1990s linked with 
tax records, that paper found that a $1,000 increase in the amount of a family’s tax credit was 
associated with an increase in student test scores between 6 and 9 percent of one standard 
deviation.164  They then correlated test scores with earnings in early adulthood. These results 
showed that a one standard deviation increase in student test scores in a single grade correlated 
with 9 percent increase in earnings at age 28. Combining these findings, they suggest that tax 
credits are more than offset by the long-term earnings gains they afford (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2011).  
The IRS paper evolved into a National Bureau of Economics working paper which shifted the 
focus to teachers.  The first part of the Long Term Impacts paper is devoted entirely to the 
question of bias in Value-Added measures – whether VA estimates are driven by the causal 
impact of teachers or by student sorting. First, the authors devise a novel test using the concept 
                                                             
162 Eric Hanushek’s role as the architect of Value-Added Assessment has already been 
considered in the preceding chapters; I also consider his testimony below.  
163 Video of Chetty’s testimony is available online at http://vimeo.com/85786192 
164 All test score gains cited in the various iterations of Chetty et al. are phrased in terms of 
standard deviations rather than as raw test scores. This is because in the two decades of data they 
use, the school district (New York City) underwent numerous testing changes which make the 
raw test scores incomparable. Indeed, as I note, in an earlier chapter, changes in testing 
instruments are one outside factor which compromises the validity of test-based teacher 
evaluations.   
  
158 
 
of forecast bias.165 They correlate the changes in grade average teacher value-added with the 
changes in grade average test scores. They find a very high correlation between these two 
variables.166 They find that estimates of teacher value-added in a given year are not affected by 
the addition of other highly predictive variables (parent characteristics and lagged test scores). 
Their second (and more robust) test – a quasi-experiment analyzing teacher turnover events – 
found that when a high- or low-value-added teacher arrives at or departs from a school, the 
average effect of same grade-level teachers on student test scores can be considerable and vary in 
the direction of her estimated value-added – e.g., a high-VA teacher positively impacts her 
grade’s average test scores when she arrives. These findings lead them to conclude that teacher 
value-added is an accurate predictor of a teacher’s contribution to student test scores.  
                                                             
165 Forecast bias is a very technically elaborate procedure in the case of measuring teacher 
effects. The method begins by conceiving of changes in teaching staff as experimental treatments 
administered to a grade full of students. The hypothesized effect is derived from a jackknife 
estimate (leaving out the year before and the year of the change) of teachers’ combined impacts 
on student test scores in all other available years. So if a grade of teachers had student test score 
data for 10 years – say 1991 through 2000 – and one wanted to hypothesize an effect for changes 
between 1993 and 1994, one would average the data from 1991, 1992, and 1995-2000, leaving 
out the years in question, which the authors argue are measured with error that is related to 
student outcomes (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 21). This seems suspect because it 
uses data from subsequent years in a teacher’s career to estimate her effect on students in the 
past. In the real world, schools would not be able to use a teacher’s future performance to predict 
her current ability. All the averaging of effects across grades is also not aligned with how value-
added is being used in policy. 
166 The figures presenting their estimates of forecast bias make use of “binned scatterplots” – for 
which the authors helped developed new software. This technique takes the thousands of points 
(in this case 60,000) that would be plotted on a graph and groups them into a user-determined 
number of bins (in this case 20), which are then assigned the average values of the x and y 
variables depicted on the axis of the graph. These binned averages become points on the 
scatterplot. Binning reduces the cluttered appearance of scatterplots based on large datasets. It 
can also help easily communicate the functional form of the relationship between variables. But 
binned scatterplots do not communicate the strength of the relationship between two variables 
because they tell us nothing about the R-squared value or proportion of variance explained 
(Stepner, 2014). Further, the visual effect of reducing a graph that would have thousands of 
points to one with only twenty data points is important; it makes relationships appear much 
clearer.   
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The second part of the paper utilizes the unique features of the data to assess the long-term 
impacts of teacher quality – as measured by value-added – on students. They begin with the 
finding that a one standard deviation increase in teacher value-added increases students’ test 
scores by 10 percent of one standard deviation. This is an important step because the long-term 
impacts findings are based on the correlation between those outcomes and a one standard 
deviation increase in student test scores, not in teacher VA – a one SD improvement in student 
test scores would necessitate an impossible ten standard deviation improvement of teacher VA.  
So the authors simply divide their findings by ten to approximate the impact of a one SD 
improvement in teacher value-added. The primary outcomes discussed are college attendance at 
age 20 and earnings at age 28. The authors report that on average, a one standard deviation 
increase in teacher value-added in a single grade increases a student’s probability of attending 
college by 0.49 percentage points, and increases student earnings at age 28 by $182. These are 
modest findings given that, in terms of policy, a one standard deviation increase in teacher value-
added would require schools to affect a 34 percent increase in overall teacher quality, however 
defined. 
These findings are accompanied by various extrapolations which require strong assumptions 
about how teachers are related to test scores, and how test scores are related to long-term 
outcomes. For example, the $182 earnings gain is extrapolated to a policy of “deselecting” (read 
firing) the bottom five percent of the value-added distribution from the teaching force and 
replacing them with average teachers.167 They argue that such a policy would increase each 
                                                             
167 The authors note that teachers in the bottom five percent of the distribution are on average 
only two standard deviations below the mean, suggesting that the distribution of teacher value-
added is clustered closer to the mean. Their use of the bottom five percent follows from 
Hanushek’s earlier research on teacher replacement. They also assume in their calculations that 
the replacements would not be new teachers, but those with average experience (Chetty, 
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student’s lifetime earnings by $9,422 – but under difficult assumptions including that: a) higher-
VA teachers affect all students in the same way, b) earnings gains would be plausible if all 
students got higher-VA teachers, and c) that replacements of average quality are readily available 
at any time.   
Long Term Impacts received much attention even as a working paper – including front-page 
coverage in the New York Times and significant mention in President Obama’s 2012 State of the 
Union Address. Still, many authors have raised questions about the findings of Chetty et al. in 
this study. Richard Rothstein (2012) suggests that the focus on teachers’ abilities to raise test 
scores elides other important aspects of teaching. Combining the findings of Long Term Impacts 
with those of the Measures of Effective Teaching study (discussed below) he contends that this 
narrow focus ignores other ways teachers impact students which could in fact have more 
dramatic long-term impacts.  
Dale Ballou (Ballou, Review of The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-Added and 
Student Outcomes in Adulthood, 2012) argues that although the authors find no forecast bias in 
the estimation of teacher value-added, they fail to address this same type of bias in their 
assessment of long-term impacts: 
“Even if we could be assured that the value-added model perfectly measures a teacher’s 
contribution to student knowledge [test scores], it would remain problematic to attribute 
long-term outcomes to the impact of teachers… [it must be established that] high value-
added teachers are not more likely to have been assigned students who were for other 
reasons destined for greater long-term success.” (pp. 5-6)   
Just as the authors tested for bias in value-added measures by checking for the impacts of parent 
characteristics, the same tests should be used to establish that the effects of teachers on long-term 
                                                             
Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 48). This assumption can be made in theory, but is unlikely to 
hold in the actual teacher labor market. 
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outcomes are not being confounded with the impacts of parental characteristics on earnings, 
college attendance, etc. Ballou suggests that without these tests for bias in the prediction of long 
term outcomes, not just test scores, the validity of the findings of Long-Term Impacts is called 
into question. 
Taking a different approach, Moshe Adler (2013) looks closely at what is actually measured in 
Chetty et al.168 He raises two major issues with the findings. The first concerns the lynch-pin 
linking the two studies.  As noted above, the thread that connects the authors’ conclusion of 
unbiased measurement of value-added (part one) and the long-term impacts of teacher-value 
added (part two) is that a one-standard deviation increase in student test scores is shown to 
correlate with long-term outcomes. There are two problems with this connection. The first is the 
fade-out of teacher effects on test scores, which Adler documents from numerous prior studies 
(2013, p. 5). If test score effects don’t last, then the correlation between test scores and long-term 
outcomes is improperly attributed to the effect of teacher quality. The second more serious 
problem is the measurement of value-added at the teacher level and the student level. A one-
standard deviation increase in teacher value-added is shown to increase students’ test scores by 
10 percent of a standard deviation. Thus, to increase student test scores by a full standard 
deviation would require increasing teacher value-added by ten standard deviations. Though the 
authors reduce the magnitude of their reported effect size to reflect this, the problem is the 
effects they actually find are based on changes in teacher quality that are nearly impossible. 
Adler further supports his critique by noting that the range of teacher value-added documented in 
Chetty et al. is between -0.18 and 0.18 standard deviations of student test scores – reflecting that 
                                                             
168 Adler is unconvinced by the critiques offered by Rothstein and Ballou. He contends that these 
critiques of Chetty et al. do not decisively undercut the authors’ claims because they focus on 
what is missing from their argument rather than the strength of the evidence offered.   
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teacher effects on student test scores are clustered around the mean, adding to the implausibility 
of assuming that teachers could account for massive changes in student test results.169   
The second broad aspect of Adler’s critique is the selective focus on outcomes. Long-Term 
Impacts finds a statistically significant impact of teacher value-added on student earnings at age 
28. They also measure earnings at age 30, but state that “the 95 percent confidence interval for 
the estimate [of earnings at age 30] is very wide.” This is a dubious way of saying that the impact 
on earnings at age 30 was not found to be statistically significant (Adler, 2013, pp. 3-4). 
Unfortunately, one would need to read deep into the paper to discover that; appendix table 6 
shows that the point estimate is $206 with a standard deviation of $195.170 Nonetheless, the 
authors assume that the earnings gains found at age 28 would persist when they estimate both the 
lifetime earnings impact of high value-added teachers and the impact of deselecting the bottom 
five percent of teachers.  In sum, Adler finds that the evidence offered in Long-Term Effects is 
thin given the scope of its claims. 
Thomas Kane was the second expert witness called by the plaintiffs in Vergara. His testimony 
focused first on the results of the Measures of Effective Teaching project (funded by the Gates 
Foundation), for which he was principal investigator171. He also testifies based on his study of 
the distribution of ‘bad teachers’ in Los Angeles in terms of students’ ethnicity. While the MET 
study report stresses the need for multiple measures of teacher ability, value-added assessment 
                                                             
169 This range is cited in numerous figures in the Long-Term Impacts paper (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2011a, pp. 60-67). 
170 Chetty et al. claim that the sample size of 30-years olds is too small to generate a reliable 
estimate, but Adler argues that over 61,000 student records provide more than enough statistical 
power (Adler, 2013, p. 4). 
171 In addition to Kane, the other authors of the MET study report were Daniel McCaffrey and 
Trey Miller from the RAND Corporation, and Douglas Staiger of Dartmouth College (Kane, 
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013). 
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serves as the study’s benchmark quality metric.172 Further, the latter portion of Kane’s testimony 
relies solely on Value-Added measures of and specifically his replication of Chetty’s argument 
about long-term impacts. But given the prominence of the MET study, it is important to consider 
in its entirety. I focus here on three MET study reports.    
The MET project brought the weight of randomized control trials (RCTs) to bear on the question 
of test-based teacher assessment.  Since the passage of the Education Sciences Act in 2002, 
RCTs have been regarded as the gold standard for educational research. The Gates Foundation 
has been particularly important in funding education-focused RCTs – the foundation funded the 
MET project for $45 million.  The MET RCT included over 1,000 teachers across more than 300 
schools in six geographically diverse school districts.173 It attempted to fulfill one assumption of 
value-added assessment which is never met in real school settings: random assignment of 
students to teachers. Randomization of students had to take place within school, grade and 
subject – requiring a complex process assignment procedure.174  In addition to existing state 
                                                             
172 In the first of the MET study’s reports, the authors lay out three premises including that 
“whenever possible a teacher’s evaluation should include his or her students’ achievement gains” 
and that “any other components of the evaluation should be demonstrably related to student 
achievement gains” (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 4-5). Rothstein (2011) notes that these 
assumptions are problematic for a project studying effective teaching – as they rule out in 
advance the possibility that test score gains may be a poor measure of teaching ability. Baker 
(2013) has a similar critique, noting that using Value-Added as the outcome measure of quality 
makes it almost certain that prior Value-Added will be the best predictor of quality. Goldstein 
(2015) connects these assumptions to the Gates Foundation’s already-stated policy priorities and 
to its close ties with the Obama Administration, which had already endorsed the practice of test-
based teacher evaluations. 
173 The initial pool of teachers was over three thousand, but attrition by both teachers and 
students whittled that number down to 1,181 (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, p. 45). 
Nonetheless, the MET study is still the largest educational experiment ever conducted (Rothstein 
& Mathis, 2013, p. 5). 
174 Rosters of students were randomized among a block of teachers who taught the same grade 
and subject in a school. For example, students would be randomly assigned among three fourth 
grade teachers in a participating school.   
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tests, MET employed a number of new instruments to measure teacher ability in different ways 
(project-specific achievement tests, student surveys and standardized assessment of teaching 
practices).  
The first portion of the project focused on correlating value-added assessment with other 
measures of teaching using non-experimental methods. This was also the first stage of the RCT; 
teachers who agreed to participate in the study were ranked (according to their value-added 
scores in 2009-2010) as ‘more effective’ or ‘less effective’ prior to being randomly assigned a 
roster of students in 2010-2011.  
Among their findings, the report highlights that teacher value-added is relatively stable across 
classrooms and across different testing instruments. Correlations between two sections taught by 
the same teacher in the same year ranged between .09 and .38 depending on the subject and 
instrument used. For elementary school teachers who do not teach multiple sections, value-added 
in one year correlated modestly with the prior year (.40 for Math and .20 for English). 
Correlations between the state tests and the MET-administered tests were .377 for ELA and .221 
for Math (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 23-25).175 The authors adjust these last figures by 
exploiting data on teachers who have multiple sections to estimate the correlation between 
‘persistent teacher value-added’ on the different assessments – which are reported as .54 for 
math and .38 for English Language Arts (ELA) (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, pp. 18-21).  
This first report concludes by using non-experimental methods to compare teachers with the least 
evidence of effectiveness (measured by value-added) to those with the most. This analysis is 
                                                             
175 This report required careful reading. Though the text of the report claimed these correlations 
were listed in Table 5, they were in fact reported in tables 7 and 8 (Math and English were 
reported separately).  
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confined to those teachers who taught more than one classroom in 2009-10, as it uses value-
added ranking in one class to predict value-added in the other. They report differences between 
teachers in the top and bottom quartiles of the effectiveness distribution and find between a 0.07 
and 0.33 standard deviations in average test score gains between these two quartiles (the 
magnitude of difference varies by instrument). For ease of interpretation, the authors convert 
these differences to estimated months of learning based on a scale developed by Kane (2004).176 
Using a “rule of thumb” They report that the average difference between high-effectiveness and 
low-effectiveness teachers is between 2 and 12 months of learning (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p. 
27). The findings from this analysis serve as the precursor to the random assignment study. 
The MET project’s final report, Have We Measured Effective Teaching?, was released in January 
2013, and features the results of the random assignment study.  The report begins by describing 
the algorithm used to rate teachers prior to randomization – which includes 2009-10 value-added, 
classroom observation ratings, student survey scores, and teacher characteristics (Kane, 
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 10-11).177 It then demonstrates that the observed growth 
gains were close to their predictions using a binned scatterplot.178  
From a methodological standpoint, the most significant outcome of the study may be its high 
rates of attrition and non-compliance. The original intent was to randomly assign students to 
                                                             
176 The authors acknowledge that this scale is based on only one outcome measure, and that this 
conversion to months is not appropriate for the two state tests, which are not scaled vertically 
(Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p. 27).  
177 Following the general logic of the MET study – where score gains are the priority – the 
outcome that these factors predict is test score growth. Teachers with the highest predicted 
average test score growth are those designated highly effective.   
178 This is a consequential presentation choice. Teachers were sorted into groups of 40, 
dramatically reducing the number of points on the regression line and thereby hiding the amount 
of divergence from the line (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 4-5). 
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2,642 teachers using a very complicated process and requiring a number of preconditions. 770 
teachers were either not eligible for randomization because of job changes; 281 were dropped 
from randomization because they had did not have another teacher in the same school-grade-
subject with whom to exchange rosters; a further 441 teachers were excluded because the school 
in which they taught was excluded from the study. Thus, only 1,181 teachers were randomly 
assigned students. But the random assignment was further challenged by subsequent non-
compliance. Across all six participating districts, between 34 and 73 percent of randomized 
students did not remain with their assigned teacher. Further, non-compliance appeared to be 
systematic: teachers who were part of randomization had students with higher average test scores 
, were more likely to be white, less likely to be African American, and  less likely to be classified 
as either special education students or English-language learners (Garrett & Steinberg, 2015). 
The authors examine and acknowledge that even among randomized teachers, there was some 
sorting of students to teachers – suggesting that student roster changes made after randomization 
were not themselves random (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, pp. 16-17).179 They also 
note that because students were not randomly assigned to schools, the findings are limited to 
whether value-added measures are biased within schools, and cannot say whether value-added 
was biased between schools.180 Using a final sample of 27,255 students, they proceed to assess 
the question: Does a one unit increase in predicted teacher effectiveness translate into a one-unit 
difference in observed student achievement? 
                                                             
179 Steinberg and Garrett (2015) re-analyzed the MET data and found that indeed this sorting has 
a significant impact on measured teacher performance, following Rothstein’s (2010) criticism of 
value-added models.  
180 As my analysis in Chapter 2 shows, school level variables are important determinants of 
teacher value-added scores, suggesting that between-school bias may be significant.  
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Thus the MET project uses random assignment to assess the treatment effect of teachers. 
However, owing to the high non-compliance rate, the analysis relies on an alternative method of 
identifying teacher (treatment) effects: Instrumental variables (IV).181 This shifts their focus to 
the effect of treatment on those students who remained in the randomization blocks – what the 
literature on experimentation calls “compliers.”  Compliance varied by district; in one 
municipality, a student’s assigned teacher had no correlation with their actual teacher’s 
effectiveness.182 Nonetheless, in their analyses, the authors find support for their hypothesis 
among the specified population – concluding that the average effect of being assigned to a more 
effective teacher reflects measures of that teacher’s effectiveness (Kane, McCaffrey, Miller, & 
Staiger, 2013, p. 38).183  
After the random assignment study was complete, the MET project also released a paper which 
addressed the use of multiple indicators in teacher evaluations (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & 
Lockwood, 2013).  In addition to scores on state tests and project-specific tests, the MET project 
                                                             
181 In RCTs with considerable non-compliance, simple outcome comparisons of the treatment 
and control groups are regarded as unreliable. IV methods are one approach to identifying 
treatment effects in such circumstances. IV attempts to estimate the average effect of the 
treatment on those who actually received treatment. The modern approach to IV was developed 
by economists working with non-experimental data in so-called natural experiments (Angrist, 
Imbens, & Rubin, 1996). Researchers working on random assignment studies have since adopted 
this method (see for example Hedges, 2008). Using IV methods requires that strong assumptions 
be met especially when dealing with “weak instruments,” such as RCTs with very high non-
compliance, like the MET study (Staiger & Stock, 1997; Imbens, 2014).  
182 Imbens and Angrist (1994) outline conditions required to adequately estimate local average 
treatment effects. Among them is the “no-defiers” or “monotonicity” assumption, which states 
that the treatment needs to affect the outcome in only one direction, such that treatment is always 
better (or always worse) than control. In the case of MET, where teachers were randomly 
assigned to classrooms, it seems likely that a high-value-added teacher would not always affect 
all students in the same direction (e.g., positively impact achievement for everyone). This 
violates the no-defiers assumption and problematizes their estimation of LATE.    
183 They are careful to note that the findings among English teachers are considerably imprecise, 
but do not mention that results among middle school students were also more imprecise. 
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conducted student surveys in all participating classrooms and collected multiple videotaped 
lessons for all participating teachers.184 Each lesson was rated using general and subject-specific 
rubrics. These two sources of data were each used to construct standardized scales which were 
incorporated into composite estimators of teacher quality.  
This report, though written in a technical style, provided perhaps the some of the project’s 
clearest findings. First, the authors report that all three measures of teacher quality (value-added, 
observation ratings, and student surveys) are somewhat unreliable –the same measure fluctuates 
from year to year. Second, they show that different instruments of the same ‘mode’ (e.g., 
observation scores for two different rubrics or value-added measures for two different tests) are 
far more correlated than with each other than they are with any other mode (e.g., value-added 
with observations). They interpret this to mean that each indicator is capturing a relatively 
unique aspect of teacher effectiveness.185 Finally, they demonstrate that the optimal weighting of 
a composite estimate of teacher quality depends almost entirely on the outcome one wants to 
predict. If, for example, one wishes to predict teacher observation scores, the optimal predictor 
will put preponderant weight on another observation score. Their evidence leads them to 
conclude that decisions about how to rate teacher effectiveness are not matters of picking the 
most statistically reliable indicators, but rather of deciding which aspects of teaching are the 
most important outcomes, and that if one outcome is chosen, little is gained by using a composite 
                                                             
184 Goldstein (2015) notes that MET’s protocol of filming teachers at work generated 
controversy in the media. 
185 Looking at the data supporting this point (Table 3 on page 24 of the report), another 
interpretation is possible. The average correlations between the two subjective measures – 
student surveys and teacher observations – are somewhat higher than those between value-added 
and either subjective measure. One interpretation of this is that while observations and surveys 
address what happens in classrooms between teachers and students, test score gains are 
determined by a combination of endogenous and exogenous forces.   
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estimate (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013, p. 39). If any composite measure is to 
be used, the authors suggest equally weighting each of the three modes of assessment. 
Nonetheless, much of the report focuses on how to optimally weight and reliably predict teacher 
quality when value-added is the outcome of interest. This focus was chosen based on “the current 
policy focus on improving student test scores” (p. 25). 
While recognizing the scope and importance of the MET study, critics have raised questioned the 
presentation and interpretation of its findings. When considering the RCT specifically, such high 
levels of attrition raise serious concerns about generalizability of those results.  After 
problematizing the assumptions laid out in the first MET report [see footnote 28 above], 
Rothstein (2011) critiques the report’s assertion that different test instruments consistently 
identify effective teachers. Individual teachers’ between-test correlations averaged .54 in 
mathematics and .37 in ELA, indicating that many teachers identified as effective by one test 
would be ranked below average by the other test.186 Rothstein also challenges the authors’ 
estimation and correlation of a stable component of value-added, which can be inferred by 
statistical procedures, but not definitively ascertained. Further, reporting correlations between the 
stable components of value-added measures overstates the precision of VA estimates (Rothstein 
J. , 2011, pp. 3-5). The MET study’s admittedly imprecise method of converting test score gains 
into months of student learning has been criticized by as a way of inflating the value of 
objectively small differences in actual test performance (Rubinstein, 2014; 2013; DiCarlo M. , 
                                                             
186 Language is conveniently flexible among MET reports. The authors call a correlation of 0.54 
between value-added measures “moderately large” (Kane & Cantrell, 2010, p. 9). However, 
when correlating value-added with subjective measures – observations and student surveys – 
0.53 is called “weakly correlated” (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013, p. 28). 
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2012).187  A larger criticism of the early MET findings focuses on the difference between high-
stakes evaluation and research. The value-added data collected were not used for decisions about 
dismissal or tenure; if they were, the data would likely be very different. Thus although the study 
is intended to validate value-added assessment for personnel decisions, it is unable to address 
that issue (Rothstein J. , 2011, p. 7).   
The random assignment component of the MET study has also been subject to scrutiny.  
Rothstein and Mathis (2013) argue that although the study is large in scale, the voluntary opt-in 
by districts and schools meant that even the intended sample was not representative of the US K-
12 system. Participating schools within the six MET districts were on average higher-performing 
than non-participating schools. Further, student non-compliance with the study was far from 
random; students who remained in the study as assigned188 were on average higher-performing 
than those who shifted from their assigned teacher. The authors of this review point out that the 
subgroups that were under-studied in the MET experiment are precisely the subgroups which 
raise questions about bias in value-added assessment (pp. 5-6). Owing to these limitations, they 
argue that the study does little to improve on Kane and Staiger’s 2008 random assignment study 
in Los Angeles and does not resolve the question of whether value-added measures are biased 
based on student sorting. Furthermore, the statistical VA model used in the MET reports is far 
                                                             
187 This method of converting average test scores to months of learning can be traced back to a 
study by Eric Hanushek (1992). It has also featured prominently in research on the effectiveness 
of charter schools (Center for Research on Educational Outcomes, 2012) and of alternative 
teacher certification methods (National Center for Educational Evaluation, 2013).  
188 The MET project final report analyzes all students who were randomly assigned, even though 
a substantial proportion (14 percent) of those did not remain with their assigned teacher (Kane, 
McCaffrey, Miller, & Staiger, 2013, p. 14).  
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more comprehensive than those being used for consequential evaluations – which further limits 
the utility of the results (pp. 7-9).  
Critics regard the Composite Estimator findings as much more interesting, perhaps because they 
are less controversial. That no two modes of evaluation were highly correlated suggests that 
decisions about evaluation are necessarily value judgments, not matters of technical precision.      
Notably, the What Works Clearinghouse, a federally funded program which assesses the strength 
of education research and focuses on experimental and quasi-experimental methods, did not 
assign a rating to the MET study. WWC said that though the study utilized random assignment, it 
did not “test a specific policy, intervention or practice” (What Works Clearinghouse, 2013).189 
But this is not exactly the case. The MET project poses and provides an answer to an ‘RCT-
ready’ question – what is the causal effect of a one unit change in measured teacher 
effectiveness?   So it is interesting that the study was not rated. But the WWC standards suggest 
an explanation.  The review process focuses on Intent-to-Treat (ITT) analyses of effects – which 
were not provided in the MET reports.190 And the MET study population differed substantially 
from the general population on certain key traits (baseline test scores, ELL and Special 
Education status). For the WWC, this compromises the use of the alternative instrumental 
variables (IV) approach. Further, in its use an alternative effect measure, the study does not 
include a baseline equivalency measure of SES, which is a requirement for meeting WWC 
                                                             
189 Despite this claim by WWC, it reviewed parts of the Chetty et al. long-term impacts study 
(What Works Clearinghouse, 2012).  
190 Two of the study’s lead authors have used ITT estimates of treatment effects in a smaller 
study of teacher effectiveness conducted in Los Angeles (Kane & Staiger, 2008). The MET study 
was an elaboration of the design used in that paper (Rothstein & Mathis, 2013). 
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standards when there is high attrition. Thus it is likely that if the WWC were to review the MET 
project as a random assignment study, it would not meet their evidence standards. 
Two key witnesses in the Vergara trial –Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty – each made significant, 
high-profile contributions to value-added research. These contributions feature prominently in 
their expert testimony. But they are not without significant limitations or criticisms.191 Thus we 
now turn to examine the expert testimony to see how their research is translated into trial 
evidence.  
Expert Testimony in Vergara- Raj Chetty 
 
In considering the expert testimony of Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty, I examine transcripts of 
their testimony and the demonstrative exhibits used in their presentations. The transcripts are 
uncertified drafts and were accessed from a website established by the California Teachers 
Union during the trial. The charts and diagrams used by expert witnesses were accessed through 
the Students Matter website.  
Raj Chetty testified in the Vergara trial over the course of two days – January 29th and 30th 2014. 
He was examined by Theodor Boutros for the plaintiffs and cross-examined by James Finberg 
and Nimrod Elliot for the defense. The evidence related to Chetty’s testimony was his National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Working Paper released in 2011 (Chetty, Friedman, & 
Rockoff, 2011a) and slides based on that research.192 The early part of the testimony – 35 
minutes – was spent elaborating on Chetty’s career as an economist – including his degrees, 
                                                             
191 Other criticisms were made of Chetty et al. and the MET project, but I focused on those 
which were available before the trial.    
192 Chetty’s papers were admitted as plaintiffs’ exhibits 7, 8, 9, 11 and 15. The slides were 
admitted as plaintiffs’ exhibit 677 (p. 582).  
  
173 
 
awards, involvement with government officials, and research interest in public economics (p. 
436-455). Before proceeding into his testimony on value-added measurement, Chetty also 
connected VA research to the use of “Big Data” in solving policy problems. He justifies this as 
promoting a scientific and non-ideological approach to social policy – perhaps not considering 
the fact that his role as an expert witness in a trial seeking to undermine teachers unions is a 
profoundly ideological choice (p. 461).193   
His testimony on value-added methodology focused on so-called intuitive concepts rather than 
technical details. For example, measuring gains in learning by subtracting average fourth grade 
test scores from average third grade test scores (p.478) is an intuitive method. But [as I showed 
in chapter one] it is a technically fraught approach to isolating an individual teacher’s 
effectiveness – since there are effectively two teachers’ effects being estimated under a typical 
testing schedule. Chetty’s discussion of demographic controls or ‘fairness variables’ in VAA 
argues that prior year test scores are the only important control (p.482), a claim which is still in 
dispute among VA researchers, especially given that non-random student sorting is prevalent in 
most schools districts (cites).  
The discussion then shifts to the quasi-experimental tests for bias reported in the Long Term 
Impacts paper.  In explaining how teacher turnover creates a natural experiment, he refers to 
random assignment as “a gold-standard scientific experiment” (p.488). This presages the 
testimony given later by Kane, but also belies the trouble with compliance in such studies. He 
                                                             
193 “So at a high level what I’m interested in as an economist, what motivates me is trying to 
bring a scientific approach to bear on public policy issues. I think too often in our public policy 
debate; decisions are made on the basis of ideology or political interests rather than what I think 
can be really scientific answers.” This is consistent with what Chetty argues in a New York Times 
Op-Ed (Chetty, 2013). 
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then describes the quasi-experimental observations of moments in which a highly effective 
teacher (top 5 percent of the VA distribution) enters a grade. Chetty’s description of his own 
findings at this point is inaccurate – he attributes the growth in test scores solely to the highly 
teacher effective teacher (pg.  489).194 On the other hand, the Long-term impacts paper itself 
reports that this is the growth in average test scores across the entire grade, not just in the 
classroom of the newly hired instructor (Chetty, Friedman, & Rockoff, 2011a, p. 61). This is a 
consequential difference because it is not necessarily clear that the newly hired teacher is on her 
own responsible for the growth – one could imagine that instructors can and do collaborate, 
especially when a staff member is new to a school. The same point can also be made in reference 
to the next few minutes of his testimony, which concern the entry and exit of highly effective or 
ineffective teachers (p. 490-500) The year Chetty analyzes is also of consequence – New York 
City (the data source) changed its reading test instrument between the 1995 and 1996 school 
years. As a result, the proportion of students who scored at or above grade level in reading 
dropped from 47.5 percent to 41.6 percent – leading local officials to caution against over-
interpreting the change in test scores (Newman, 1996).   
                                                             
194 “Now what happens as soon as that teacher enters, test score immediately jump up, and they 
continue to stay high for subsequent cohorts of children who are taught by this highly effective 
teacher [emphasis added]” Chetty is clear that these figures are taken from the Long Term 
Impacts paper, which is listed as exhibit 7 for his testimony (p. 492). He clarifies later on that the 
level of analysis is the grade rather than the teacher, but his clarification is far more technical: 
“So let’s say there are four teachers teaching in a particular grade, and one of them is a highly 
ineffective teacher who leaves, we’re not saying look at the test scores of that one teacher. We’re 
saying let’s average the test scores of all the fourth-graders. Now, 25 percent of them were 
exposed to the highly ineffective teacher. Now we’re going to compare that to all fourth graders’ 
test scores on average after that teacher leaves, and the average teacher quality that those 
students face in the next year will be higher…the idea is that on average the entire grade has 
better teachers and that’s the nature of the experiment.” (pg.500) 
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The next part of Chetty’s testimony focuses on forecast bias. This concept [described in footnote 
23 above] is very sophisticated and relies on a complex estimation procedure, which the witness 
and examiner make no attempt to describe.195 The demonstrative evidence is the binned 
scatterplot charts presented in the Long-term Impacts paper, which nicely show points clustering 
around a best fit line, but compress nearly 60,000 data points into only twenty, giving a false 
sense of consistency (slides 214-01 and 214-02). The reported slope of the best fit line (0.98) is 
very near a perfect correlation, and looks more perfect because the outliers among the 60,000 
points are compressed into the binned average points.  
The testimony then turns to the actual long-term impacts cited in the paper, beginning with 
college attendance and earnings.  A major omission of the testimony is the way “long-term 
impacts” are actually determined. The authors infer the long-term impacts of teachers based on 
the correlations between test scores and later outcomes. This is at the heart of Ballou’s (2012) 
critique of their study discussed above. To know that teachers have such long-term impacts, one 
first needs to determine non-spuriousness – whether other variables which correlate with teacher 
value-added are also correlated with long-term outcomes. 
Chetty’s exhibits include three charts taken from the Long-Term Impacts paper, which are again 
the binned scatterplots – though this time 20 data points stand in for 1.1 million student 
observations, which Chetty points out in his testimony (p. 515). This means that 55,000 student 
                                                             
195 “So let me describe how we construct it. On the x-axis are changes in average value-added of 
teachers across consecutive cohorts of students. So like we were using in the [quasi-
experimental] example before, this would be the difference in the average value-added of 
teachers in 1996 minus 1995 in a given school in a given grade in a given subject, okay. And on 
the y-axis is the change in the actual test scores for the students between 1996 and 1995 or 
between the next year and the previous year generally.” This description omits the detail that 
average teacher value-added for a grade-subject in ‘1996 minus 1995’ is estimated without data 
from the years 1996 and 1995, and further likely includes data from years 1997 and later.  
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data points are being compressed into one (slide 204-01). Further, even though Chetty’s 
testimony mentions highly effective and highly ineffective teachers (the top and bottom 5 
percent of the distribution); the lowest bin on the chart’s x-axis indicates an average ranking in 
the 15th percentile, while the highest point is at the 90th percentile.196 The chart’s y-axis is equally 
important to consider, as the range of teacher impacts on college attendance is less than 2 
percentage points. Chetty argues that this represents the impact of a single teacher, and that the 
effects of teachers are cumulative, arguing that the college attendance effect could be “10 or 15 
percentage points,” calling the potential effects “roughly additive.” (p.517). Value-added 
research – including Kane and Staiger’s Los Angeles experiment – has found that teacher effects 
fade out drastically (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Jacob, Lefgren, & Sims, 2010). Nonetheless, Chetty 
argues that this cumulative benefit can also result in cumulative harm in the case of successive 
ineffective teachers.  This point about cumulative teacher effects is reiterated in his testimony 
regarding college quality and student income.     
The discussion of teachers’ impacts on students’ college quality begins by establishing the 
measure used. Chetty and his coauthors gauged a college’s quality based on the mean earnings of 
its graduates 12 years later.197 Chetty refers to this measure as simultaneously indicating a 
                                                             
196 The chart illustrates a point made in Chapter 2; value-added rankings are not normally 
distributed – teacher VA scores tend to cluster in the middle of the distribution. Indeed, five 
binned data points are clustered around to the 50th percentile. Yet Chetty goes on “You can 
directly see from this chart real data with these 1.1 million children. A child who is assigned to a 
teacher who’s in the bottom 5 percent of the distribution, a highly ineffective teacher, based on 
value-added metrics, has a 36 percent chance of attending college in this school district 
compared with approximately 38 percent for a child who is assigned a highly effective teacher in 
the top 5 percent of the distribution.” (pg. 516) 
197 At this point in the testimony, Chetty indicates his involvement with the Obama 
administration’s controversial attempt to rank colleges based on student’s mean post-graduation 
earnings. The initial plan, which would have tied college funding to these ratings, ultimately 
failed in Congress, but the Department of Education’s “college scorecards “ still do report this 
statistic (Fain, 2013; Stratford, 2015).  
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college’s selectivity and its value-added (p. 521). He argues that a single highly effective teacher 
can increase her students’ average college quality by two to three percentage points or $500 in 
additional average post-graduation earnings when compared to a highly ineffective teacher. The 
eighteen points in the middle of the chart are not discussed, as the differences between their 
effects on college quality are far less dramatic than two percentage points.  
Chetty’s testimony then focuses on the earnings impacts of highly effective and highly 
ineffective teachers, using two charts.  The first chart (slide 205-01), drawn from Long-Term 
Impacts, focuses on students’ reported earnings at age 28, shows far more variation than those 
related to college outcomes. As such, the best fit line looks flatter than in the three previous 
figures – the points associated with the two highest ventiles are no higher than some near the 
median. Chetty explains this as statistical noise – despite the analysis being based on over 
360,000 observations – and instead directs attention to the trend line.198  It is of interest that he 
does not cite the $182 difference between the bottom and top five percentiles, which is perhaps 
the most cited figure from the paper. He is saving dollar amounts for a larger idea.  
The next chart deviates from those included in Long-Term Impacts. It presents a normal curve 
with the bottom 5-percent highlighted. He proposes that if schools were to ‘let go’ of teachers in 
this lowest value-added ventile and replace them with average teachers, that the data suggest this 
would improve the lifetime earnings of each child by $50,000, and multiplies this figure by 28 – 
the average class size in the data – to produce a classroom-level effect of $1.4 million. The 
                                                             
198 He does concede that it is possible that “teachers in the very upper tail of the distribution, the 
top 1 percent or the top 2 percent of the value-added distribution might not be having as 
substantial effects on students’ long term earnings as you might predict based on their impacts on 
test scores.” This point tacitly reveals the methodology of the Long Term Impacts study, which 
was described above, but not discussed explicitly in the testimony.  
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$50,000 figure is said to represent a 2 to 3 percentage point increase in lifetime earnings, and is 
further exploited by comparing it to the impact of the “Great Recession” which reduced GDP by 
between 6 and 7 percent. Thus he argues that the “feasible policy” of removing and replacing 
low value-added teachers with average ones would have an effect “on the same order as ending 
the financial crisis again and again, year after year.” (p. 529) 
This point needs detailed explication. As noted earlier, these effect estimates assume little fade 
out of teacher effects over time – a fourth-grader is nine years old and the testimony discusses 
income measured at age 28.199 Further, the testimony did not include the authors’ measures of 
income effects at age 30, which were not significantly different from zero. Even the paper did 
not examine income at other age points under 30 where participation in the labor force is 
robust.200 This “feasible” policy of effectiveness-based layoffs was first mentioned by Eric 
Hanushek in the propaganda film Waiting For Superman. But for such a policy to be feasible, 
school systems would need to have a reserve army at least five percent of the size of their teacher 
labor forces available every year and adequately divided by grade and subject specializations. 
Chetty’s testimony then briefly moves through three other outcomes examined in Long-Term 
Impacts:  teen pregnancy, neighborhood quality, and retirement savings (slides 206-01 through 
206-03). He argues that being assigned to highly ineffective teachers increases the likelihood that 
                                                             
199 Chetty discussed fade-out briefly in the testimony. He acknowledges the fade out of test 
scores documented in the value-added literature and argues that this is why they chose to study 
long-term impacts directly (pg. 537). But this holds only if one accepts studying teachers’ effects 
on earnings via her average marginal effect on test score growth as a direct measure.  
200 For example, the most recent Baccalaureate and Beyond (B&B) survey indicates that about 
80 percent of recent bachelor’s degree recipients were employed by age 26 and that a large 
majority of these held full-time jobs (Cataldi, Siegel, Shepherd, & Cooney, 2014). Labor force 
participation among two-year college students and high-school graduates who did not attend 
college is probably comparable. This suggests that Long Term Impacts could have investigated at 
least three other age points with large sample sizes.    
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female students will have children at or before age 19, reduces the quality of the neighborhood 
that students live in at age 28, and negatively impacts the probability of students having 
retirement savings accounts by age 28. (pgs. 529-532) At this point, Chetty again quickly reveals 
the arbitrary analytic choices made in the study – focusing their analysis on outcomes for 28 
year-olds. Chetty says that this choice was made “simply because we don’t have an adequate 
number of children who are beyond age 28 in our data.” (pg. 532) As Adler (2013)noted in his 
critique of this study, this inadequate number of students is over 61,000 – quite a robust figure by 
most standards. The next slide (205-02) returns to the earnings outcome and tracks the authors’ 
estimated impacts over time from ages 20 to 28. Chetty uses this slide to show that teacher 
effects on student’s earnings trend upward.201 
The next set of comments in Chetty’s testimony respond to three criticisms of value-added 
measures made by other researchers: that VA cannot disentangle the many factors which 
influence student test scores, that VA scores are affected by the students to which teachers are 
assigned, and that VA measures fluctuate from year to year. To the first point, he begins by 
agreeing that many things can affect student test scores; he then makes an analogy to basketball 
to argue that even though many factors affect performance, policy should try to control what it 
can.202 To the second point, Chetty argues that his teacher-switching quasi experiment as well as 
                                                             
201 But this slide also reveals the authors’ selective presentation of their own data. The chart ends 
at age 28, but includes all prior data points. This is inconsistent with the paper, which presented 
earnings estimates for age 30, but for no other age points. The y-axis is the percentage point 
impact on earnings of a teacher one standard deviation above average. The authors correctly 
explain the negative impacts before age 23 – many students are still in college (testimony pg. 
533). After that, we see that the largest single-year jump in the earnings effect occurs between 
age 27 and 28, and that between ages 24 and 26, the average effect is about 1 percentage point. 
One possible explanation for not including these findings in the paper or the testimony is that 
these effects did not achieve statistical significance.   
202 “There are many determinants of a basketball player’s ability. One of the most important is 
perhaps a player’s height. If you are 5’2”, your odds of making it to the NBA are not great 
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Kane and Staiger’s random assignment study in Los Angeles have proved that value-added 
measures are unbiased if they control for prior test scores. Though many researchers agree that 
the Long-Term Impacts paper showed that value-added was capable of capturing teacher 
contributions to test scores, some have still raised objections to their technique of estimating bias 
(Rothstein J. , 2015). Further, reviews of the random assignment study in Los Angeles showed 
that important groups of students were likely excluded. To the final point, the unreliability of VA 
measures, Chetty later responds that simply finding a low correlation between value-added 
                                                             
relative to if you are 6’6” or 7 feet tall…Now does this mean that you shouldn’t be concerned 
about coaching a basketball player, like should we be interested in trying to improve coaching? 
My view is the fact that there are other important determinants of a player’s ability doesn’t mean 
that you should not pay any attention to things you can manipulate.” (p. 540) This is a weak 
defense of value-added as a policy tool; as the proper analogy would be if some coaches got 
teams full of 5’2” players while others got teams full of 6’6” players and we nonetheless had a 
policy of firing those coaches with the lowest average point totals. Chetty makes extended 
analogies to baseball and basketball statistics to support numerous points in his testimony, so it 
seems appropriate to unpack the limits of such an analogy.  
There is a deep affinity between value-added assessment in education and statistics in sports 
management. Baseball analysts have long kept track of certain basic statistics – runs scored, 
batting average, bases stolen, earned run average, etc. But beginning in the 1980s, some baseball 
researchers began applying the tools of statistical inference to “search for objective knowledge 
about baseball” (Grabiner, 1994). The resulting approach – known as Sabermetrics – created new 
statistics for the analysis of the sport which measure players’ contributions accounting for their 
positions and other aspects of their role on a team. The most famous application of these 
principles was on the Oakland Athletics professional team in the 1990s, which was documents 
by Michael Lewis in the book Moneyball. One statistic – value over replacement player (VORP) 
– is precisely the same operative idea behind value-added. A replacement player is defined by 
certain average characteristics for backup players, and active players’ contributions to their 
teams are quantified by their deviation from this average (Woolner, 2001).  
In baseball there are acceptably talented players far in excess of the available positions on major 
league teams (1,200 roster positions are available in all). In such a situation, it makes sense to 
create management policy based on the assumption that average players are available to replace 
your starting players – especially at a league minimum salary of over $500,000 per year. 
However, with a teaching labor force of 3.1 million where salaries average $55,000 per year, a 
value over replacement teacher strategy is hardly tenable. Further, baseball has only one 
“important” outcome – winning games. Nonetheless, VORP combines numerous statistics to 
measure how players contribute to that goal. Education reformers instead seek to use one 
measurement – student test scores – to assess teacher contributions to an undetermined number 
of socially important outcomes.            
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scores from one year to the next is not enough to render the data invalid. He instead returns to his 
dollar-value calculations of the impact of using value-added as a policy tool and says that, 
regardless of how accurate the measure is, an effectiveness-based layoff policy would produce 
$1.4 million in additional income for students, so it is worth it.203 His response to this criticism 
also relies on sports analogies; he notes that batting averages are unreliable and that despite 
basketball players’ average performances, people tend to focus on outliers (p. 554). So with the 
exception of the question of forecast bias, for which his study provides an answer, Chetty’s 
response to criticisms of VA measures is that whatever their flaws, they should be put into 
practice. Broadly, he hinges his belief in the validity of value-added methods on the teacher 
switching quasi-experiment featured in Long Term Impacts. We have seen that this is a strong 
but not infallible piece of evidence. It also does not by itself prove teachers’ long term impacts or 
confirm value-added as standalone measure of teacher quality. 
 The plaintiffs finally ask Chetty to comment on two LAUSD policies – a 16-month teacher 
probation period and the “Last-in-First-out” (LIFO) teacher retention policy. Chetty’s comments 
on these policies both use VA methods as a reference point and invoke to the theorized policy of 
firing teachers in the bottom five percent of the effectiveness along with the hypothesized 
lifetime income benefits it would afford to students. He argues that the probationary period 
should be 3 years instead of 16 months, since the additional years of value-added data would 
more precisely identify the bottom of the distribution for more finely-tuned teacher layoffs – 
though he uses evasive terms “deselecting the bottom five percent” (p. 567).204 Lengthening the 
                                                             
203 “…and that’s the critical point here. The measure is not perfect. Qualitatively it’s correct that 
there is inconsistency, but, that, in my view, a 1.4 million-dollar gain is still very substantial and 
does not undermine the value of the measures.” (p. 553) 
204 The term “deselecting” was first used to describe this policy by Eric Hanushek (2009).  
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probationary period, he argues, would increase students’ lifetime earnings by $163,000 (Slide 
208-03).  
Chetty’s comments on LIFO make use of data analysis commissioned by the plaintiffs rather 
than Long-Term Impacts – thus it is based on analysis of LAUSD data which are significantly 
smaller (500,000 students over three years from 2009-2011) than the New York City data (2.5 
million students over twenty years). The claims he makes about the impacts of different policies 
also require many assumptions about school policy. For example, the court is asked to imagine 
that Los Angeles is asked to lay off five percent of its teacher labor force (p. 573). This is done to 
contrast the possibility of laying off teachers based on effectiveness ratings against doing so 
based on seniority. He notes the LIFO policy results in layoffs across the value-added 
distribution, including many ‘above average’ teachers and some in the top five percent of the 
distribution. 205 Of the latter group of high value-added teachers who would be affected, Chetty 
argues that “we should be doing everything we can to keep these superstars of the teaching 
profession in our school district.” (p. 575) Again returning to sports analogies and says that 
seniority-based layoffs would be akin to cutting Michael Jordan from the basketball team if he 
didn’t do well in his first year. This is dubious; an effectiveness-based layoff policy would be as 
likely (if not more so) to cut a player who didn’t do well. Here his argument against LIFO 
complicates his position on extending the probationary period. If probationary periods – during 
which teachers can be fired with little recourse – were extended to three years, many new 
teachers might be “deselected” before their “superstar” status could be determined.  
                                                             
205 Chetty testifies that about “roughly five percent” of the teachers who would be laid off under 
a LIFO policy would be in the top five percent of the value-added distribution (p. 575). But if his 
demonstrative chart of two largely overlapping normal distributions (slide 201-3) is to be 
believed, that percentage is substantially smaller.    
  
183 
 
Chetty goes on to describe the earnings impacts of switching to a layoff policy based-on the VA 
distribution. This combines the analysis of test score data in Los Angeles with the earnings 
impacts estimated in New York City – which by fiat makes the assumption that such impacts can 
be inferred from one municipality to another. He argues that the impact of removing teachers in 
the bottom five percent of the VA distribution would increase students’ lifetime earnings by $2.1 
million for every teacher laid off (p. 579). After briefly addressing the disproportionate effects of 
LIFO policies on poor and minority students – based on Thomas Kane’s research – Boutros ends 
his examination of Dr. Chetty.206 
Expert Witness Testimony in Vergara – Thomas Kane 
 
Dr. Thomas Kane testified over two days from February 5th to February 6th 2014.207 He was 
examined by He states that his primary research interest since 2006 has been teacher 
effectiveness, and that from 2008 to 2012 he was on leave from Harvard to work as deputy 
director of K-12 programs at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (Feb 5 PM Session, 
                                                             
206 The cross-examination is shorter and far less focused, so I only discuss it briefly.  James 
Finberg, the first cross-examining attorney for the defense, begins by confirming that Chetty has 
never actually taught or been an administrator in a K-12 classroom (p. 587). But he seemed too 
unfamiliar with VA methods or with Chetty’s testimony to effectively cross-examine. After 
failed attempts to talk about Chetty’s Long-Term Impacts study, Finberg questions Chetty on in-
school and out-of-school factors other than teacher effectiveness that could impact student 
achievement, establishing from Chetty’s research that smaller class size and teacher experience 
were also shown to be correlated with better long-term student outcomes (p. 595-602). He further 
confirms from Chetty’s own research that cities in California including Los Angeles were ranked 
high on a social mobility index, and that the quality of local schools was one important factor in 
determining levels of social mobility (p. 606-609). Nimrod Elliot, the second cross-examiner, 
confirms Chetty’s hourly retainer rate as an expert witness, $825 per hour and that the portions 
of his expert testimony on LIFO policies were conducted as an expert witness and not subject to 
peer review (p. 610). His final questions clarify some of Chetty’s model specifications on the 
LIFO analyses.  
207 Since there were no readily available transcripts, I rely on a video of Kane’s testimony from 
the Courtroom View Network. References refer to the date and time of the session and the time 
stamp of the video. Citations to the slides are the same as done with Chetty’s testimony.  
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2h43m).208 It was during this time that he worked on the MET project with the specific goal of 
developing “systematic, replicable measures of teacher effectiveness.” (Feb 5 PM Session, 
2h47m).209 
The first remarks Kane makes with respect to teacher evaluation concern standard classroom 
observations, which he regards as “perfunctory.” (Feb 5, PM, 2h48m) He then gives the main 
point from the five MET study reports – that they have identified stable, unbiased measures of 
teacher effectiveness and that those measures correlate with observed student achievement gains 
(Feb 6, AM 0h1m). He mentions a number of his teacher effectiveness studies, including a 
replication of Chetty’s Long Term Impacts (Bacher-Hicks, Kane, & Staiger, 2014) and the 
random assignment study in Los Angeles which he referred to as a miniature MET project (Kane 
& Staiger, 2008) (Feb 6, AM, 0h7m).   
Kane was retained to comment on five topics, three of which are conceptual in relation to teacher 
effectiveness, and two which are specific to Los Angeles schools (Slide 356-01). His opinion on 
Los Angeles is that the district shows wider variation in teacher effectiveness than do many other 
cities and that Black and Hispanic students are disproportionately assigned to ineffective 
teachers. But he begins by discussing teacher effectiveness generally and the MET study in 
particular.  
                                                             
208 Kane connects his selection to head the MET study to his work with Doug Staiger and Robert 
Gordon, “Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job” (Gordon, Kane, & 
Staiger, 2006).  
209 He describes systematic and replicable measures later on in his testimony and clarifies that 
this refers to student surveys and scored teacher observations in addition to student test scores 
(Feb 6 AM 0h21m). Kane generally seems more careful in his comments about Value-Added 
models.  
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The first few minutes of testimony are primarily drawn from a Gates Foundation Policy and 
Practice Brief on Ensuring Fair and Reliable Measures of Effective Teaching.210 Kane starts his 
opinion by saying that is essential for school districts to measure teacher effectiveness. He 
supports this by saying that measurement is essential so that teachers can “develop their own 
effectiveness” through feedback, and that not doing so would be like “running Weight Watchers 
without bathroom scales or mirrors” (Feb 6, AM 0h18m). He advocates direct measures of 
student achievement gains where possible and other data – observations and student surveys – 
which are known to be related to student achievement gains (Slide 359-01). He distinguishes 
between these measures and others – such as teacher credentials and certifications – which have 
been shown to be uncorrelated with student test score gains (Feb 6 AM, 0h26m).  
Kane and Lipschutz (the plaintiff’s attorney) engage in a discussion of Campbell’s Law (Slide 
360-01).211 The quote from Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change refers both to the 
                                                             
210 Rothstein and Mathis (2013) point out that these policy briefs do not provide the level of 
detail of the full papers and give the impression that random assignment was unproblematic.  
211 The slide quotes “The more any quantitative social indicator is used for social decision-
making, the more subject it will be to corruption pressures and the more apt it will be to distort 
and corrupt the social processes it is intended to monitor…Many commentators, including 
myself (1969b), assume that the use of multiple measures, all recognized as imperfect, will 
alleviate the problem, although Ridgeway (1956) doubts this.”  
 
The quotation is misleading. The ellipsis – which is intended for use when the meaning of a 
quote is unchanged by the omission – omits ten pages of text. In those ten pages, Campbell 
discusses at length the “highly corruptible” nature of student achievement tests (Campbell, 1976, 
p. 61), the phenomenon known as “creaming” – where the most difficult cases are excluded from 
accountability metrics (p. 60), and the need to have practitioner organizations  cooperate in the 
measurement process using the example of a teachers’ union (p. 63).  
 
In the same paper, Campbell explicitly urges evaluation researchers to refuse to conduct the sort 
of research that Kane and Chetty have advanced. His point is worth quoting at length – and 
without substantive omission: “I recommend that we evaluation researcher methodologists 
should refuse to use our skills in ad hominem research. While the expensive machinery of social 
experimentation can be used to evaluate persons, it should not be. Such results are of very 
limited generalizability… (5 lines down) This prohibition on ad hominem research should also 
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corruption of quantitative indicators and to Campbell’s support for using multiple measures – but 
the attorney pushes Kane’s testimony to focus on the value of value-added as a single 
quantitative indicator (Feb 6 AM, 0h36m).212  
Nonetheless, Kane makes an interesting point here; triangulation of multiple sources of data 
around a concept is an important way to validate findings, and perhaps to improve evaluation 
policy. But one also needs to question how much the MET project really promoted ‘multiple 
measures.’ As we saw above, the measure of an important measure is, for MET, its correlation 
with Value-Added. Kane emphasizes this both in the MET reports and in his expert testimony. 
So if all the measures are conceptually bound to a single measure, how many measures do we 
really have?   
The testimony then turns to the MET findings on multiple measures – Value-Added, Student 
Surveys, and Classroom Observations. Kane’s remarks here center on whether the combined 
metrics developed in the MET project perform better than existing methods of making teacher 
tenure and retention decisions. Similar to other proponents of VA, Kane evaluates value-added 
                                                             
be extended to program clients. We should not be evaluating students or welfare recipients but 
alternative policies for dealing with their problems.” (Campbell, 1976, p. 56)     
212 The exchange is important. “Now does Campbell’s law mean that you cannot measure teacher 
effectiveness using Value Added Measures? No. Why Not? The implication of the first statement 
is that if you used just Value-Added, there’s a danger that it would become distorted. But the 
second part of Campbell’s Law is implying that the way to alleviate that problem is to collect 
multiple measures that would allow you to lessen the chance that teachers or principals or 
whomever would improperly try to distort the behavior you’re trying to incentivize. But even if 
you used only Value-Added measures, would that provide you any insight into a teacher’s 
effectiveness? Yes. If one only had a Value-Added measure, one could characterize differences 
in effectiveness, but one wouldn’t want to use that as the sole measure and apply it in an 
evaluation system because the measure may no longer be measuring the things that you think it 
is. But if you take an existing data set and apply Value-Added to that existing data set where 
Value-Added is not used for high-stakes purposes, can you use Value-Added to assess teacher 
effectiveness? Yes.”  
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not on its own strength, but on its comparative merits (see for example (Harris D. N., Value-
Added Measures in Education: What Every Educator Needs to Know, 2011)). The chart which 
informs this testimony demonstrates a circular logic; existing measures of teacher quality are 
compared with the MET composite based on their respective correlations with student test score 
gains – one component of the MET composite. This same circular logic is evident in one of 
MET’s three culminating reports (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Staiger, & Lockwood, 2013), where the 
authors find that each measure of effective teaching is only strongly correlated with itself.  
On the same point (Slide 365-01; Slide 366-01) Kane begins to use a misleading measure of 
student achievement to support his position on the use of VA measures. His slides convert 
standardized test scores to months of student learning (Feb 6 AM, 0h50m-56m). Later in his 
testimony, one chart indicates that this procedure of converting test score gains to months 
follows Hill et al. 2008 (Slide371-01). That paper – originally released as a technical report 
released by the research firm MDRC – estimates average annual student test score growth by 
grade level; it never endorses the practice of converting test score gains into months of learning 
(Hill, Bloom, Black, & Lipsey, 2007).213 As noted above, this conversion was first used by 
Hanushek (1992) and has been subject to criticism. 
The next section of Kane’s testimony focuses on the MET random assignment study. As with 
Chetty’s testimony, random assignment is described as the only way to make causal claims based 
on research (Feb 6 AM, 1h05m). He then relies on slides which plots predicted and observed 
                                                             
213 Specifically, Hill et al. includes a table which shows the average student test score gains by 
grade level across six nationally-normed math tests and seven nationally-normed reading tests (p. 
3). Because the MET study focuses on grades 4 through 8, Kane averages the annual test score 
gains across those five grade levels (.420 standard deviations) and then divides by twelve to 
calculate the average month of student learning – .035 standard deviations (author’s calculation 
based on Hill et al. 2007 and Kane et al. 2013).   
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student achievement gains (Slide 369-01, 370-01). Unlike the previous slides, predicted teacher 
effectiveness is only measured by value-added. The chart is a binned scatterplot like those 
featured in Chetty’s testimony; in this case, each of the twenty points represents 40 teachers, 
meaning that the plot could have instead featured 800 points (Feb 6 AM, 1h10m-13m). This is 
different from Chetty’s charts insofar as it would have been feasible to plot 800 points without 
too much clutter; however, it would likely have been a far less persuasive picture.  In both slides 
(Math and ELA), the slopes of the regression lines are much more shallow than those in Chetty’s 
Long Term Impacts papers. Kane ultimately states his opinion based on this evidence: that 
teacher probationary periods should be extended. He does this relying on an odd analogy to 
dating.214 Contrary to Kane’s emphasis on multiple measures, his discussion of the benefits of 
extending the probationary period for new teachers focuses solely on the additional years of test 
score data which that extension affords (Feb 6 AM, 1h38m).  
Kane’s testimony on his second topic – differences in teacher effectiveness – relies on his study 
of teachers in the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD), which replicates the first 
section of Chetty et al. and relies solely on VA measures of effectiveness (Feb 6 AM 1h56m). He 
defends this study against his emphasis on multiple measures, arguing that the point of the 
LAUSD study was to validate VA measures, not to recommend VA as a standalone teacher 
evaluation policy. It is important to note that in the paper based on these data, Kane and his 
                                                             
214 “Now do you have an opinion about whether a year and a half is enough time for a school 
district to gather the evidence…to make an informed judgment about a teacher’s effectiveness? 
My opinion is that it’s not long enough; it’s analogous to telling people that they can have a 
maximum of one-and-a-half dates before they decide to get married. Certainly after one date it’s 
possible to identify matches that won’t work out, but I don’t think it’s possible after one-and-a-
half dates to be really confident that this commitment you’re making is worthwhile. If we limited 
people to one-and-a-half dates before making marriage decisions, we’d have a lot of bad 
marriages” (Feb 6 AM, 1h34-36m). This analogy is simply too absurd to seriously consider, but 
Kane insists on this logic, returning to it after being cross-examined (Feb 6 PM, 1h48m). 
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colleagues do not mention the need for multiple measures as they justify the validity of VA 
measures as a policy tool (Bacher-Hicks, Kane, & Staiger, 2014). The testimony notes three 
findings from the LAUSD study: that teacher effectiveness measures are predictable, that the 
effects of teacher assignment are larger than those found in New York, and that ineffective 
teachers are disproportionately assigned to Black and Latino students (Slide 364-01). The first 
finding is supported by a binned regression plot similar to those used in Chetty’s testimony 
(Slide 351-01, cf. Slide 214-01) and similar statements by Kane (Feb 6 AM, 2h00m).   
The argument regarding the effects of teacher assignment on learning is supported by charts 
comparing the effect size differences in the LAUSD study to those in Long Term Impacts and the 
MET study (Slides 371-01 and 372-01). Specifically, Kane notes the learning differences 
between the bottom 5 percent and average teachers, using the same months of learning 
conversion described above, across the three studies. This makes the effect of teacher assignment 
in Los Angeles look far more dramatic than in other municipalities; the chart shows students 
with the lowest VA teachers losing 9.5 “months” of ELA learning and 11.7 “months” of math 
learning – an entire school year. This is compared to 6.6/7.0 months in the New York (as found 
by Chetty et al.) and 4.8/6.7 months in the six MET districts. The prosecutor emphasizes this 
comparison with the following exchange: 
“That means that I lose 11.73 months or an entire year of learning relative to students 
assigned to the average teacher. How is that possible, Dr. Kane? How could a student 
lose an entire year of learning in one year? By not learning very much…So what is the 
conclusion we should take from this slide? Although there are differences in all three 
districts associated with being assigned to a bottom fifth percentile teacher rather than the 
average teacher, the differences are larger and the consequences are larger in Los 
Angeles…” (Feb 6 AM, 2h06m) 
Kane makes two final points regarding the LAUSD study. The first is that Black and Latino 
students are assigned to teachers who have on average lower VA scores. The second is that those 
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students are more likely to be assigned to teachers in the bottom five percent of the VA 
distribution.  His demonstrative slide again uses the months of learning metric. Kane refines the 
point by suggesting that the “maldistribution” of teachers in Los Angeles is widening racial 
achievement gaps. But in making this point he also notes that students in the data who started a 
year with lower test scores were more likely to be assigned to low VA teachers.215 Inadvertently, 
this reinforces arguments for student sorting made by Rothstein (2010)and others (Garrett & 
Steinberg, 2015). In describing the reasons for the maldistribution of teachers, he says that 
policies which make premature tenure decisions or make it hard to fire ineffective teachers could 
lead to what he calls a “Lemon Accumulation Machine.”216 He further says that low VA teachers 
tend to settle in schools with higher proportions of black and Latino students owing to labor 
market forces (Feb 6 AM, 2h26m-28m). 
The direct examination concludes after Kane briefly addresses how the MET study complements 
the findings of Long Term Impacts. James The first cross-examination on behalf of the California 
Teachers’ Association is conducted by James Finberg. He begins in the same way as with 
Chetty, confirming that Kane has never been a teacher or administrator in a public school. But 
                                                             
215 “We also looked at differences in the effectiveness of teachers assigned to students who 
started the year low on state achievement tests to those who started the year high on state 
achievement tests. And the relationship we saw was that students who started the year lower on 
the state tests were assigned less effective teachers one average than [sic] students who started 
the year with higher achievement on state tests.” (Feb 6 AM, 2h25m) In other words, the best 
teachers are assigned to the best students – one wonders how these teachers got to be the “best.”    
216 He describes this phrase in more detail. “In any system where districts have to make tenure 
decisions prematurely and where it is difficult to make dismissal decisions later, ineffective 
teachers will tend to accumulate. It’s sort of an inevitable result of those two factors and the 
regrettable implication is that ineffective teachers then tend to accumulate in the schools where 
there are more vacancies. And the schools where there are more vacancies are often the schools 
where there are large accumulations of African American or Latino students.” (Feb 6 PM, 0h1m) 
One gets the impression from this remark that the same forces that make a school desirable to 
teachers are the same environmental factors that lead to higher test scores – and consequently to 
higher teacher VA ratings. I demonstrated this in Chapter 2.  
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his cross-examination of Kane is much more substantial, lasting over an hour. As with the direct 
examination, I only focus on portions which pertain to VA assessment.  
The defense attorney first establishes, based on language from one MET study (The Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation, 2013),  that Kane prefers evaluations which use multiple measures, 
and that such evaluations produce more consistent estimates of teacher effectiveness. He then 
confirms Kane’s belief that relying on a single indicator (such as state test scores) can have 
negative consequences for students, teachers and schools (Feb 6 PM, 0h15m-35m).217 Relying 
from the LAUSD study, the defense establishes that teacher mal-distribution was related not only 
on race/ethnicity but also to prior-year student test scores, both within and between schools (Feb 
6 PM, 0h38m-44m). Using Kane’s Hamilton project study (Gordon, Kane, & Staiger, Identifying 
Effective Teachers Using Performance on the Job, 2006) he establishes that Kane believes that 
working conditions affect teachers’ labor market decisions, that schools can get information 
about teacher effectiveness using less than three years of data, and that the authors did not 
advocate dismantling or substantially altering the teacher tenure system (Feb 6 PM, 0h50m-
1h11m). He finally utilizes the work of other scholars (Rothstein J. , 2010; Papay & Kraft, 
Productivity returns to experience in the teacher labor market: Methodological challenges and 
new evidence on long-term career improvement, 2015) to confirm with Kane that test score 
                                                             
217 Across all the witnesses I considered, cross-examinations were labored by objections from the 
plaintiffs. In Kane’s case, it took nearly 20 minutes to establish these two points. The defense 
attempted to establish that Kane doesn’t believe multiple measures are necessary to identify 
effective teaching, but the plaintiffs’ objection to this line of questioning was sustained by Judge 
Treu. Generally, the judge seemed very impatient with the defense’s questioning method.  
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impacts fade over time and that teacher experience is positively related to student achievement 
gains(Feb 6 PM, 1h12m-1h15m).218  
Kane is also briefly examined by an attorney for the State of California. She establishes that 
Kane believes multiple measures to be important to prevent ‘gaming’ of the tests or cheating, and 
that such would be a consequence of sole reliance on VA measures (Feb 6 PM, 1h17m). She also 
establishes that the study did not consider whether individual teachers were teaching out-of-field, 
which she calls “mis-assignment” (1h20m). She finally establishes with Kane many in-school 
and out-of-school factors other than teachers affect student performance (1h24m).  
Expert Testimony – Jesse Rothstein 
 
Attorneys for the defense called UC-Berkeley professor Jesse Rothstein as an expert witness on 
March 6th, 2014. Direct examination lasted four hours; cross examination took an additional 
hour, making Rothstein’s the longest testimony among the experts on value-added.  The length 
of his testimony owes both to the frequency of procedural objections made by the plaintiffs’ 
legal team, and to the fact that Rothstein addresses both value-added models and the broader 
issue teacher tenure and dismissal policies.  
The substantive basis for the first part of Rothstein’s testimony is his paper “Teacher Quality 
Policy When Supply Matters” (2012). The paper responds to the hypothetical policy of annually 
                                                             
218 Papay and Kraft’s (2015) study was originally released as a working paper in 2014, and 
concludes based on North Carolina data that teachers continue to grow in effectiveness (as 
measured by Value-Added) beyond the first three years. This calls into question the prevailing 
wisdom from economists that VA levels off after three years – which is the rationale for the 
probationary period proposed in Chetty and Kane’s testimonies. In a related study, they also find 
that these returns to experience vary based on the level of support teachers receive in their 
schools (Kraft & Papay, 2014). This again suggests that context matters, a point largely elided by 
VA proponents. 
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firing teachers in the bottom five percent of the effectiveness distribution and to that of 
prolonging the mandatory teacher probation period by posing the issue of teacher supply.  Given 
that no municipalities have yet implemented such policies, Rothstein uses simulations to infer 
how such policies would alter the teacher labor market. The idea of simulation research initially 
confuses the court (Mar 6 AM, 0h23-25m) and prompts numerous objections from the plaintiffs 
(Mar 6 AM, 0h23m-43m).219 In this portion of his testimony, Rothstein addresses a number of 
broad concerns about high-stakes teacher evaluation policies in terms of new and continuing 
teachers’ perceptions of their job security.  
Following the arguments made in his paper, Rothstein suggests that potential teachers consider a 
number of factors when deciding to enter the field. Since the pay is low relative to other jobs for 
college graduates, teaching has to appeal to new recruits for non-salary reasons – job security 
being important among them. Further, since teachers’ earnings tend to be “back-loaded” – 
greater at the end of their careers – job security remains an important consideration among 
continuing teachers (Mar 6 PM, 0h1m-3m). Given this, Rothstein contends that evaluation 
systems and tenure policies which increase the likelihood of arbitrary or capricious layoffs serve 
to reduce the attractiveness of the profession both to potential new teachers and to existing 
teachers, and make it harder to recruit and retain effective educators (Mar 6 PM, 0h18m). His 
early testimony only tangentially addresses value-added models. For example, he argues that the 
economic returns to extending the probationary period suggested by Chetty in his testimony – 
and based on the Long Term Impacts paper – would be offset by the broader teacher labor market 
                                                             
219 Chetty’s evidence on teacher dismissal policy, though based on empirical data both rely on 
simulated counterfactual policies. Many early studies of VA methods similarly relied on 
simulations like those conducted by Rothstein, including Hanushek’s early work. However, their 
conjectures prompt no objections from the defense. As we have seen, this seems to be a 
difference of style between the two legal teams. 
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effects of such a policy (Mar 6 AM, 1h34m-35m).220 He then makes a case that employing VA 
instead of seniority-based rules in reductions in force would negatively impact teaching in a 
number of ways including increased cost of evaluations, and decreased attachment of teachers to 
their schools and communities (Mar 6 PM, 0h24m-33m). In short, this section of Rothstein’s 
testimony suggests that using effectiveness-based layoff policies could do substantive harm to 
schools by placing too much emphasis on indicators taken out-of-context.  Ironically, teacher 
dismissal policies that explicitly seek to improve aggregate teacher effectiveness could end up 
having the opposite effect if they in the process make teachers less willing to enter or remain in 
teaching. 
Rothstein’s testimony then shifts to value-added models and the testimony given by Raj Chetty 
and Thomas Kane. In addition to echoing some of the caveats presented above, Rothstein’s 
critique of Chetty presents two additional problems which compromise his claim that VA 
measures are unbiased. First, Chetty’s concept of bias is shown to fundamentally different from 
what other VA researchers. Whereas most research on value-added holds teacher ability constant 
when testing for bias, the bias tests featured in Long Term Impacts allow teacher effectiveness to 
grow or diminish over time.  According to Rothstein’s testimony, Chetty Freidman and Rockoff 
changed this specification between versions of their study, and essentially “redefined bias as 
non-bias.”221 Second, he argues that Chetty et al.’s teacher-switching experiment – which was 
                                                             
220 Rothstein also argues that a lengthened probationary period proposed by VA proponents 
would harm student achievement because ineffective teachers would likely remain in the system 
until they were denied tenure (Mar 6 AM, 1h10m-12m). 
221 “And in the first version of the study, he found that it didn't, so he found what I would 
interpret as evidence for bias. In the second version of the study based on feedback that I gave 
him and I'm sure that others gave him as well, there was a new interpretation of that evidence, 
and so he changed the question somewhat. So in the past, all VA studies assume that teachers 
have a fixed level of effectiveness, and that what we were doing with VA was trying to measure 
that; but that the teachers underlying level of effectiveness didn't change from year to year. And 
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also used to prove non-bias – was not a very strong test. While the paper implies that teacher-
switching only occurred between schools, many of the actual incidents of switching were grade 
changes within schools (Mar 6 PM, 0h43-45m). This is a consequential difference, since VA 
research (including Chapter 2 above) shows that teacher effectiveness estimates are affected by 
school context. Teacher-switching within schools therefore doesn’t demonstrate the robustness 
of teacher quality, and serves to contaminate Long Term Impacts’ evidence of non-bias. 
The defense then asks about the strength of Kane’s random assignment studies as evidence of 
non-biased VA estimates.  Again, Rothstein offers two additions to the caveats already detailed 
above. He notes that the mini-MET study in Los Angeles (Kane & Staiger, 2008) was a 
voluntary opt-in study and that the data show the teacher pairs selected by principals to be very 
similar: 
“Also in that study the pairs of teachers he had were carefully selected in the sense that 
principals were allowed to nominate teachers to participate in it, and many of the 
principals who they asked to participate declined to participate, and so one of the 
concerns is that the pairs of the teachers they were looking at in that study were more 
similar to each other than our normal pairs of teachers. They're teachers for whom the 
principal doesn't care which students are assigned to which teacher. And so that's a 
setting where I would expect there to be relatively little bias, and it doesn't tell you much 
about the broader setting.” (Mar 6 PM, 0h48m)    
Although Rothstein acknowledges that although the MET study was far larger and therefore 
“less selected,” he contends that the non-compliance was systematic in ways which would tend 
to reduce estimates of VA bias. He further notes that even among the compliers, there was 
                                                             
the Chetty et al. evidence suggested that that wasn't true; some teachers are becoming more 
effective over time, some teachers are becoming less effective over time. And so he changed the 
bias question to ask whether models from this year predict next year’s impacts as well we would 
expect if the teachers are becoming more or less effective over time, and there was no bias 
beyond that. So in other words he redefined what previous research would have called bias as 
non-bias, and once you redefine that, he found what he calls evidence of non-bias.” (Mar 6 PM, 
0h42m). 
  
196 
 
evidence of bias in English Language Arts (Mar 6 PM, 0h51m). Ultimately he feels that although 
MET is an important study, non-compliance precludes the researchers from being able to 
generalize their findings.  
The next section of Rothstein’s remarks focuses on volatility in Value-Added scores, and is 
based on an article he co-authored with Linda Darling-Hammond and others (Darling-Hammond, 
Amrein-Beardsley, Haertel, & Rothstein, 2012).222  Rothstein reiterates that the reliability issues 
with VA scores undercut the face validity of these measures and opens up the teacher evaluation 
process to legal challenges from teachers. Based mostly on his own work (Rothstein J. , 2010), 
he states that teacher effects as measured by VA are subject to dramatic fade out after the first 
year (Mar 6 PM, 0h58m-1h02m). He is also asked to evaluate Kane and Chetty’s conversion of 
test score impacts into “months of learning”; he contends that this measure is misleading because 
“nobody has ever actually done the study of ‘what is the impact of keeping the kids in school for 
two more months or two fewer months’.” ((Mar 6 PM, 1h09m). 
The capstone of Rothstein’s testimony came at the very end, and did not rely on simulation, but 
on an extant counterfactual to the challenged tenure statutes: charter schools. Rothstein testified 
that if the challenged statutes were harming student achievement, then charter schools – whose 
teachers generally do not benefit from those statutes – would out-perform traditional public 
schools. However: 
“…they don't on average perform better than the traditional public schools, and that 
suggests that these regulations are not the cause of less than desired performance in the 
traditional public schools." (Mar 6 PM, 1h58m-59m) 
                                                             
222 This paper’s contentions about the volatility of VA scores has already been discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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The plaintiffs’ cross-examination built on their frustration with Rothstein’s simulation 
methods.223 The plaintiffs attempt to undercut Rothstein’s testimony by showing that despite his 
claims about teacher labor force policies, he lacks empirical evidence about California’s policies. 
They also get Rothstein to testify to the value of VA models for research purposes, including his 
own.  Nonetheless, they were unable to unseat the charter school evidence, leading to them to 
call another witness as a rebuttal.  
Expert Testimony: Eric Hanushek 
 
Eric Hanushek was called by the plaintiffs in a rebuttal.  Specifically, he was called to rebut 
expert witness testimony offered by the defendants – specifically Jesse Rothstein.224 His 
testimony shows the links between many concepts and events presented in this and other 
chapters. Indeed, the defense refers to Hanushek as “the father of Value-Added.” Hanushek was 
an expert witness in the 1973 Serrano v. Priest case, which was the precursor to Vergara in 
relating school funding to systemic inequality. In that case, he testified for the defense 
(California Public Schools) that teacher effectiveness mattered far more than school funding in 
                                                             
223 The plaintiffs’ cross-examination shows the difference that highly-paid counsel makes. Every 
point in their cross-examination was researched to correspond with Rothstein’s pre-trial 
deposition. By contrast, defense cross-examinations seemed far less planned. Indeed, the strategy 
of undercutting Rothstein’s simulation study could have been used against Chetty, who relied on 
data from New York, and Kane who relied on an RCT with high non-compliance.   
224 The defense objects repeatedly to the plaintiff’s use of Hanushek as a rebuttal witness, 
arguing the plaintiffs were simply trying to get the last word, rather than to make an authentic 
rebuttal. The defense attempted to undercut the validity of value-added assessments as a teacher 
evaluation metric, just as the plaintiffs attempted to establish its validity in order to make the 
case of harm done to students by California teacher tenure policy. The judge ultimately admitted 
Hanushek as a witness, asking the plaintiffs to focus on specific testimony of defense witnesses 
(Mar 24 AM, 0h36m-39m). For the purposes of my argument, the rebuttal shows that Vergara 
was as much about Value-Added methodology as about California teacher tenure.  
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determining student achievement (Mar 24 AM, 0h15m-16m).225 He served as an expert witness 
in twenty school funding equity cases since the 1970s; his amicus brief in Horne v. Flores, an 
Arizona funding equity case from 2009, was cited by Justice Samuel Alito in the Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion.  
The theme of Hanushek’s remarks on VA was that the defense’s case made value-added out to 
be flawed for use in high stakes decisions, but that this misstates the purpose of VA altogether. 
Hanushek summarily refutes the various critiques of VA offered by defense expert witnesses 
(volatility of measures, bias, perverse incentives, etc.), saying that these criticisms are “irrelevant 
to some uses of value-added, and misleading with regards to others.” (Mar 24 AM, 0h26m). For 
example, he argues that economists use VA to gauge the difference between average teachers 
and ineffective teachers in the aggregate, not to evaluate individual teachers, and that this “main 
use” is unaffected by bias in VA measures (Mar 24 AM, 0h28m). In essence, Hanushek attempts 
to refute criticism of the policy uses to which VA is being put by reasserting the research 
purposes for which he created it. In principle, this is an acceptable position. However given the 
focus of the case and the hypothetical VA-based policy which Kane and Chetty rely upon to 
establish specific harm to students, this is misleading testimony.   
Hanushek’s first substantive testimony regards his claim that firing the bottom five percent of 
value-added teachers would bring US educational attainment up to the level of Finland. He 
testifies that his five percent proposal implies using multiple measures for high stakes decisions, 
and that he would not support a system based only on VA (Mar 26 AM, 0h40m). However, his 
published work on this policy proposal is based solely on Value-Added measures of teacher 
                                                             
225 More recently, Hanushek wrote a book on the subject of funding and achievement (Hanushek 
& Lindseth, 2009). 
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effectiveness, and actually advocates firing between five and ten percent of teachers each year 
(Hanushek E. A., 2009).  
The next important point he makes is a response to earlier testimony by Jesse Rothstein that 
firing teachers would not generate the achievement gains promised by Hanushek and others 
(Staiger & Rockoff, 2010). This is based on Rothstein’s own simulation study (2012), which was 
later published in the American Economic Review. Hanushek critiques Rothstein’s study by 
arguing that: 
“...economists sometimes use very simplified models to study different outcomes, and 
that’s what this is, and in fact a constructed model to show a specific thing in this 
case…perhaps the best analogy is that if I sat here and put a rabbit into my hat and then 
turned around and reached into my hat and pulled out a rabbit, you shouldn’t be 
surprised. He has constructed a model that tries to relate characteristics of teacher 
contracts to a stylized version of the teacher labor market and their implications for 
student outcomes, but it takes a strong a specialized view which has no bearing on the 
reality that we’ve seen…” (Mar 24 AM, 0h52m-53m) 
 
Ironically, much early work on Value-Added relied on simulation data, and the very same 
critique of simplified modeling and circular logic can and has been leveled at past and present 
VA research. Hanushek further argues that Rothstein is wrong about the teacher labor market, 
stating that there is a “reserve army of people looking to enter teaching.”  He criticizes 
Rothstein’s reliance on the Tennessee STAR experiment to infer class size effects on 
achievement, since the effect is only found in Kindergarten and first grade and other studies of 
class-size reduction show no effects on achievement (Mar 24 AM, 0h57m). But the STAR 
experiment was a large random assignment study (the largest educational experiment ever prior 
to the MET project), which according to many analysts found significant effects across grade 
levels. For Hanushek to diminish its findings would be akin to dismissing Kane’s study on 
Value-Added. On the issue of teacher-pupil ratio, Hanushek’s research takes Rothstein’s role, 
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picking apart the evidence by meticulously mapping out the educational context (Hanushek E. 
A., 1999). The plaintiff’s end their examination of Hanushek on this point.226     
The teachers’ union’s cross-examination of Hanushek first focuses on VA models. The defense 
establishes that Hanushek sees potential issues with the use of VA models, particularly the 
possibility that reliance on student achievement gains may lead to ‘teaching to the test’ or 
cheating (Mar 24 AM, 1h25m). They then establish that Hanushek views other factors – schools, 
neighborhoods, peers, families – as pertinent to student achievement (Mar 24 AM, 1h29m). In 
terms of the teacher labor force question, the defense unsuccessfully attempts to establish that 
Hanushek’s five percent policy would increase the risk of working as a teacher.  
The next piece of the cross-examination focuses on a series of studies by the Center for Research 
on Educational Outcomes (CREDO) which compares charter school and public school 
performance. In direct examination, Hanushek referred to a CREDO report on Los Angeles 
charter schools to argue that charter schools outperform traditional public schools (Center for 
Research on Educational Outcomes, 2014a). This was in response to Jesse Rothstein’s testimony 
that changing the teacher tenure policy could harm student performance. Since charter schools 
have much less robust tenure rules, Hanushek uses the LA report to claim that this doesn’t 
necessarily hold true. The defense challenges Hanushek’s credibility by citing contrary evidence 
from a statewide CREDO study of California charter schools (Center for Research on 
Educational Outcomes, 2014b). Hanushek says this report did not inform his opinion on the 
                                                             
226 On cross-examination, Hanushek states that he views the results of the STAR experiment to 
be unreliable, and that although he objects to Jesse Rothstein’s use of its findings in his study, he 
does not object to similar use of STAR data by Raj Chetty et al. in Long Term Impacts (Mar 24 
AM, 1h31m). Curiously, the defense attorney does not pursue this point any further – given that 
it could characterize Hanushek as politically driven in his interpretation of research.  
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subject because he was not familiar with it because it was only recently published (Mar 24 AM 
2h05m). This is a dubious claim; upon further questioning, we find out that both studies were 
primarily authored by Hanushek’s wife, CREDO director Margaret Raymond.227  Although not 
mentioned in the case, the timing of the report was clearly not an issue either; the California 
CREDO report was published only one day after the Los Angeles report. The defense attempts to 
establish the same credibility problem by referring to other CREDO studies with similar, but is 
unable to successfully connect those studies to Hanushek’s testimony. The defense’s last attempt 
at this strategy cites on Hanushek’s long one-sided history as an expert witness in school funding 
equity cases, but the court does not allow this line of questioning (Mar 24 PM, 0h39m). After a 
brief re-direct examination, Hanushek leaves the stand and the defense rests.228 
Expert witness testimony in Vergara proved that the trial was as much about Value-Added 
methods as it was about teacher tenure. In attempting to establish specific harm done to students 
by California’s tenure policies, the plaintiffs posited value-added as a counterfactual mode of 
assessment. Their witnesses, Raj Chetty in particular, converted teachers’ hypothesized impacts 
on student test scores into months of learning lost and million-dollar income shortfalls. They 
further claimed that using value-added in retention, promotion and dismissal policies would 
mitigate the harm done to students by ‘grossly ineffective teachers.’ In doing so, they had to 
                                                             
227 Hanushek founded CREDO in 1998 at the University of Rochester before relocating it to 
Stanford in 2000.   
228 Seeking to get the last word, the plaintiffs re-examine Hanushek. They confirm that his 
testimony regarding charter schools does not affect his opinions regarding the effects of teachers. 
Like Thomas Kane, Hanushek translates student test score gains into days of learning (Mar 24 
PM, 0h48m-49m). The re-direct examination ends after referring to a number of charts from the 
CREDO Los Angeles charter study which focus on minority student achievement (Mar 24 PM, 
0h50m-55m). The defense attempts to re-examine Jesse Rothstein in rebuttal, but his testimony 
is not admitted by the court after successful objections by the plaintiffs (Mar 24 PM, 2h19m-
2h34m).  
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validate value-added before the court. This validation relied on two major trends in social policy 
science. Chetty’s Long Term Impacts study leveraged so-called Big Data; and Kane’s Measures 
of Effective Teaching project featured the largest random assignment study ever conducted in 
education research. As I have shown, both Chetty and Kane presented their research unburdened 
by important caveats that have been raised by critics. As an expert for the defense, Jesse 
Rothstein gave voice to these criticisms, troubling the foundation of the plaintiff’s case. 
Rothstein contends that using value-added methods beyond their intended research purpose for 
high-stakes decisions has the potential to do harm to school systems. To challenge the 
testimonies of Kane and Chetty, he argues that such measures are too biased and too volatile to 
be used as an alternative to existing teacher evaluation and tenure systems.229 He also 
demonstrates that existing tenure rules could not be the cause of poor student achievement, since 
charter schools are not subject to those rules and achieve similar results. To rebut his testimony, 
the plaintiffs relied on Eric Hanushek, the “father of Value-Added” and a veteran of politically-
charged education research, to buttress their argument. After another day of closing arguments 
and two months deliberation, the judge ruled.  
Outcome and Press Coverage of Vergara   
 
Oral arguments in Vergara ended on March 27th, 2014 and the case officially concluded on April 
10th. Judge Treu handed down a 16-page ruling on June 10th. He ruled in favor of the plaintiffs 
that the “challenged statutes” (seniority-based reductions in force, the two-year probationary 
                                                             
229 Rothstein’s testimony was weakened by the fact that some of his research relies on 
simulations. In the middle of direct examination by the defense, Mr. McRae argued before the 
judge: "Your Honor, the difference with all of our experts is that their studies were actually 
based on DATA [my emphasis] where they went in and did countless numbers of examinations 
with actual students and actual test scores and wasn't again just plucked as 'in vacuo' an 
abstraction 'if you do this, will it have that effect?'” (Mar 6 PM, 1h14m-15m)  
  
203 
 
period for tenure, and various due process protections) caused students to be exposed to ‘grossly 
ineffective teachers’ and thus violated their constitutional rights to a good education. Though 
much of the decision relies on testimony on teacher dismissal processes, its definition of grossly 
ineffective teachers relies on Value-Added studies conducted by Chetty and Kane. Treu’s first 
and most dramatic point refers to these studies: 
“Evidence has been elicited in this trial of the specific effect of grossly ineffective 
teachers on students. The evidence is compelling. Indeed, it shocks the conscience. Based 
on a massive study, Dr. Chetty testified that a single year in a classroom with a grossly 
ineffective teacher costs students $1.4 million in lifetime earnings per classroom. Based 
on a 4 year study, Dr. Kane testified that students in LAUSD who are taught by a teacher 
in the bottom 5% of competence lose 9.54 months of learning in a single year compared 
to students with average teachers.” (Vergara v. State of California, 2014, p. 7) 
 
Despite the many technical nuances of the expert testimony, the ruling is curt on the question of 
identifying ineffective teachers. Treu assumes that grossly ineffective teachers exist and 
ascertains a number of them.230 The sparring between Jesse Rothstein and Eric Hanushek over 
the performance of charter schools – though important to both sides during trial – was not 
mentioned in the ruling. Indeed, despite his lengthy stay on the witness stand, Rothstein’s 
testimony is not referred to once, even negatively. The judge’s very short opinion – only 4,000 
words long – drew criticism from the teachers’ unions who intervened in the case. They charged 
                                                             
230 The frequency of grossly ineffective teachers in Los Angeles is based on the testimony David 
Berliner, another defense expert. In cross-examination, Berliner estimated that somewhere 
between 1 and 3 percent of active teachers are grossly ineffective. This figure was extrapolated 
in Treu’s ruling to a range of 2,750 – 8,250 teachers (Vergara v. State of California, 2014, p. 7). 
Berliner later argued that his testimony on the proportion was mischaracterized in the ruling 
(Murphy, 2014). 
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that it lacked any thorough or reasoned consideration of either the statutes in question or the 
larger context in which they function (Weingarten, 2014; Weingarten & Pechthalt, 2014).231 
The Vergara ruling received much press attention, which I now turn to analyze. I collected 53 
documents in all: 17 stories came from major news outlets within two days of the ruling, eight 
editorials and opinion pieces from those same sources, 15 stories from high-visibility online 
sources (like The New York Times and Washington Post blogs, and online magazines Slate and 
The Atlantic), and 13 additional pieces from up to two weeks after the ruling and/or from less 
visible news outlets.232 I consider what aspects of the ruling and the reaction received the most 
attention; I then conclude by assessing how value-added was translated from expert testimony to 
ruling to press coverage.  
News media love good headlines. In his ruling, Judge Treu used two key phrases (both in the 
quoted paragraph above): ‘grossly ineffective teachers’ and, referring to the impacts of said 
teachers, ‘shocks the conscience.’ These were by far the most oft-cited phrases in the news 
coverage. 20 of 25 major news stories and editorials included the first phrase; 14 of 25 included 
the latter. Of all 53 pieces, 30 used the former and 22 the latter. Further, a number of stories 
repeatedly used the grossly ineffective teacher phrase. Across articles from major news outlets, 
some version of grossly ineffective was used 30 times; in all 53 pieces, the phrase appears 60 
times.    
                                                             
231 The ruling was very short when compared to other education law cases. The 1971 Serrano v. 
Priest opinion was 15,000 words long; the opinion in the 1976 iteration of that case was 28,000 
words. The 2010 Doe v. Deasy opinion was approximately 10,000 words. 
232 I coded and analyzed these documents using Atlas-ti qualitative data analysis software.  
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These ‘sound-bites’ from the ruling are used rather uncritically. The phrase ‘grossly ineffective 
teachers’ was used by the plaintiffs throughout the trial and is directly related to their reliance on 
value-added – grossly ineffective means the bottom five percent of the VA distribution. Treu’s 
conscience-shocking evidence also relies on VA measures; it refers to the suggested difference 
between being assigned a bottom 5th-percentile teacher as opposed to an “average” teacher. Eight 
of the 25 major outlet pieces (and 10 stories overall) also referred to Treu’s potentially dubious 
estimate of the number of grossly ineffective teachers. Yet only one major new story (and six 
overall) make any mention of value-added methods. Similarly, few stories mention Raj Chetty or 
Thomas Kane – the researchers who produced this evidence – despite their names being cited in 
the judge’s opinion. Expert witnesses for the defense – Jesse Rothstein and David Berliner – 
were each mentioned in only three stories out of 53.  
As would be expected, the challenged employment statutes in Vergara received more attention 
than value-added; but this was largely driven by a few data points. LA Schools superintendent 
John Deasy was the most often referenced witness, mentioned in seven of the major outlet stories 
and 12 pieces overall. This is likely because the case was about California tenure rules and 
because Deasy testified about the potential cost of teacher dismissal. The figure cited in the 
ruling – $50,000 to $450,000 per teacher – was referenced in news coverage more often than 
Deasy himself (nine major outlet stories). California’s two-year probationary period was 
mentioned in 14 out of all 53 pieces. Nonetheless, none of the actual substance of the trial 
received as much attention as did the quotable phrases discussed above.    
The two parties to Vergara – Students Matter and the two California teachers’ unions – received 
somewhat similar amounts attention. Nearly all the major news stories mentioned Students 
Matter (17 of 25) and at least one involved union (19 of 25). However, only 9 of 25 news stories 
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gave background on Students Matter, which is an important omission given that the organization 
financed the case. Given that the ruling was in favor of the plaintiffs, 12 of 17 major news stories 
(not including editorials) covered the statements and press releases from the teachers’ unions.  
Judge Treu’s terse ruling may be partly responsible for the lack of depth in press coverage 
following Vergara. There was simply not much information to report in the 16-page opinion. But 
given the potential impact of the ruling, and the fact that both plaintiffs and defendants 
maintained extensive online presence throughout the 3-month long trial – providing links to both 
admitted evidence and witness testimony – there was reason and opportunity to expand coverage. 
Very few stories, even in California, gave readers substantial background, specifically on the 
concept of ‘grossly ineffective teachers.’ Without context, the value-added definition of effective 
and (grossly) ineffective teaching is reified by both the ruling and the subsequent press coverage.  
This chapter has shown how value-added, a methodologically-contested technique, is deployed 
tactically and simplistically in a public forum like a trial. Despite defense experts introducing the 
complexity and contingency of this technique, the judge was persuaded by exaggerated and 
debatable data points. Thus value-added data – complex and fraught as it was – was simply 
transformed into ‘grossly ineffective teachers’ whose negative impacts ‘shocked the conscience.’ 
When Vergara was covered in the press, this evidence was turned into ‘sound byte’ coverage 
with little or no context.  In the conclusion, I will consider the implications of this translation for 
theorizing the relationship between technology and policy in education.  
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Chapter 7: Understanding Value-Added: Reason, Rationality and Politics in the 
Social Sciences 
 
The preceding chapters have made two broad arguments. The first was to show that the 
assumptions of value-added assessments (VA) are at odds with many of the practical realities of 
the schools and classrooms these techniques are intended to evaluate. The second was to argue 
that this disconnect threatens the intended social functions of education. To substantiate the 
divergence between VA in theory and schools in practice, I demonstrated three empirical 
problems with VA measurements using data from New York City. 
Second, by examining the history of innovations in US educational assessment, I argued that the 
politics of school reform are impacted by technical ‘upgrades,’ particularly as they coincide with 
claims of educational decline and consequent national peril. To understand VA in this context, I 
traced the history of its technical evolution and related this to concurrent political developments 
in the educational sphere. Making use of expert testimony in and press coverage of Vergara v. 
California, I showed how VA research on teacher effectiveness was simplified to make VA 
methods appear objective and neutral and then stylized to fit a political agenda of educational 
privatization and top-down management.  
My intention in this project has been to use value-added assessment as a case study in the 
relationship between technology – defined as both research methodology and the tools employed 
in research – and social policy. To conclude, I return to social theory to consider different 
perspectives on the connections between social science, technology and politics, specifically as 
they relate to education. More simply, I ask under what conditions and by what mechanisms does 
education come under the influence of often unsound science and technology? 
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Two broad positions must be explored. The first argues that science and technology, regarded 
neutral and objective, are corrupted and deliberately deployed by actors in the political sphere. 
The second contends that ideology and power are inherent in science and technology. This latter 
position implies that technology need not be corrupted or politicized, as its very application 
contains a priori ideological assumptions. Let us begin by consider the theoretical underpinnings 
and specific examples of each position.  
Value-Neutral Science 
 
Understanding the value-neutral view of science requires going back to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason, in which he argues that reason corresponds to a class of knowledge which is 
independent of judgment or experience.233 In outlining what part reason plays in our knowledge 
of reality, Kant describes mathematics and the laws of natural science (by which he primarily 
meant physics) as capable of producing synthetic a priori knowledge – synthetic in the sense that 
they combine two or more concepts and a priori in the sense that each constituent concept is 
defined axiomatically. The statement “8+3=11” is such a piece of knowledge, as ‘8’ and ‘3’ are 
always what they are, and their sum is a synthesis of the two.234 But Kant, deeply influenced by 
the skeptical tradition of Hume, is careful to say that our knowledge of the natural world is 
necessarily limited. Since experience is mediated by our faculties of sensibility and 
                                                             
233 One can indeed trace the value-neutrality question much further back. Walsh (2013), quoting 
Samuel Coleridge, contends that the fact/value, is/ought divide originates with Plato and 
Aristotle. Though he traces the general spirit of philosophy back to the Greeks, Husserl 
(1954/1970) credits Descartes with the earliest claim to this legacy. 
234 Kant’s view of science is nuanced and contained in many works over his career. What is 
important in the context of this discussion is that Kant’s definition of science as distinct from 
‘systematic arts’ is very restrictive and almost entirely bound up with the use of mathematics. 
Thus his famous line in Metaphysical Foundations “in any special doctrine of nature there can be 
only as much proper science as there is mathematics therein.” 
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understanding, which organizes sensory experience according to intuitions and principles (e.g., 
cause and effect), Kant argues we are unable to know the actual contents of the universe 
axiomatically – the things themselves. Thus, while Kant is appropriately careful to delimit our 
knowledge of the external world, the idea that knowledge can be generated independent of 
experience (through reason alone) opens up space for a value-free science.    
Rationalist and positivist philosophy since Kant, itself influenced by scientific and technological 
advance, argued that the world in itself is indeed objectively knowable. Combining Hume’s 
empirical principle that all we can know is the sense data of experience with the rationalist view 
that reason is primary in acquisition of knowledge, logical positivism – associated with the early 
20th century Vienna Circle – asserts that knowledge of reality is possible through the 
construction of verifiable logical statements based on empirical observation. This philosophical 
perspective stands in opposition to any metaphysics and implicitly to the mediated experience of 
the world proposed by Kant (and by Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit). This rejection of 
metaphysics furthers the possibility of a value-free science by asserting that empirical 
observation reliably describes the world as it is.   
But positivism as a worldview was formulated earlier by the ‘father of sociology,’ Auguste 
Comte. Relatively obscure other than for his coining of the terms ‘sociology’ and ‘positivism,’ 
his influence is largely ignored or disavowed by social scientists whose approach was anticipated 
by Comte’s program for positive philosophy (Lenzer, 1998).  
Comte was deeply concerned with the revolutionary political climate which characterized his 
times – which he called moral and political anarchy. In response to this ‘crisis,’ he devoted his 
life to using the tools of science to facilitate an orderly society. Contrary to the liberal 
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philosophers of the time, Comte located the source of social unrest in an excess of individual 
freedom (be it of a king or the revolutionary masses) rather than the tyranny of government. 
Specifically, he felt that the critical spirit of political philosophy needed to be replaced with a 
positive spirit. Comte thus sought to resolve the conflict between the individual and society in 
favor of society, and specifically in favor of non-arbitrary power grounded in positive political 
science. In the service of this project, he sought to found an objective ‘social physics’ which 
would allow the “preponderance of observation over imagination” in political affairs (Comte, 
Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society, 1822/1998, p. 36). Comte 
further sought to directly attach his efforts to those in power – offering his services to the 
Russian Czar Nicholas I and to the Ottoman Emperor (Pickering, 2009, pp. 77-80).235  
While this context sounds like the opposite of value-free, Comte’s positive social science was to 
be free of all “admiration or reprobation of phenomena;” while he refers to the critical spirit of 
liberal philosophy as “directly contrary to that which ought to reign in scientific politics” 
(Comte, Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society, 1822/1998, p. 
54). Comte details his philosophy of science in the six-volume Cours de Philosophie Positive. 
Reflecting his value-free ethos, and anticipating later developments in social science 
methodology, he argues that social science must emulate the techniques of the natural sciences 
and places mathematics at the foundation of all other sciences: 
“In the present state of our knowledge we must regard mathematics less as a constituent 
part of natural philosophy than as having been, since the time of Descartes and Newton, 
                                                             
235 Comte’s early formulation of his positive political science suggests collaboration with the 
existing ruling classes: 
“The governing classes, clearly perceiving [through positive knowledge of social science] 
the end that they are called on to realize, can reach it directly…They will by anticipation 
combine measures for overcoming opposition with others calculated to facilitate the 
acceptance of the new order of things by their opponents.” (Comte, 1822/1998, p. 46) 
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the true basis of the whole of natural philosophy…as being the most powerful instrument 
the mind can employ in the investigation of the laws of natural phenomena. Geometry 
and mechanics must, on the contrary, be regarded as true natural sciences…But these two 
physical sciences…will be more and more, employed rather as method than as doctrine.” 
(Comte, View of the Hierarchy of the Positive Sciences, 1853/1998, p. 100)236 
Comte’s subsequent move toward a secular religion based on his social and political theory was 
rejected by most of his contemporaries – and helps explain his obscurity in modern discourse on 
social science methodology. Nevertheless, Comte’s spirit of detached, objective inquiry into 
social phenomena was extended by canonical sociological thinkers, perhaps the most significant 
of whom is Emile Durkheim. Durkheim’s (1895)  The Rules of Sociological Method, in which he 
tries to carve out a distinct space for sociological inquiry, rests on Comte’s value-free, anti-
metaphysical, and rationalistic principle.237 His position on the role of social scientists in 
political affairs is that they should play, if anything, an advisory role (Lukes, 1982). Durkheim 
does however, move from Comte in his preferred techniques of inquiry and assumptions required 
for the study of ‘social facts.’   
Max Weber (1864-1920) was thoughtful about the role of social scientist in society and made an 
attempt to distinguish the objects of social scientific study from the value they imply. In his 
influential 1904 essay Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy, Weber begins with the 
observation that “an empirical science cannot tell anyone what they should do” (Weber, 
                                                             
236 Recognizing some limitations, Comte did note that social physics – only later renamed 
sociology – was not yet fit for mathematical analysis, if only because mathematical education 
was still inadequate to produce the models needed for these “difficult researches.” His ultimate 
vision is that mathematical reasoning will absorb and eliminate “the only part of the old 
philosophy that could even appear to offer any real utility, the logical part.” (Comte, 1853/1998, 
p. 177) Thus we see that Comte’s positivism sought to create a value-free social science through 
the application of natural scientific and ultimately mathematical methods, placing him very much 
in the tradition which informs much of contemporary social science. 
237 Indeed, Durkheim cites Comte’s Cours de philosophie positive as “the only original and 
important study which we possess on the subject [of sociological method]” (Durkheim, 
1895/1982, p. 48).  
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1904/1949, p. 49). In an apparent reference to Comte, he declares that “only positive religions – 
or more precisely expressed, dogmatic sects – are able to confer on the content of cultural values 
the status of unconditionally valid ethical imperatives (p. 57). From these basic principles, Weber 
suggests that what we now call ‘policy science’ is impossible because problems of social policy 
cannot be resolved based on facts alone, and indeed because policy decisions must be worked out 
based on debating cultural values (p. 60).  
Weber thus acknowledges a fact/value distinction which constantly presents itself to the social 
scientist. The objects of social science are inherently meaningful for Weber, thus precluding the 
possibility of ‘presuppositionless’ investigation (p. 76). Given this, he lays out two primary 
responsibilities for the social scientist. The first is that one must always make clear one’s value 
judgments in two ways – specifically the standpoint from which one’s analysis departs and 
moments in writing when discussion shifts from scientific analysis of fact to evaluation of policy 
(pp. 59-60). The second responsibility is that one must attempt to remain value-neutral in 
analysis as much as possible. In practice, what this entails is paying attention to evidence which 
contradicts the dominant formulations or analytic constructs that one uses in analysis.  
This latter imperative is connected to Weber’s main methodological construct: the ideal type. 
Weber demands that social scientists pay attention to empirical events which do not agree with 
the ideal types which drive their formulations. He further points out how tempting it can be to 
“do violence to reality in order to prove the real validity of the construct” (p. 103) and how 
scientists can often confuse their analytic ideal types with their own subjective ideals (p. 98). But 
he nonetheless holds out the possibility that social science can use value-laden standpoints as 
analytic tools while refraining from using them as evaluative principles. Thus, although he holds 
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a more pessimistic view, Weber still maintains that social science can be distinct from any 
particular value set.238 
Holding aside for the moment the criticisms of positivism beginning in the early 20 th century 
(these will be discussed below, as they constitute the basis of the other broad position), the idea 
of value-free, politically detached science continued under the auspices of ‘post-positivism.’239 
As a response to various critiques, post-positivism concedes that empirical observation and 
analysis is necessarily “theory-laden,” and that we cannot attain certain truth through scientific 
inquiry, only (and at best) conjectural knowledge (Trochim, 2006). Regardless of this 
epistemological position, post-positivism methodologically produces the same purportedly 
‘objective’ knowledge claims as its positivist forbears. Further, the philosophical move to 
contingent knowledge did not prevent the growing emphasis on mathematical and analytic 
methods which increasingly shaped social science in the mold of the natural sciences. Phillips 
and Burbules (2000) note that the philosophical criticisms that turned positivism into post-
positivism are largely ignored in texts on research methods, and thus implicitly turn observation 
and empirical data into unmediated (and value-free) truth.240 Introducing a volume of essays on 
positivism and alternative epistemologies across the social sciences, Steinmetz (2005) contends 
                                                             
238 This view did not prevent Weber from holding social scientists accountable for making 
political choices. But he insisted that these choices should be made specifically in their roles as 
citizens, since social scientists “are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty 
of making a choice, and they should therefore not create the impression that they can do so.” 
(Weber, 1949, p. 19) 
239 Post-positivism is elsewhere called anti-positivism and non-positivism; my use of the former 
is arbitrary. 
240 One popular research methods textbook which features such an elision was co-authored by 
Eric Hanushek, whose highly politicized research career has been discussed throughout the 
preceding chapters (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977).  Hanushek’s introduction singles out 
Economics as more rigorously deductive than other social sciences, but even contemporary 
methods texts in sociology present the relationship between theory and empirical data as 
untroubled by social forces (Healey, 2012).  
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that despite varying trajectories depending on the discipline, social science methods are still in 
the midst of a “positivist haunting” (p. 3).    
This omission from texts on methodology partially reflects a pragmatic orientation on the part of 
researchers, who ignore questions of objectivity and ultimate truth for the sake of ‘getting down 
to business’ (for examples in education research, see Miles & Huberman, 1984; Howe, 1988).241 
A related explanation for is that as research became more policy-oriented (and government 
funded) over the course of the 20th century, the assertion that the ‘normal’ functioning of society 
constitutes empirical fact was elevated from theoretical claim to required assumption.242 
Mirowski (2005) traces the relationship between logical positivism and operations research (OR) 
in the United States and argues that the immense funding and relative autonomy afforded to 
researchers working on defense contracts came at the cost of  questioning the uses to which their 
work was put. Indeed, the trajectory of educational research methods traced in the preceding 
chapters exemplifies the ascendancy of the postpositivist, analytic paradigm and the extent to 
which claims of objectivity are taken for granted.  
The dominant assumption of a value-free scientific enterprise is also reinforced by the 
mainstream sociology of science, which largely eschews questions of power or interest. Robert 
Merton’s program for the sociology of science focused on empirical markers of scientific activity 
– publications and biographies – and on reward systems within the sciences, rather than 
                                                             
241 Weber (1904/1949) would contend that this sort of ignoring of value judgment cannot lead to 
value-neutrality, but only to unacknowledged value-judgments which nonetheless make their 
way into the evaluation of the ‘facts’ (for example see pp. 82,94). 
242 Both Comte and Durkheim express versions of the ‘normative is natural’ claim. Comte argues 
that society as it currently exists is a manifestation of fundamental laws that govern the progress 
of civilization (Comte, 1822/1998, pp. 42-44). Durkheim’s fundamental distinction between the 
‘normal’ and the ‘pathological’ is a more measured version of the same concept.    
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examining at how scientific findings are deployed outside the profession, or on how outside 
forces determine what is studied (Merton, 1973).243 Related tendencies in the history and 
philosophy of science focus on its internal dynamics – that is, how scientific knowledge 
accumulates and changes over time. Karl Popper’s (1959/1968) The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery and Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions are among the best 
known works in this tradition. But both the sociology and history of science largely take for 
granted the isolation of scientific research from the corrupting influence of politics.244 Whatever 
the causes, and despite important critical upsurges – variously named ‘Science Wars’ and 
‘Paradigm Wars’ –, versions of positivistic practice claiming value-free status are generally 
dominant across the social sciences (Steinmetz, 2005a).   
Science as Value-Laden 
 
Positivism and its epistemological descendants all rest on the assumption that scientific inquiry 
can describe the world as it is without consequential mediation by human values. But this 
position gave rise to many criticisms which claim that science immanently contains its own value 
system. We even see a germ of this critique in Weber, though he addresses this primarily to 
                                                             
243 In a later essay which appeared in the same volume, Merton does attempt to outline the 
relationship between applied research and policy (Merton, 1973a). Among the insights offered in 
that paper, Merton does attempt to understand how policy research is utilized, and includes the 
possibility of co-optation of research by politicians (p. 75).  
244 Kuhn’s description of how knowledge accumulates does differ from positivistic accounts of 
scientific progress. Once a ‘paradigm shift’ occurs, Kuhn argues that the language used to 
describe objects of study changes so drastically that the facts discovered under one paradigm are 
incommensurable with those of another. Hence Kuhn’s critique is placed within the anti-
positivist tradition. But demonstrating its isolation from politics altogether, Kuhn’s account does 
not even consider the role of academic politics in thwarting important theoretical developments. 
Looking at String Theory in physics, Lee Smolin (2008) argues that the failure of much work in 
physical science is due to boundary maintenance and careerist tendencies among university 
physicists.  
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clinical science (medicine) and technology (engineering), arguing that these applied sciences 
assume evaluative standpoints in advance and proceed with specific goals in mind – patient 
health in the former case and productive efficiency in the latter (Weber, Objectivity in Social 
Science and Social Policy, 1904/1949, pp. 85-86).  
Significant critiques of positivist social science arose from phenomenology, the Frankfurt School  
and later from French social theory.  Each in its own way seeks to reassert the subjective 
dimension of scientific inquiry and the technology it produces.  
Edmund Husserl’s Vienna Lecture245, delivered in 1935 characterizes his attempt to account for 
the failure of European Sciences (and more broadly of European humanity), which he believed 
had fallen victim to a posivistic spirit which had “decapitated philosophy” (1954/1970, p. 9) and 
left even the positive sciences (e.g., phsyics and mathematics) in a crisis of meaning despite their 
practical accomplishments. This lecture also outlines his phenomenological approach to knowing 
and understanding the world. 
Husserl accepts the successes of the physical and biological sciences and attributes these 
successes to the application of theoretical reason to empirical reality and to the search for 
universal laws, “the result of [which]…was a true revolution in the technical control of nature” 
(Husserl, Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, 1954/1970, p. 271). But he argues 
that humanistic disciplines cannot seek to uncover such natural laws because humanist objects – 
                                                             
245 I take Husserl as representative of the phenomenological critique of positivism and value-free 
social science. The Vienna Lecture was the precursor to Husserl’s final book-length attempt to 
outline his phenomenology, The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. I refer to this (both the Vienna Lecture and The Crisis) among his works 
because it speaks directly to the theme of this chapter. Other phenomenological critiques are 
certainly worth considering (see for example, Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1968). 
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Freud’s pscyhe or Weber’s social values – are bound up with individual subjective experience.246 
Abstraction from nature (rather than from spirit) thus cannot lead the humanist to an exact 
science. 
To explain what he calls the crisis, Husserl first traces the history of the European Sciences back 
to Ancient Grece.247 The worldview which originates with the Greeks is the pursuit of infinite, 
unconditional and durable ideas – what Husserl calls the theoretical attitude (p. 280). This 
contrasts with other forms of human pursuit which although like science, were concerned with 
successful production, did not seek infinite truths, only more immediate ends. He calls this the 
natural or practical attitude. But it is the further transition from the theoretical attitude of 
philosophy (for example, Plato’s disinterested pursuit of the forms) to that of science (which 
applies ideal norms to empirical matters) which for Husserl constitutes the decisive shift, not 
only among the scientific community, but also in the general population through scientific 
education (pp. 285-287).  
The stumbling block which turns this historical progression into a crisis lies in what Husserl calls 
naïve rationalism, ‘naturalism,’ or ‘objectivism.’ While acknowledging that scientific pursuit 
requires systematic focus on specific objects, Husserl contends that this periodic focus must be 
                                                             
246 This is the essential implication of Husserl’s concept of the lifeworld. Rather than there being 
some objective world that we all experience in exactly the same way, Husserl argues that what 
we regard as the external world occurs to us as phenomenon. This impression of the world can be 
socially founded, and it is precisely a malaise of this impression which Husserl exposes in the 
Vienna Lecture.  
247 Husserl defines Europe not in a geographical sense, but in the spiritual sense of a shared 
experience of the world (lifeworld). This leads him to include the United States and other British 
and European colonies in the concept, as they share European institutions and societal goals 
(Husserl, Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity, 1954/1970, p. 273). He distinguishes 
Greek philosophy from earlier wisdom (Egyptian, Babylonian)  
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tempered by reflection.248 He argues that the discoveries of math, geometry, and physics were so 
successful (in producing tools and predictions) that without appropriate reflection 
mathematical/geometrical reason was applied to the whole of natural and psychic (psychological 
and moral) experience. Thus, “in…the constantly objectivist attitude, everything spiritual 
appeared as if it were [simply] spread over [the surface] of physical bodes” (Husserl, 1954/1970, 
p. 291).249  
Further, the one-sided pursuit of natural and spiritual laws leads the scientist to forget the 
subjective experience which grounds his pursuit of universal laws and instead to leads him to 
idealize his experience of the world as ‘apodictic’ or objectively self-evident (Husserl, 
1954/1970, pp. 294-297). ‘Objectivism’ is then the naïve belief that our individual experience of 
the world, however rigorously investigated, is unconditional and generally applicable. Husserl 
proposes transcendental phenomenology – a systematic inquiry into subjective experience – as 
the necessary groundwork for all natural and humanistic sciences to overcome the objectivism 
that characterizes the European sciences.  
The pheonomenological critique offered by Husserl is fundamental; from it we understand the 
basic problem of naturalizing (making objective) subjective experience – it obscures value-laden 
choices made in the process of inquiry. But to probe the specific values which underwrite this 
objectification, we turn to the Frankfurt School critique of positive science. This critique is 
                                                             
248 “The true philosopher must always devote himself to mastering the true and full sense of 
philosophy, the totality of its horizons of infinity. No line of knowledge, no single truth may be 
absolutized and isolated…Only through this constant reflexivity is a philosophy universal 
knowledge” (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 291). 
249 In a separate essay, Husserl discusses in detail the assumptions required in the 
mathematization of nature. Therein he demonstrates that what we call assumptions are 
perceptions which we turn into logical (self-evident) propositions.  
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exemplified in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightment (1944/2002), but is grounded 
in the concept of ‘reification’ advanced by Georg Lukacs (1923/1971).   
Like Husserl, Lukacs engages Kant’s problem of epistemology250 and critiques the subject-object 
split which characterized positive natural and social sciences in the early 20th century. A further 
similarity is that he shows how this split in the sciences affects the rest of social life. But Lukacs 
argues that this artificial split – especially in the social sciences – reifies human relations 
following the model of capitalist class relations.251 Specifically, he connects the emergence of 
objective science with that of the commodity form – arguing that the subjective stance of human 
social relations is fundamentally altered by the increasing dominance of the commodity form: 
“Only in this context does the reificiation produced by commodity relations assume 
decisive importance both for the objective evolution of society and for the stance adopted 
by men towards it. Only then does the commodity become crucial for the subjugation of 
men’s consciousness to the forms in which this reification finds expression and for their 
attempts to comprehend the process or to rebel against its disastrous effects and liberate 
themselves from servitude to the ‘second nature’ so created.” (Lukacs, 1923/1971, p. 86) 
Lukacs thus connects the critique of objective science with the Marxist critique of capitalism by 
implicating bourgeois values as the basis of inquiry.  Frankfurt school theorists take his argument 
further as it relates to science and technology. Max Horkheimer (1932/1999) argues that science 
is limited by its existence as a mode of production under capitalism – with its products being 
social values and useful applications for industry. He regards modern science as superficial in its 
ahistorical focus on improving existing conditions and in its seemingly arbitrary – but in reality 
                                                             
250 Lukacs uses Kant as an exemplar of bourgeois thought which divides the world of thought 
and intelligible forms from the world of objects. He also connects the mathematization of natural 
and social phenomena (and the specialization which comes along with it) with the split effected 
by the commodity form (Lukacs, 1923/1971, pp. 110-121).   
251 Reification as a concept is developed by Lukacs, but originally comes from Georg Simmel 
who first proposed it in his “Philosophy of Money.”  
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ideological – choice of research tasks (p. 211).252 Horkheimer’s prognosis for science is similar 
to Lukacs: since the crisis of science is “inseperable from the general crisis,” (p. 212) only a 
revolution in the broad social conditions within which science operates is capable of freeing 
science from its crisis.  
This persepective on science is further explored in Horkheimer’s collaboration with Theodor 
Adorno on the concept of Enlightenment. Adorno and Horkheimer contend, similar to Husserl, 
that rationality is taken to an absurd extreme in the age of modern science. This overemphasis on 
rational (specifically mathematical) calculability refelects and reinforces a system of domination 
over nature, and promotes suspicion of alternative conceptions and data that stands beyond 
calculation.253 Like Lukacs they see the cultural dominance of science as the outcome of an 
historical development in which the rationalism of the Enlightenment had to displace the 
ideological dominance of religion. But they pessimistically regard the process as nearly 
complete; for them, enlightenment rationality has all but disposed of its epistemological others 
and become self-maintaining.254 This dominance has a corrosive effect on the critical power of 
enlightenment insofar as individuals model themselves on such standardized behavior and are 
unable to conceive alternatives to or criticisms of the existing order (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
                                                             
252 Horkheimer seems to address Husserl’s position directly when he says that: ‘Science in the 
pre-War years had a number of limitations. These were due, however, not to an exaggeration of 
its rational character [e.g., positivism] but to restrictions on it which were themselves 
conditioned by the increasing rigidification of the social situation.” (Horkheimer, 1932/1999, p. 
209)  
253 “The manifold affinities between existing things are supplanted by the single relationship 
between the subject who confers meaning and the meaningless object, between rational 
significance and its accidental bearer.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944/2002, p. 7) 
254 “Knowledge does not consist in mere perception, classification, and calculation but precisely 
in the determining negation  of whatever is directly at hand…mathematical formalism…arrests 
thought at mere immediacy…The more completely the machinery of though subjugates 
existence, the more blindly it is satisfied with reproducing it.” (Horkheimer & Adorno, 
1944/2002, p. 20) 
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1944/2002, p. 22). In their analysis, the productive values inherent in science are already largely 
taken for granted in society and thereby further insulated from critical scrutiny. 255While 
Horkheimer and Adorno take the insights of Lukacs as a point of departure, they go beyond 
positing science as an agent of capitalist domination and afford independent ideological power 
Enlightenment rationality.  
Other exponents of the Frankfurt School add important insights regarding the value content of 
science as it becomes further linked to technology. Marcuse (1941/1982) defines technology not 
as productive tools (technics), but as a social process which shapes consciousness. As individuals 
come to identify with both technics and this structuring social process, they succumb to the fetish 
of technique – the willing hierarchichal coordination of activities for maximum expedience. 
Echoing Weber, Marcuse argues that under the sway of ‘technological rationality’ man values 
efficiency above all, and regards individualistic and critical values as obstacles to efficient 
production. But while Weber confined this value to specialities like engineering, Marcuse sees 
the notion of efficiency pervading throughout human social life. We increasingly view the world 
through the lens of what Lewis Mumford calls ‘matter-of-factness’ – in which: 
“Individual distinctions in the aptitude, insight and knowledge are transformed into 
different quanta of skill and training, to be coordinated at any time in the common 
framework of standardized performances.” (Marcuse, 1941/1982, p. 142) 
Marcuse is ambivalent about technics – machines and productive tools themselves. He believes 
these can serve the ends of liberation or exploitation.256 But his view of technology and 
                                                             
255 “The technical process, to which the subject has been reified after the eradication of that 
process [thought] from consciousness is free from…meaning altogether, since reason itself has 
become merely an aid to the all-encompassing economic apparatus.”  
256 Marcuse develops his position on the liberating potential of modern technics in Eros and 
Civilization (1966/1955). There, he argues that technical progress has enabled mankind to 
overcome scarcity and the need for toil. Thus, he sees the continued compulsion to work as 
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technological rationality is far more pessimistic, as he believes the ideology of efficiency is 
particularly well-suited to absorbing critical protest and thus to preserving the existing order. 
This theme dominates his later classic work, One-Dimensional Man (Marcuse, 1964/1991). 
There he argues that the domination of nature and society are reinforced by a productive 
technological apparatus which has dispensed with metaphysics and become totalitarian 
(Marcuse, 1964/1991, pp. xlvi-xlvii). The Frankfurt School critique of technology thus relates 
the idea of value-neutral science to the maintenance of the exploitative productive relations of 
capitalism. In the evolution of this analysis, science also emerges as an relatively autonomous 
cultural force which shapes consciousness.  
French social theory took a different path in understaning the politics inherent in science. 
Poststructuralism257 – a label used to refer to many primarily French social theorists of the 1960s 
and 1970s – offers its own critique of the knowledge produced by science. But unlike the 
Frankfurt School or phenomenology, poststructuralism do not offer an alternative grounding for 
pursuing scientific truth. Some of the best known works in this tradition come from Michel 
Foucault, and perhaps the most appropriate for the present purpose is The Order of Things. In his 
‘archaeology’ of the human sciences – which focuses on the unconscious elements which shape 
the production of scientific knowledge258 – Foucault posits science and scientists as subject to 
                                                             
surplus repression and thus believes that it is possible to reduce working time to its necessary 
minimum.   
257 Poststructuralism of course must be a reaction to the tradition of structuralism. The latter is 
closely associated with the work of Claude Levi-Strauss who argues that there exist “vertical 
structures,” social formations which transcend space and time. These vertical structures are 
described in terms of Levi-Strauss’ famous binaries like ‘the raw and the cooked,’ and ‘the 
sacred and the profane’ (Levi-Strauss, 1963). Poststructualists reject such transhistorical 
concepts and argue that all ordering concepts should be understood as historically constructed.      
258 “…it is rather an inquiry whose aim is to rediscover on what basis knowledge and theory 
became possible; within what space of order knowledge was constituted; on the basis of what 
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forces beyond their control. Each historical period is determined by certain ‘epistemes’ which 
condition how knowledge is concieved and thus shape scientific discourse (Foucault, The Order 
of Things, 1994/1970).259 This archaeological approach also characterizes Foucault’s 
examinations of medicine, prisons and sexuality. In tracing each of these social formations, he 
emphasizes historical  changes (both in the traditional and Marxist senses of that term) in the 
associated discourse: the language used to describe and delimit madness, crime, and sex.  
An overarching theme of these diverse studies is Foucault’s concept of a ‘regime of truth’:  
“[A] form of power which applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes 
the individual marks him by his own individuality, attaches him  to his own identity, 
imposes a law of truth on him which he must recognize…” (Foucault, 1982, p. 781) 
This concept is the critical link between power and the knowledge produced by science. 
Although Foucault doesn’t regard power as residing with any specific person or institution, he 
emphasizes that modes of knowledge are constitutive of the forms of surveillance and 
domination This makes realtively clear the political nature of science – the prevailing 
contemporary mode of knowledge.260 Furthermore, the larger point of his work – that knowledge 
                                                             
historical a priori…sciences could be established…rationalities be formed , only, perhaps to 
dissolve and vanish soon afterward.” (Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970/1994, pp. xxi-xxii)  
259 Foucault’s approach to the history of science – with its emphasis on discontinuity and 
contingency – comes from the influence of Gaston Bachelard through Georges Canguilhem. 
Bachelard developed the concept of the ‘epistemological break’ which is central to Foucault’s 
histories. Foucault’s early focus on medicine and his attention to discourse seem to be a product 
of Canguilhem’s influence.      
260 Notably, Foucault looks at 19th century schooling and testing as evidence of this point: 
“Similarly [to the judicial penalty] the school became a sort of apparatus of uninterrupted 
examination… [it became] a perpetual comparison of each and all that made it possible both to 
measure and to judge…the examination is at the center of the procedures that constitute the 
individual as effect and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge.” (Foucault, 
1977/1995, pp. 186-192) 
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production is not set apart from its social context – entails the certainty that science cannot be 
disinterested.          
Louis Althusser, a contemporary of Foucault similarly influenced by Bachelard’s discontinuous 
history of the sciences, is much clearer about the relation between science and power. He argues 
that in moments of crisis for the sciences, the ‘spontaneous philosophy of of the scientists’ is 
revealed (Althusser, 1990/2012, pp. 115-116). This spontaneous philosophy is present, though 
dormant, in non-crisis periods as well, though most scientists would not recognize it as such. 
Like Foucault, Althusser regards the spontaneous philosophies of scientists as historically 
contingent and as consitutive of the limits of science (p. 128). But he goes further and identifies 
them, in the last analysis, with the dominant practical ideology of the historical period: 
“…but they are used to furnish arguments or guarantees for extra-scientific values that 
the philosophies in question objectively serve through their own practice, their 'questions' 
and their 'theories'. These 'values' pertain to practical ideologies, which play their own 
role in the social cohesion and social conflicts of class societies.” (Althusser, 1990/2012, 
p. 130). 
Althusser thus clarifies the relation of science and politics by arguing the philosophy which 
underwrites science at a historical moment is determined by the dominant ideology.261 Bringing 
him closer to the Frankfurt School tradition, he would regard science (and for that matter, 
                                                             
261 Similar to Husserl, who distinguishes between the natural and human sciences, Althusser sees 
values and ideology as more important in the latter (which he argues lack a true subject matter): 
“What we might call scientific ideologies and philosophical ideologies assume an extreme 
importance in the domain of the human sciences. Not only do these ideologies exist and have 
great importance in our world, but they directly govern the scientific practices of the human 
sciences. They take the place of theory in the human sciences.” (Althusser, 1990/2012, p. 92)  
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education) as one of the ideological state apparauses which shapes individual and social 
consciousness.262  
I am left with the question of how science operates as an agent of power in shaping 
consciousness. The criticisms of value-free science above – particularly Marcuse and Althusser – 
have hinted at an answer; once science becomes the primary arbiter of knowledge in society, it 
becomes hostile to other epistemological forms. But the works of Paul Feyerabend and Stanley 
Aronowitz provide much more clarity on this question by focusing on the question of scientific 
method.  
Feyerabend is most recognized for his ‘anarchic’ account of scientific progress in Against 
Method (Feyerabend, 1975/2010). He argues against scientific exceptionalism, demonstrating 
that science does not proceed according to a single pre-determined set of rules, nor is it guided 
exclusively or even primarily by rigorous observation. Rather, he contends that science, like 
other cultural and ideological formations, makes use of all means at its disposal to advance its 
propositions. Scientists also suspend what many regard to be the key tenets of their enterprise – 
falsifiability of theory and grounding in observation.263 His account shows that scientific 
progress would not have been possible without the eclecticism. Feyerabend utimately views 
                                                             
262 Paul Feyerabend – discussed directly below – contends that Althusser accepts the ideology of 
science, as Althusser accepted the Marxist dialectical method as a positive science (Feyerabend, 
1975, p. 177, see also Aronowitz, 1988, p. 180).  
263 Feyerabend makes case studies of key moments regarded as points of great scientific progress 
(the Copernican Revolution, Einstein’s relativity, etc.). For example, he argues that Galileo 
helped overturn the geocentric model more through his ability to persuade than through his data 
or logical theories. As such, Against Method takes a different approach to the same data treated 
by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure of Scientific Revolutions.  
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science as not too dissimilar from myth or magic in its methods – an interesting point which we 
will consider again below. 
Feyerabend’s view of science as far from value-free is implicit in this argument; if scientific 
methods are not distinct from other methods, then they are equally subject to political and 
ideological biases. Indeed, he argues that methodological choices are based on ethical decisions 
(Feyerabend, 1965, p. 219). But his work is much more specific on the point of how science 
actually operates as power – and this point focuses on methodology: 
According to the fairy-tale the success of science is the result of a subtle, but carefully 
balanced combination of inventiveness and control. Scientists have ideas. And they have 
special methods for improving ideas. The theories of science have passed the test of 
method. They give a better account of the world than ideas which have not passed the test 
(Feyerabend, 'Science.' The myth and its role in Society, 1975, p. 167).    
This special position afforded to scientific methods is important. If scientific methods are 
percieved as objective, then science – afforded the unique position of being value-free – thus 
becomes an objective measure of all ideologies (p. 169). Widespread belief in the objectivity of 
scientific methods leads to the use of scientific knowledge as the basis of important political 
decisions without recourse to democracy – since science produces untainted facts rather than 
ideologically-driven opinions.  
Stanley Aronowitz (1988) brings together many of the ideas discussed above to synthesize an 
argument about the political force of science in modern society. With Lukacs and the Frankfurt 
School, Aronowitz contends that the rationalist model of science is linked to the domination of 
nature and of man. Similar to Feyerabend’s pluralistic epistemology, he begins with the premise 
that “the power of science consists, in the first place, in its conflation of knowledge with truth” 
(p. vii).  
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Making the case that scientific discourse has become hegemonic, Aronowitz shows that even 
critical theorists of science – for example Althusser and Marcuse – see scientific methods and 
their attendant technologies operating beyond social determination. They thus regard science as 
potentially liberating, but for their current use in the service of domination (pp. 165-180). This 
exclusion of scientific method from scrutiny is in part because intellectuals share what Alvin 
Gouldner calls a ‘culture of critical discourse.’ Aronowitz argues that this critical discourse is 
consciously and vigorously distinguished from ‘common sense’ by professional intellectuals.264  
The further and more substantial point is that “as scientific discourse permeates the state and 
civil society, scientific culture spills over beyond the laboratory,” affecting decision-making 
processes in all spheres of social life (p. 9). To the extent that scientific discourse – specifically 
its emphasis on objective methods – becomes hegemonic, non-scientists generally don’t question 
the knowledge claims made by scientists. These claims become truth itself. Moreover, 
approximations of the scientific ideal, controlled experimentation and mathematical calculation, 
become the standard of practice for political and industrial leaders.265 Finally Aronowitz argues 
that the remaining bastions of critical science – those portions of academia where the research 
programs are not in line with normative scientific activity (p. 320)  and don’t indoctrinate new 
                                                             
264 Gouldner (1979) sees the role of this class as yet to be determined. He sees intellectuals as 
having revolutionary potential (as Althusser regarded science and Marcuse regarded technology), 
but still morally ambiguous and internally divided between those technically and humanistically-
oriented. Steven Brint (1996) explores the internal divisions among ‘experts’ and argues that 
intellectuals are not so politically engaged and that many are in quite politically conservative.  
265 In this regard, Aronowitz also discusses government and foundation funding of so-called 
independent researchers to study/validate preselected policy options. But he also insists that 
these research mandates themselves are evidence of the independent power of scientific ideology 
– as political and economic powers feel compelled to cloak their decisions in the veneer of 
scientific method (pp. 326-336).   
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researchers – science all but completely merges with power as a single version of science 
becomes the arbiter of natural and social truth. 
On Mathiness and Policy 
 
Most if not all the scholars (positive and critical) cited above discuss the role of mathematics in 
the practice and ideology science. Comte regarded mathematics as first among the sciences and a 
methodological precursor to positive science. Husserl wrote on the ‘mathematization of nature’ 
in his phenomenology. Althusser regards mathematics not as a tool of the sciences, but as an 
active participant in their constitution. And given the depth of Value-Added’s mathematical 
content, one must account for the particular place of math in the politics and practice of science, 
and particularly in economics – from which Value-Added hails.  
Economics leads the social sciences in its capacity to influence policy. The president maintains a 
council of economic advisers, not sociological advisers. The Congressional Budget Office and 
the Federal Reserve are two government institutions dominated by economists. Indeed, we saw 
above how an economistic mindset came to dominate federal education policy beginning in the 
1970s; that trend has not abated. Thus ,the role of math in the internal dynamics of economics is 
particularly important to understand. 
It is well-known that economics is dominated more than most social sciences by sophisticated 
mathematical modeling. A casual glance at a mainstream economics journal will show that even 
what economists call theory is essentially equation-building.266 Economics did not begin this 
                                                             
266 As Levinowitz (2016) notes, Deirdre McCloskey and Robert Nelson both see mathematics 
used in economic theory as a way to stake a claim to scientific status. As I’ve pointed out above, 
Raj Chetty (2013) has gone out of his way to emphasize the objective scientific credentials of his 
discipline.    
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way, but it was pervasive enough by the early 20th century that no less than John Maynard 
Keynes wrote in his general economic theory that: 
“Too large a proportion of recent ‘mathematical’ economics are merely concoctions, as 
imprecise as the initial assumptions they rest on, which allow the author to lose sight of 
the complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and 
unhelpful symbols.” (Keynes, 1936, p. 297) 
But recent work on the influence of mathematics in economic theory regards this overemphasis 
on modeling as politically suspect and counterproductive to economics as a discipline. Paul 
Romer, an economist who has made notable contributions to the theory of economic growth, 
recently argued that his sub-field is being dominated by ‘mathiness’ which he defines as:  
“[using] a mixture of words and symbols, but instead of making tight links [between the 
two] it leaves ample room for slippage between statements in natural versus formal 
language and between statements with theoretical as opposed to empirical content.” 
(Romer, 2015, p. 89) 
He distinguishes mathiness from mathematical theory, specifying that the latter makes tight links 
between mathematical symbols and the language used to describe them. Such also allows theory 
to be closely connected to the empirical evidence used to support it. Romer cites Gary Becker’s 
human capital theory as an example of strong mathematical theory and good science. He 
contends that unfortunately, economics also has a tendency toward ‘academic politics;’ in the 
context of this research, we would call this ideology.267 The problem for Romer is that mathiness 
allows ideology to “masquerade as science” (p. 89), since the proliferation of mathematical 
economics makes it hard to separate the proverbial ‘wheat from the chaff.’ He worries that 
prolonged exposure to poorly-specified mathematical models without solid foundations will turn 
                                                             
267 What Romer is doing in this argument is a well-established tradition. Althusser (1990/2012) 
points out that scientists react to crisis in their discipline by trying to root out what they see as 
poor practices.  
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economic theory into something like card tricks, where everyone expects sleight-of-hand but 
nobody takes it seriously (p. 93).  
Other economists have taken the sleight-of-hand metaphor further when commenting on 
mathiness. Whereas Romer’s mathiness refers specifically to macroeconomic growth theory, 
Paul Pfleiderer (2014) makes a similar case for finance and economics more generally. He posits 
a distinction between ‘bookshelf’ and ‘real-world’ economic models, noting that while all 
economic models are unrealistic to a degree, bookshelf models are not intended to correspond to 
reality and should be regarded as similar to thought experiments. The practical distinction 
between the two is that bookshelf models contain assumptions that seem impossible in the real 
world Take as two examples: ‘there are no information assymetries between buyers and sellers’ 
or more to our point ‘teacher effects on student academic performance continue undiminished 
forever.’ Pfleiderer argues that when such bookshelf models are advanced as support for policy 
prescriptions in the real world, they become ‘chameleons.’ The problem is that once economists 
are criticized for the dubious assumptions made by such models, they retreat to the position that 
their models are not intended to correspond to reality.268 One of the primary ways that chameleon 
economic theories succeed in penetrating into policy discussions is that they are often cloaked in 
complex mathematics: 
“A simple model with dubious assumptions that drives the results is likely to be 
recognized for what it is. A much more complex model with many assumptions including 
the aforementioned dubious assumptions, is more difficult to evaluate.” (Pfleiderer, 2014, 
p. 28) 
                                                             
268 Eric Hanushek’s testimony in Vergara v. California is exemplary of such a chameleon 
posture. When challenged about the application of VA to the real world, Hanushek replies that 
nobody ever suggested that Value-Added Assessment be applied as the sole metric of teacher 
quality (other than he for his entire academic career).    
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Ultimately, Pfleiderer argues that all theoretical models – plausible, absurd, and chameleon –
must be evaluated on the strength of their assumptions, and that defenses such as models being 
‘true pending empirical falsification’ or that some dubious assumption ‘is standard in the 
literature’ have to be challenged.  
Where does all this mathematical economics lead us? Alan Levinowitz (2016) compares present-
day economists’ fetishization of mathematical models with similar valorization of 
mathematically-sophisticated astrology in ancient imperial China. Like modern economists, 
Chinese astronomers possessed enormous influence in the imperial court, which believed that 
ever-more accuarate calculation of celestial motion (Li) would provide a guide for policy 
decisions; but also like modern economics, many basic assumptions of astrology are dubious – 
something that no amount of sophisticated calculation can fix. Nonetheless, the allure of their 
models gave the Li-calculating astrologers access to power and quite large sums of research 
funding from the Emperor (Levinowitz, 2016, p. 5). Levinowitz thus argue that, then as now, 
“when mathematical theory is the ultimate arbiter of truth, it becomes difficult to see the 
difference between science and pseudoscience.”  
While I would stop short of calling economics a pseudoscience, it is safe to say that the high-
level mathematics it employs grants an imprimatur of objectivity which allows its assumptions to 
go relatively unquestioned. We saw this at numerous points in the debate over value-added 
assessment. It was precisely this assumptions-versus-data contest that we saw in Vergara. Jesse 
Rothstein’s work on “Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters” –which was the substance 
of his expert testimony – tested the assumptions of Value-Added-based teacher dismissal policies 
against the real-world characteristics of the teacher labor market. The plaintiffs lawyers protested 
that all this was specualtion, arguing that Thomas Kane and Raj Chetty had presented “actual 
  
232 
 
data” to support their claims, without mentioning that these data – via the modeling strategies 
empoyed – are products of their underlying assumptions. What seems clear from the trial verdict 
is that the data presented by Chetty, Kane and Hanushek were enough to ‘shock the conscience’ 
of the presiding judge and those of the media outlets, while Rothstein’s critiques of model 
assumptions could not moderate the shock.  
Bringing it all together – Value-Added and moments of “Methodological Politics” 
 
We’ve outlined two broad positions above; the first is that science and technology constitute a 
value-free enterprises capable of conveying relatively unmediated truths about nature and 
society. This position is the implicit operating assumption of most mainstream social science. 
Various critical perspectives share the view that science has inherent ideological content which is 
primarily associated with technical efficiency and top-down control of natural and social forces.  
Despite the singularly humanistic enterprise that constitutes its object, much education research 
shares the implicit assumption of value-neutrality. In his work on the politics of charter school 
research, Henig (2008) argues that even though this body of research was put to overtly political 
uses by both charter school proponents and their opponents in the teachers’ unions, the processes 
of data collection and analysis remains shielded from political influence.269 This claim is tenuous 
even in Henig’s own analysis; he concedes that private philanthropies – which play a large and 
growing role in funding education research – are very specific about the questions sponsored 
research asks, the modes of inquiry by which they are answered, and the ways research findings 
                                                             
269 This is a version of Reichenbach’s (1938/1977) distinction between the “context of 
discovery” and “context of justification.” Henig argues that the discovery of objective 
knowledge about charter schools remains a value-neutral process even if the reasons for first 
inquiring about them were infused with politics.  
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are presented. If funders – most of whom have very overt ideological positions – determine what 
is asked, how it is answered, and how the answers are reported, what of this process is value-
free?  
Regarding federally-funded education research, Margaret Eisenhart (2005) contends that 
‘scientific’ research stands apart from moral and political questions. Responding to criticism of a 
2002 National Research Council Report, Scientific Research in Education – on which she 
collaborated and which defined scientific research in primarily quantitative and experimental 
terms – Eisenhart says political and moral questions are best left to ‘philosophers’ and ‘critical 
theorists’ (p. 54) since science focuses on gathering empirical evidence about ‘what works.’ This 
position is similarly poorly-founded; even the NRC definition of scientific research is admittedly 
determined by the opinions of congressional leaders, and the political resonance of (quantitative 
and experimental) research (2005, pp. 52-53).270 Again, if funding sources private and public 
determine a validity hierarchy for research methods (quantiative/experimental vs. 
qualitative/descriptive) and specify the nature of research questions (emphasizing those which 
create interventions on pre-determined outcomes) at the outset, education research can hardly be 
described as standing apart from value judgments.    
The persistent claims to value-neutrality perhaps represent the aspirations of social scientists 
powerfully articulated by Max Weber, even though Weber himself understood this as an ideal 
and knew that social science could never stand apart from value judgments. But, as the critical 
tradition outlined above suggests, ‘objective’ research in education seems to carry and conceal its 
                                                             
270 Baez and Boyles (2009) argue that the language of ‘scientific research in education’ in the No 
Child Left Behind Act, which greatly influences the NRC report, is an instance of political 
interests using science to subvert politics. 
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own particular value set. Indeed, the recent fashion for discovering “what works” in education 
implies that research is only supposed to find more efficient means of producing already-
accepted outputs which are themselves determined by the political process. This was precisey the 
danger alluded to by John Dewey in Education as Engineering (2009) and by Walter Lippman in 
his critiques of intelligence testing discussed in detail in chapter 3 above.  
But the more interesting question that the above study sheds light on is how the value set of 
objective research plays out in moments of technological innovation. Critical scholarship on 
science indicates that allegedly value-neutral, and specifically mathematically sophisticated 
research is vested with an imprimatur of objectivity. We’ve seen that knowledge stated in 
numbers and equations recieves special treatment in literal courts – Frederick W. Taylor’s 
congressional testimony in 1912 or the Vergara v. California trial in 2014 – and in the ‘court of 
public opinion’ as we saw with the Boston School Committee report in 1845. Today, even 
politically progressive forces in education argue for more comprehensive data systems and 
research-proven interventions, believing that they provide unmediated truth (Education 
Opportunity Network, 2013).  
This fetishization of mathematical methods and quantitative data in general seems to be 
amplified by novel techniques; innovations are accompanied by millenialist hopes that education 
will be once and for all be rendered productive, efficient, accountable, and fundamentally equal 
for all students. We saw this sort of hope with the emergence of large-scale experiments and 
systems analysis in the 1970s and we see it again today. In such moments, we forget Weber’s 
assertion that policy cannot be decided by simple recourse to facts; cultural values remain 
essential to establishing social priorities.  
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Thus, while Raymond Callahan (1962) and Jal Mehta (2013) ascribe the success of top-down 
education reformers to the relative weakness of teachers’ organizations, these successes are 
equally well-explained by the unwarranted moral and political power afforded to science and 
technology at moments of innovation. As Morozov (2013) and Aronowitz (1988) suggest, the 
logic of domination is smuggled in and democratic politics are crowded out by the belief that 
difficult educational problems can be solved with seemingly innocuous technical improvements 
to the mechanisms of control. But we see that these technical changes are always accompanied 
by new pushes for administrative centralization. Whether it is the move for professionalized 
superintendency in the 19th century or the gutting of teacher tenure protection in the 21st century, 
technology is politics carried out by other means.   
Further, the examination of the Vergara trial in chapter five adds another micro-level layer to the 
issue of objectivity in science and policy that complements this idea of technology as politics by 
other means. The expert witnesses in that trial would all claim to be doing value-free science 
rooted in objective empirical methods. But given the very political implications of the case – the 
elimination of teacher tenure protections – the experts’ opinions vis-à-vis this consequence, are 
expressed in peculiar forms.  
Take a few examples. Raj Chetty’s testimony for the plaintiffs features an abundance of sports 
analogies: baseball statistics and Kobe Bryant’s height and why coaching athletes still matters. 
Sports methaphors allow Chetty to talk about the quantitative accuracy of a technique like Value-
Added in terms set apart from its real consequences in the very fraught terrain of California 
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public schools.271  Tom Kane’s discussion of the test score impacts of ‘teacher deselection’ 
similarly veils the true potential effects of VA-driven teacher evaluations – teachers will be fired 
and lose their livelihoods based on unreliable and perhaps invalid measures of their abilities. In 
his testimony for the defense, Jesse Rothstein discusses abstract assumptions about teacher 
supply at length, critiques Chetty’s unorthodox definition of forecast bias, and underscores the 
high rate of attrition in the Measures of Effective Teaching Project random assignment study. 
These are strong methodological arguments, but they fail to capture what’s at stake. In order to 
refute these criticisms, Eric Hanushek comes full- circle to the origins of this technique and 
recasts VA as a research method used by economists, not as a policy tool with consequences. 
Value-added as a decision-making policy is held at arm’s length despite the fact that such was 
the very substance of the Vergara trial. 
These exchanges point to what I regard as a ‘methodological politics.’ Chetty, Kane, Rothstein 
and Hanushek each have very clear positions on the appropriateness of VA as a tool for high-
stakes teacher evaluations. Yet, their testimonies become a back-and-forth of statistical minutae; 
instead of teachers’ livelihoods, experts debate standard error calculations and the definition of 
forecast bias. This may be an artifact of the highly scripted nature of expert testimony, and of the 
particularities of economics as a discipline (described briefly above), but the exaggerated nature 
of these exchanges is a useful way of looking at science as a political force. In essence, experts 
who all purport to be pursuing value-neutral truth attempt to best each other with statistical 
sophistication and force their opponents to accept their value judgments as the necessary 
consequence of their ‘objective’ data and methods. If one accepts the methods by which Chetty 
                                                             
271 Promotional materials for value-added assessment go back to the technique’s origins in 
agricultural research and talk about VA in terms of trees growing.   
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empirically adduced Long Term Impacts, or the ‘gold standard’ of experimental design employed 
in Measures of Effective Teaching, one must therefore accept the implication that teachers ought 
to be evaluated by student test score gains. This style of discourse obscures the implications of 
scientific knowledge in favor of abstract technical discussion. But politics are only obscured, not 
altogether absent; the political contents remain intact, as does the appearance that science stands 
apart from such matters. Thus with Marcuse, we might argue that: 
“The analysis is ‘locked;’ the range of judgment is confined within a context of facts 
which excludes judging the context in which the facts are made, man-made, and in which 
their meaning, function and development are determined.” (Marcuse, 1964/1991, pp. 
115-116)      
Placing Value-Added Assessment in context of the history of innovations in educational 
assessment provides perspective on how science manifests as power in determining policy. At 
the larger level, science proceeds as a form of politics to the extent that new technologies are 
percieved as merely technical innovations free of inherent biases. Yet, historical examination 
shows that the use of these techniques is always accompanied by an attendant push for 
increasingly centralized control over schooling. The perceived neutrality of scientific methods 
and the tools they produce allows this admisitrative control to be smuggled in. On a smaller 
scale, debates over policy are displaced into debates over technique, constituting what I have 
called a methodological politics. In the case of value-added, the real stakes of evaluation policies 
are submerged beneath expert opinions on the precision and validity of measurement techniques. 
More importantly, the distinction between fact and value is blurred, and experts who engage in 
such discourse seem caught in a bind. Their commitment to the ideal – or the appearance – of 
objectivity colors the very political consequences of their work, resulting in a contest over 
methods and data rather than interpretations and implications.   
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Something else gets lost in abstract discussion of teacher evaluation policy – education. 
Schooling is a structured interaction between teachers and students which is supposed to educate 
the latter. Having worked with K-12 students throughout the course of this research, it behooves 
me to keep them in mind; at some points I have done so. Chapter one assessed how the workings 
of schools and classrooms would have to be transformed to meet value-added model 
assumptions, and placed this possibility in context of the necessarily contentious relationship 
between teachers and students. There I argued that overemphasis of tests and their results would 
vitiate the important moral content of education. Similarly, the history of assessment technology 
explored in chapter three repeatedly invoked the hazards of measurement-driven instruction for 
both teachers and students. These are important topics, but insofar as this analysis has been 
confined to schooling as a process rather than education as its goal, it is necessary but not 
sufficient.  
Education is not reducible to schooling; it is rather the socially agreed-upon goal which 
schooling – concurrent with other social institutions (notably the family, media, and popular 
culture) – is supposed to achieve. Education is successful to the extent that it reproduces agreed 
upon values, knowledge and capacities among future generations. Understanding the impact of 
evaluation technology on education as distinct from its impact on schooling requires defining 
these shared goals – what is to be taught and learned.  
A comprehensive statement on K-12 curriculum is far beyond the scope of this project, but some 
general outlines can be traced. Curriculum has been and continues to be a ‘third rail’ in US 
politics, particularly when the time comes to discuss evolutionary biology, sex education, and 
certain aspects of American history. In addition, the notion of a national curriculum runs up 
against the idea of ‘states rights,’ making it a wedge issue for conservatives. The ‘Common 
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Core’ standards – the most recent attempt at K-12 curriculum policy – bear the imprint of both of 
these forces; these standards primarily focus on mathematics and reading, and many states 
(especially in the south) either banned the standards altogether or never adopted them in the first 
place.  
In the absence of any sustained explicit negotiations, curriculum is defined by assessments and 
thus by textbook publishers and test-makers. While many industrialized countries use 
comprehensive content examinations as the capstone of students’ compulsory education, the 
closest US equivalents are the SAT and ACT college entrance exams. Even students who apply 
to open-admissions and community colleges are faced with some version of the SAT/ACT. 
Despite numerous revisions intended to align these exams with curriculum, they are still a hybrid 
of basic literacy and numeracy and aptitude testing. These tests are the benchmark of US 
educational assessment, and thus of the curriculum itself. Teacher evaluation systems which 
emphasize test results – forcing teachers who have in the past served as a buffer zone between 
students and the tests – only exacerbate this test-defined experience of schooling.  
What does test-defined schooling imply for eduation in terms of values, knowledge, and 
capacities? Such exams place a premium on reductive thinking and short-cuts (Hoffman, The 
Tyranny of Testing, 1964/2003). They reward students who can identify the least rigorous path 
to the test-maker’s wanted answer and who can temporarily suspend critical thought when faced 
with two or more ‘possibly correct’ choices. Even the allegedly free-response essay portions of 
these exams – which are optional in the case of the SAT and ACT – encourage writing to a 
template rather than crafting original ideas. If value-added evaluation systems disproportionately 
reward teachers who foster these skills in their students, then education is reduced to test-
preparation. Rather than fostering critical thought and innovation, such instruction thwarts those 
  
240 
 
goals by rewarding their opposite. Moreover, to the extent that high-stakes decisions are based 
on value-added measures, teachers are prevented from acting autonomously as professionals in 
the classroom and are instead forced to work within the constraints imposed by the tests. 
Why is educator professionalism important? The production of educated students is not a one-
size-fits-all process; and it contains both measureable and unmeasureable goals. In this process, 
educators need room to adapt to the students they engage with. Early proponents of standardized 
testing understood this and hence emphasized the use of exams as tools rather than as curriculum 
itself (Chauncey & Dobbin, 1963). But this message fell by the wayside as policymakers 
clamored for more data by which to judge students, schools and teachers. Value-added is perhaps 
the culmination of this trajectory; it reduces the whole of a complex relational process to the 
residual term in a loosely-theorized and poorly-specified mathematical equation.        
Ultimately, what I take away from this research is that science and technology can blind us to the 
very complex and contingent realities of vital social processes such as education.  Insofar as 
technical innovations pose enticing and easy solutions to seemingly intractable problems, they 
can also temporarily corrupt the politically difficult but necessary process of devising more 
lasting solutions. Schooling requires more than a series of poorly-informed panics and 
technological panaceas; it needs sustained investment and a level of study whose nuance matches 
its level of complexity.  Simply put, to fulfill its vital social mission, education requires more 
than just endless measurement. 
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Postscript on Value-Added and the return of politics 
 
Writing takes time, and history continues unabated. But in this case it seems history has helped 
validate my thinking in two ways which I will mention briefly. My historical analysis in chapter 
three suggested that after periods of fervor for methodological innovations, they tend to fall out 
of favor. Though it is still uncertain, value-added seems to be on that path. In New York, 
Governor Mario Cuomo – who was a staunch supporter of value-added assessments – has since 
backed off the mandate for teachers to be evaluated on the basis of test scores – even potentially 
reducing their proportional role to zero (Taylor K. , 2015). In California, the Vergara ruling was 
overturned by an appeals court  on April 18th, 2016 - although Students Matter plans to take the 
case to the Supreme Court.  
What is more important is why this is happening. One important factor is the opt-out movement, 
which encourages parents to refuse to have their children sit for local, state and national-level 
standardized tests. Change the Stakes – a New York City-based opt out group – lists standardized 
tests’ role in evaluating teachers as among the primary reasons to resist testing. Supporters argue 
that the perverse incentives created by test-based evaluation hurt instruction at both the 
classroom and school level by encouraging teachers to reallocate time and discouraging teacher 
cooperation. A sign of the appeal of opt-out, 20 percent of New York State students in grades 3 
through 8 did not sit for testing (Harris E. , 2015). Growing opt-out numbers are also evident in 
Washington, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Illinois (Stokes, 2015).  
Opt-out, in light of the above research, seems a logical response to the crowding out of 
democratic politics by technology in the field of education. Policymakers see the world at a 
particular level and want aggregate evidence at that level to make decisions (Scott, 1998). But, as 
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Feyerabend makes clear, the reliance on the so-called objective evidence in science is 
fundamentally undemocratic. It is presented as unassailable truth rather than as knowledge 
produced by human beings with particular values of their own, and rejects all other knowledge 
claims as ideological (Feyerabend, 1975). Thus, when opt-outers declare that “my child is not a 
number” and seek to revitalize the interactions of the classroom – including their own 
participation – they articulate a fundamentally democratic response to a top-down 
methodological politics epitomized by value-added teacher evaluations. And in targeting the 
supply of data on which these evaluations subsist, opt-out demonstrates its recognition of the role 
of science and its methods as critical mechanisms of power in society. Understanding full well 
that my own science is not value-free, I hope they succeed.  
  
  
243 
 
Bibliography 
 
National Research Council. (2002). Scientific Research in Education. Washington DC: National 
Academy Press. 
Aaronson, D., Barrow, L., & Sandler, W. (2003). Teachers and Student Achievement in the 
Chicago Public Schols. Chicago: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. 
Adler, M. (2013). Findings vs. interpretation in "The long-term impacts of teachers" by Chetty et 
al. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(10), 1-11. 
Aitken, H. (1960). Taylorism at Watertown Arsenal; scientific management in action, 1908-
1915. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Alexander, K., Entwisle, D., & Olson, L. (2001). Schools, Achievement, and Inequality: A 
Seasonal Perspective. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 23(2), 171-191. 
Alexander, L. (1986). "Time for Results: An Overview.". Phi Delta Kappan, 68(3), 202-204. 
Althusser, L. (1990/2012). Philosophy and the Spontaneous Philosophy of the Sciences. 
Brooklyn, NY: Verso. 
American Educational Research Association. (2015). AERA Statement on Use of Value-Added 
Models (VAM) for the Evaluation of Educators and Educator Preparation Programs. 
Washington, DC: American Educational Research Association. 
American Social History Productions. (2012). Debunking Intelligence Experts: Walter Lippmann 
Speaks Out. Retrieved December 13, 2014, from History Matters: The U.S. Survey 
Course on the Web: http://historymatters.gmu.edu/d/5172 
American Statistical Association. (2014). ASA Statement on Using VAlue-Added Models for 
Educational Assessment. Alexandria, VA: American Statistical Asociation. 
Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2008). Methodological Concerns About the Educational Value-Added 
Assessment System. Educational Researcher, 37, 65-75. 
Amrein-Beardsley, A. (2014). Rethinking Value-Added Models in Education. New York: 
Routledge. 
Angrist, J., Imbens, G. W., & Rubin, D. B. (1996). Identification of Causal Effects Using 
Instrumental Variables. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 444-455. 
Archer, J. (1999, May 5). Sanders 101. Education Weeke, p. 26. 
  
244 
 
Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery. (nd). History of Military Testinf. Retrieved 
December 9, 2014, from Official Site of the ASVAB: http://official-
asvab.com/history_res.htm 
Army Alpha and Beta Tests. (2014). In A. M. Colman, A Dictionary of Psychology 3rd edition. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Aronowitz, S. (1988). Science as Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society. 
Minneapolis: Univeristy of Minnesota Press. 
Aronowitz, S. (1988). Science As Power: Discourse and Ideology in Modern Society (1st ed.). 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Aronowitz, S. (2000). The Knowledge Factory: Dismantling the Corporate University and 
Creating True Higher Learning. New York: Beacon Press. 
Aronowitz, S. (2014). The Death and Life of American Labor. New York: Verso. 
Ascher, C. (1996). Performance Contracting: A Forgotten Experiment in School Privatization. 
Phi Delta Kappan, 77(9), 615-621. 
Attewell, P. (1987). Big Borther in the Sweatshop. Sociological Theory, 5, 87-99. 
Ayres, L. (1909). Laggards in our schools; a study of retardation and elimination in city school 
systems. New York: Charities Publication Committee. 
Ayres, L. (1920a). What Tests are For. Journal of Educational Research, 2(2), 585-586. 
Ayres, L. (1920b). Psychology of the Educational "Standpatter". Journal of Educational 
Research, 1(2), 135-136. 
Bacher-Hicks, A., Kane, T., & Staiger, D. O. (2014). Validating Teacher Effect Estimates Using 
Changes in Teacher Assignments in Los Angeles. Washington, DC: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Baez, B., & Boyles, D. (2009). The Politics of Inquiry: Education Research and the Culture of 
Science. Albany: SUNY Press. 
Bagley, W. C. (1925). Determinism in Education. Baltimore: Warwick & York. 
Baker, A. P., & Xu, D. (1995). The Measure of Education: A Review of the Tennessee Value-
Added Assessment System. Nashville, TN: Tennessee Office of Educational 
Accountability. 
Baker, B. (2013). Gates Still Doesn't Get It! Trapped in a World of Circular Reasoning & Flawed 
Frameworks. Retrieved from School Finance 101: 
  
245 
 
https://schoolfinance101.wordpress.com/2013/01/09/gates-still-doesnt-get-it-trapped-in-
a-world-of-circular-reasoning-flawed-frameworks/ 
Baker, B., Joseph, O., & Green, P. (2013). The Legal Consequences of Mandating High Stakes 
Decisions Based on Low-Quality Information. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 
21(5), 1-71. 
Baker, E., Barton, P., Darling-Hammond, L., Haertel, E., Ladd, H., Lin, R., . . . Shepard, L. 
(2010). Problems With the Use of Student Test Scores to Evaluate Teachers. Washington, 
DC: Economic Policy Institute. 
Ball, A. (2013, October 7). The Man Behind the Numbers. Retrieved April 26, 2015, from 
Classroom Chronicles: http://tnclassroomchronicles.org/man-behind-numbers/ 
Ballou, D. (2012, February 16). Review of The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher Value-
Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood. Retrieved February 7, 2016, from National 
Education Policy Center: http://nepc.colorado.edu/thinktank/review-long-term-impacts 
Ballou, D., & Podgursky, M. (1997). Reforming Teacher Preparation and Licensing: What is the 
Evidence? Teachers College Record, 99(2), 311-334. 
Balogh, B. (2004). Making Pluralism Great: Beyond a Recycled History of the Great Society. In 
S. Milkis, & J. Mileur, The Great Society and the High Tide of Liberalism (pp. 145-182). 
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 
Barhouse-Walters, P., Lareau, A., & Ranis, S. H. (2009a). Appendix A: The Definition of 
Scientifically-Based Research in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001. In P. Barhouse-
Walters, L. A, & S. H. Ranis (Eds.), Education Research on Trial: Policy Reform and the 
Call for Scientific Rigor (pp. 221-222). New York: Routledge. 
Barnhouse-Walters, P. (2009). The Politics of Science: Battles for Scientific Authority in the 
Field of Education Research. In P. Barnhouse-Walters, A. Lareau, & S. H. Ranis (Eds.). 
New York: Routledge. 
Barnhouse-Walters, P., Lareau, A., & Ranis, S. H. (2009b). Appendix B: The Definitions of 
"Scientifically-Based Research" in the Education Sciences Reform Act of 2002. In P. 
Barnhouse-Walters, A. Lareau, & S. H. Ranis (Eds.), Education Research on Trial: Policy 
Reform and the Call for Scientific Rigor (pp. 223-224). New York: Routledge. 
Beaton, A., Rogers, A., Gonzalez, E., Hanley, M., Kolstad, A., Rust, K., . . . Jia, Y. (2011). The 
NAEP Primer: A Technical History of NAEP. Washington, DC: National Center for 
Education Statistics. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from 
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/about/newnaephistory.aspx 
  
246 
 
Bembry, K., Bearden, D., & Mendro, R. (1997). Using Student Achievement in Teacher 
Appraisal. Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association. Chicago. 
Bendix, R. (1954). Work and Authority in Industry. Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Berliner, D., & Biddle, B. (1995). The Manufactured Crisis: Myths, Fraud, and the Attack on 
America's Public Schools. New York: Basic Books. 
Bernstein, J. (2002, August 30). Test Case: Hard Lessons from the TAAS. Texas Observer. 
Bernstein, V. (1936, May 24). Security of the Teacher in his Job. The New York Times, p. 189. 
Bingham, W. (1937). Aptitudes and Aprtitude Testing. New York: Harper & Brothers. 
Bingham, W. (1941). Psychological Services in the United States Army. Journal of Consulting 
Psychology, 221-224. 
Blackwell, J. (1999). 1947: America's tester-in-chief. Retrieved December 1, 2014, from The 
Capital Century: The Trentonian: http://capitalcentury.com/1947.html 
Boas, F. (1922). Report on an Anthropometric Investigation of the Population of the United 
States. In F. Boas, Race, Language and Culture (1966) (pp. 28-59). New York: The Free 
Press. 
Boas, F. (1931). Race and Progress. In F. Boas, Race, Language and Culture (1966) (pp. 3-17). 
New York: The Free Press. 
Bollinger, L. (2003, November 3). Educational Equity and Quality: Brown and Rodriguez and 
Their Aftermath. Retrieved March 3, 2015, from 
http://www.columbia.edu/node/8247.html 
Booher-Jennings, J. (2005). "Educational Triage" and the Texas Accountability System. 
American Educational Research Journal, 42(2), 231-268. 
Bowles, S. (1970). Towards an Educational Production Function. In W. L. Hansen, Education, 
Income, and Human Capital (pp. 9-70). Ann Arbor: UMI. 
Boyette, C. (2011, July 21). 34 New Jersey Schools investigated for possible cheating. Retrieved 
from CNN.com. 
Bracey, G. W. (2007, October 2). The Sputnik Effect: Why it endures, 50 years later. Retrieved 
January 17, 2015, from Education Week: 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2007/10/02/06bracey_web.h27.html 
Braun, H. I. (2005). Using Student Progress To Evaluate Teachers: A Primer on Value-Added 
Models. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. 
  
247 
 
Braverman, H. (1974). Labor and Monopoly Capital. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Braverman, H. (1998). Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
Breault, R. A. (2009). Life Adjustment Movement. In E. F. Provenzo Jr, & A. B. Provenzo, 
Encyclopedia of the Social and Cultural Foundations of Education (pp. 470-471). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications. 
Brenneman, R. (2015, August 6). Is There a Teacher Shortage? That Depends How You Frame 
It. Education Week. 
Briggs, D. C., & Weeks, J. P. (2011). The Persistence of School-Level Value Added. Journal of 
Educational and Bahvioral Statistics, 36(5), 616-637. 
Brigham, C. C. (1922). A Study of American Intelligence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Brill, S. (2010, May 17). The Teachers' Unions' Last Stand. The New York Times. 
Brint, S. (1996). In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public 
Life. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Buckingham, B. R. (1920). A Proposed Index of Efficiency in Teaching United States History. 
Journal of Educational Research, 1(3), 161-171. Retrieved December 12, 2014, from 
www.jstor.org/stable/27524291 
Buckingham, B. R. (1921). The School as a Selective Agency. The Journal of Educational 
Research, 3(2), 138-139. 
Buder, L. (1971, March 19). Clark Assails Education Board on an Outside Testing Contract. The 
New York Times, p. 25. 
Buder, L. (1974, April 11). Lachman Bids Anker Act on Reading-Test Cheating. The New York 
Times, p. 1. 
Bulmer, M. (1996). The Sociological Contribution to Social Policy Research. In J. Clark, James 
S. Coleman (pp. 103-118). London: Routledge. 
Burawoy, M. (1979). Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process Under Monopoly 
Capitalism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Burke, W. (2013, December 9). Opening Remarks on E.L. Thorndike. Assessment and 
Evaluation Research Initiative: Testing Then and Now: Building on a Legacy in 
Educational Measurement, Assessment and Evaluation. New York, NY. 
  
248 
 
Bush, M. (2004). Breaking the Code of Good Intentions: Everyday Forms of Whiteness. 
Lanhmam, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Bush, R. (1999). We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the 
American Century. New York: New York University Press. 
Buxton, C. A. (2009). Sputnik. In E. Provenzo Jr, Encyclopedia of the Social and Cultural 
Foundations of Education (Vol. 2, pp. 754-756). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Callahan, R. E. (1962). Education and the Cult of Efficiency. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Campbell, D. T. (1975). Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change. In G. Lyons, Social 
Research and Public Policies (pp. 3-45). Hanover, NH: The Public Affairs Center, 
Dartmouth College. 
Campbell, D. T. (1975). Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change. In G. Lyons, Social 
Research and Public Policies (pp. 3-45). Hanover, NH: The Public Affairs Cented, 
Dartmouth College. 
Campbell, D. T. (1976). Assessing the Impact of Planned Social Change. Kalamazoo, MI: 
Evaluation Center - Western Michigan University. 
Carruthers, B., & Espeland, W. N. (1991). Accounting for Rationality: Double-Entry 
Bookkeeping and the Rhetoric of Economic Rationality. American Journal of Sociology, 
97(1), 31-69. 
Carson, C., Huelskamp, R., & Woodall, T. (1992). Perspectives on Education in America: An 
Annotated Briefing. Journal of Education Research, 86(5). 
Carson, J. (2007). The Measure of Merit: Talents, Intelligence, and Inequality in the French and 
American Republics, 1750-1940. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Cataldi, E. F., Siegel, P., Shepherd, B., & Cooney, J. (2014). Baccalaureate and Beyond: A First 
Look at the Employment Experiences and Lives of College Graduates, 4 Years On. 
Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics. 
Center for Research on Educational Outcomes. (2012). Charter School Performance in New 
Jersey. Stanford, CA: Charter School Performance in New Jersey. 
Center for Research on Educational Outcomes. (2014a). Charter School Performance in Los 
Angeles. Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Educational Outcomes. 
Center for Research on Educational Outcomes. (2014b). Charter School Performance in 
California. Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Educational Outcomes. 
  
249 
 
Ceperly, P. E., & Reel, K. (1997). The Impetus for the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment 
System. In J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student 
Achievement a Valid Evaluation Measure? (pp. 133-136). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin 
Press. 
Chandler, A. (1977). The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Chauncey, H., & Dobbin, J. (1963). Testing: Its Place in Education Today. New York: Harper & 
Row. 
Chetty, R. (2013, October 20). Yes, Economics is a Science. The New York Times. 
Chetty, R. (2013, October 20). Yes, Economics is a Science. The New York Times, p. A21. 
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., & Rockoff, J. (2011). New Evidence on the Long-Term Impacts of Tax 
Credits. Washington, DC: Internal Revenue Service. 
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., & Rockoff, J. (2011). The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher 
Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Chetty, R., Friedman, J., & Rockoff, J. (2011a). The Long-Term Impacts of Teachers: Teacher 
Value-Added and Student Outcomes in Adulthood. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of 
Economic Research. 
Chingos, M. (2013). Instructional Quality and Student Learning in Higher Education. 
Washington, DC: Brookings Institute. 
Chubb, J. E., & Moe, T. M. (1990). Politics, Markets and America's Schools. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution. 
Clark, M., Isenberg, E., Liu, A., Makowsky, L., & Zukiewicz, M. (2015). Impacts of the Teach 
for America Invest in Innovation Scale Up. Princeton, NJ: Mathematica Policy Research. 
Clinton, B. (1986). Who Will Manage the Schools? The Phi Delta Kappan, 68(3), 208-210. 
Clowes, G. A. (1999, November 1). Helping Teachers Raise Student Achievement: an interview 
with William L. Sanders. Retrieved August 2, 2015, from Heartlander: 
http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/1999/11/01/helping-teachers-raise-student-
achievement-interview-william-l-sanders 
Cohen, N. A. (2014). Queueing or Creaming? Will or Lose. The Journal of Sociology & Social 
Welfare, 3(4). 
Cohen, S. (2002). Folk Devils and Moral Panics. London and New York: Routledge. 
  
250 
 
Computer History Museum. (2006). Timeline of Computer History. Retrieved January 27, 2015, 
from Computer History Museum: http://www.computerhistory.org/timeline/?year=1952 
Comte, A. (1822/1998). Plan for the Scientific Operations Necessary for Reorganizing Society. 
In G. Lenzer (Ed.), Auguste Comte and Positivism (pp. 9-67). Piscataway, NJ: 
Transaction Pubslishers. 
Comte, A. (1853/1998). General View of Biology. In G. Lenzer (Ed.), Auguste Comte and 
Positivism (pp. 163-181). New York: Transaction Publishers. 
Comte, A. (1853/1998). View of the Hierarchy of the Positive Sciences. In G. Lenzer (Ed.), 
Auguste Comte and Positivism (pp. 87-101). New York: Transaction Publishers. 
Conor, W. L. (1920). A New Method for Rating Teachers. The Journal of Educational Research, 
1(5), 338-358. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/27524324 
Corcoran, S. (2010). Can Teachers Be Evaluated by their Students' Test Scores? Should They 
Be? The Use of Value-Added Measures of Teacher Effectiveness in Policy and Practice. 
Providence, RI: Annenberg Institute for School Reform. 
Cremin, L. (1961). The Transformation of the School: Progressivism in American Education 
1876-1957. New York: Alfed A. Knopf. 
Cronbach, L. (1975). Five Decades of Controversy Over Mental Testing. American Psychologist, 
30(1), 1-14. 
Cruse, K., & Twing, J. (2000). The History of Statewide Achievement Testing in Texas. Applied 
Measurement in Education, 13(4), 327-331. 
Cubberly, E. (1919). Public Education in the United States. New York and Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company. 
Cullen, M. J. (1975). The statistical movement in early Victorian Britain: The foundations of 
empirical social research. New York: Barnes & Noble. 
Cunningham, L. L. (1997). The Dallas Value-Added Accountability System: In the Beginning. 
In J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student Achievement a a 
Valid Educational Measure? (pp. 75-80). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
Darling-Hammond, L. (2012, March 5). Value-Added Evaluation Hurts Teaching. Education 
Week. 
Darling-Hammond, L., Amrein-Beardsley, A., Haertel, E., & Rothstein, J. (2012). Evaluating 
Teacher Evaluation. Phi Delta Kappan, 93(6), 8-15. 
  
251 
 
Darlington, R. (1997). The Tennessee Value-Added System: A Challenge to Familiar 
Assessment Methods. In J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is 
Student Achievement a Valid Evaluation Measure? (pp. 163-168). Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Corwin Press. 
DeBray, E. (2006). Politics, Ideology, and Education: Federal Policy during the Clinton and 
Bush Administrations . New York: Teachers College Press. 
Deming, W. E. (1982). Out of the Crisis. Cambridge: MIT Center for Advanced Engineering 
Study. 
Deming, W. E. (1982). Out of the Crisis. Cambridge : MIT Press. 
Dewey, J. (2009). Education as engineering. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 41(1), 1-5. 
Dexter, E. G. (1906). Ten Years' Influence of the Report of the Committee of Ten. The School 
Review, 14(4), 254-269. Retrieved February 2, 2015, from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1075656 
DiCarlo, M. (2012). Do Top Teachers Produce "A Year and a Half of Learning?". Retrieved 
from Albert Shanker Institute Blog: http://www.shankerinstitute.org/blog/do-top-
teachers-produce-year-and-half-learning 
DiCarlo, M. (2014, March 4). Revisiting The Widget Effect. Retrieved from Albert Shanker 
Institute: http://www.shankerinstitute.org/blog/revisiting-widget-effect 
Donald, M. (2000, October 19). The Resurrection of Sandy Kress. The Dallas Observer. 
Downey, D., von Hippel, P., & Broh, B. (2004). Are Schools the Great Equalizer? Cognitive 
Inequality during the Summer Months and the School Year. American Sociological 
Review, 69(5), 613-635. 
Drucker, P. F. (1954). The Practice of Management. New York: Harper Collins. 
Ducros, J. (nd). Admiral Hyman George Rickover. Retrieved January 15, 2015, from 
http://www2.southeastern.edu/Academics/Faculty/nadams/educ692/Rickover.html 
Durkheim, E. (1895/1982). The Rules of the Sociological Method. (S. Lukes, Ed.) New York: 
The Free Press. 
Durkheim, E. (1961). Moral Education: A Study in the Theory & Application of the Sociology of 
Education. New York: Free Press. 
Eagle Shutt, J. (nd). Ellwood Cubberly (1868-1941) - Education and Career, Contribution. 
Retrieved December 2, 2014, from Stateuniversity.com: 
http://education.stateuniversity.com/pages/1893/Cubberley-Ellwood-1868-1941.html 
  
252 
 
Education Opportunity Network. (2013, June 3). An Education Declaration to Rebuild America. 
Retrieved from http://educationopportunitynetwork.org/education_announcement/ 
Education Week. (1994, November 8). Summary of the Improving America's Schools Act. 
Retrieved July 20, 2015, from Education Week: 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1994/11/09/10asacht.h14.html 
Edwards, R. (1979). Contested Terrain: The Transformation of the Workplace in the Twentieth 
Century. New York: Basic Books. 
Eisenhart, M. (2005). Science Plus: A Response to the Responses to Scientific Research in 
Education. Teachers College Record, 107(1), 52-58. 
Eisenhart, M., & Towne, L. (2003). Contestation and Change in National Policy on 
'Scientifically Based' Education Research. Educational Researcher, 32(7), 31-38. 
Elliot, E. (1915). How Shall the Merit of Teachers be Tested and Recorded. Educational 
Administration and Supervision, 1, 291-299. 
Fain, P. (2013, August 23). Performance Funding Goes Federal. Inside Higher Ed. 
Fancher, R. E. (1985). The Intelligence Men: Makers of the IQ Controversy. New York: Norton. 
Fensterwald, J. (2015, July 21). Group Created By Silicon Valley Millionaire Targets Teacher 
Evaluations In California. Retrieved February 4, 2016, from The Huffington Post: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/21/students-matter-teacher-
evaluations_n_7841812.html 
Feyerabend, P. (1965). Problems of Empiricism. In R. G. Colodny (Ed.), Beyond the Edge of 
Certainty: Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy (pp. 145-260). Pittsburgh: 
CPS Publications in the Philosophy of Science. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975). 'Science.' The myth and its role in Society. Inquiry, 18(2), 167-181. 
Feyerabend, P. (1975/2010). Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge 
(4th ed.). Brooklyn, NY: Verso. 
Feyerabend, P. (1993). Against Method. New York and London: Verso. 
Fischer, C., & Hout, M. (2006). A Century of Difference: How America Changed in the Last 
One Hundred Years. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Foucault, M. (1970/1994). The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books. 
Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books. 
  
253 
 
Foucault, M. (1977/1995). Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books. 
Foucault, M. (1982). The Subject and Power. Critical Inquiry, 8(4), 777-795. 
Foucault, M. (1994/1970). The Order of Things. New York: Vintage Books. 
Freeman, J. C. (2009). The Common Sense SAT Workbook. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse. 
Frusciano, T. (1983). Student Deferment and the Selective Service College Qualification Test, 
1951-1967. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. 
Gabriel, R., & Lester, J. N. (2013). Sentinels Guarding the Grail: Value-Added Measurement and 
the Quest for Education Reform. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(9), 1-26. 
Gamoran, A. (1987). The Stratification of High School Learning Opportunities. Sociology of 
Education, 60(3), 135-155. 
Gamoran, A. (1992). The Variable Effects of High School Tracking. American Sociological 
Review, 57(6), 812-828. 
Garrett, R., & Steinberg, M. P. (2015). Examining Teacher Effectiveness Using Classroom 
Observation Scores: Observations From the Randomization of Teachers to Students. 
Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 37(2), 224-242. 
Gass, S. I., & Assad, A. A. (2005). An Annotated Timeline of Operations Research: An Informal 
History. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Gates, B. (2012, February 22). Shame is Not the Solution. The New York Times. 
Gille, B. (1986). The History of Techniques. New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers. 
Giroux, H. (2012). Education and the Crisis of Public Valiues. New York: Peter Lang. 
Goddard, H. H. (1920). Human Efficiency and Levels of Intelligence. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
Goldstein, D. (2015). The Gates Foundation MET Project: Paying Attention to Pedagogy While 
Privileging Test Scores. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute. 
Goldstein, H. (1997). Methods in school effectiveness research. School Effectiveness and School 
Improvement, 8(4), 369-395. 
Gordon, R., Kane, T., & Staiger, D. (2006). Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance 
on the Job. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. 
Gordon, R., Kane, T., & Staiger, D. (2006). Identifying Effective Teachers Using Performance 
on the Job. New York: The Brookings Institution. 
  
254 
 
Gould, S. J. (1981). The Mismeasure of Man. New York: Norton. 
Gouldner, A. (1979). The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of the New Class. London: 
Palgrave. 
Grabiner, D. (1994). The Sabermetric Manifesto. Retrieved from The Baseball Archive: 
http://seanlahman.com/baseball-archive/sabermetrics/sabermetric-manifesto/ 
Guarino, C., Reckase, M., & Woolridge, J. (2012). Can Value-Added Measures of Teacher 
Education Performance be Trusted? East Lansing, MI: The Educational Policy Center at 
Michigan State University. 
Hadhazy, A. (nd). 7 Curious (and Curiously Important) Inventions from the IBM Archive: 
Automated Test Scoring. Retrieved December 19, 2014, from Popular Mechanics: 
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/engineering/gonzo/7-important-
innovations-from-ibms-first-100-years-automated-test-scoring#slide-6 
Hand, H. (1958). A Scholar's Devil Theory. High School Journal, 41(7), 270-286. 
Haney, W. (2000). The Myth of the Texas Miracle in Education. Education Policy Analysis 
Archives, 8(41), 1-136. 
Hanushek, E. (1970). The Production of Education, Teacher Quality, and Efficiency. In Do 
Teachers Make a Difference? A Report on Recent Research on Pupil Achievement (pp. 
79-99). Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
Hanushek, E. (1971). Teacher Characteristics and Gains in Student Achievement: Estimation 
Using Micro-Data. American Economic Review, 61(2), 280-288. 
Hanushek, E. (1971). Teacher Characteristics and Gains in Student Achievement: Estimation 
Using Micro-Data. American Economic Review, 61(2), 280-288. 
Hanushek, E. (1992). The trade-off between child quantity and quality. The Journal of Political 
Economy, 100(1), 84-117. 
Hanushek, E. (1997). Assessing the Effects of School Resources on Student Performance: An 
Update. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 19(2), 141-164. 
Hanushek, E. (2009). Teacher Deselection. In D. Goldhaber, & J. Hannaway, Creating a New 
Teaching Profession (pp. 165-180). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Hanushek, E. (2012, February 24). Teacher Ratings are a Vital Step Forward. The New York 
Daily News. 
  
255 
 
Hanushek, E. A. (1999). The Evidence on Class Size. In S. E. Mayer, & P. E. Peterson, Earning 
and Learning: How Schools Matter (pp. 131-168). Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution. 
Hanushek, E. A. (2009). Teacher Deselection. In D. Goldhaber, & J. Hannaway, Creating a New 
Teaching Profession (pp. 165-180). Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press. 
Hanushek, E. A., & Lindseth, A. A. (2009). Courthouses and Statehouses: Solving the Funding-
Achievement Puzzle in America's Public Schools. Princeton NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
Hanushek, E., & Jackson, J. E. (1977). Statistical Methods for Social Scientists. New York: 
Academic Press. 
Hanushek, E., & Kain, J. (1972). On the Value of Equality of Educational Opportunity as a 
Guide to Public Policy. In D. Moynihan, & F. Mosteller, On Equality of Educational 
Opportunity (pp. 116-145). New York: Random House. 
Hanushek, E., Rivkin, S., & Kain, J. (2005). Teachers, Schools and Academic Achievement. 
Econometrica, 417-458. 
Harris, D. N. (2009). Teacher Value Added: Don't End the Search Before it Starts. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 692-699. 
Harris, D. N. (2011). Value-Added Measures in Education: What Every Educator Needs to 
Know. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Harris, E. (2015, August 12). 20% of New York State Students Opted Out of Standardized Tests 
This Year. The New York Times, p. A1. 
Hartley, H. (1968). Educational Planning-Programming-Budgeting: A Systems Approach. 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Healey, J. (2012). Statistics: A Tool for Social Research (9th ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. 
Hechinger, F. (1971, February 14). Accountability: A Way to Measure the Job Done by Schools. 
The New York Times, p. 7. 
Hechinger, F. (1971, June 29). Teachers: Attacked from Right and Left. The New York Times. 
Heckman, J., & Neal, D. (1996). Coleman's Contributions to Education: Theory, Research Styles 
and Empirical Research. In J. Clark, James S. Coleman (pp. 81-102). London: Routledge. 
Hedges, L. V. (2008). Using the Instrumental Variables Technique in Educational Research). 
Retrieved February 17, 2016, from Institute For Education Sciences: 
https://ies.ed.gov/director/conferences/08ies_conference/ppt/hedges.ppt 
  
256 
 
Heise, M. M. (1994). Goals 2000: Educate America Act: The Federalization and Legalization of 
Educational Policy. Fordham Law Review, 63(2), 345-381. 
Henig, J. (2008). Spin Cycle: How Research Gets Used in Policy Debates. The Case of Charter 
Schools. New York: Russell Sage. 
Hill, C., Bloom, H., Black, A., & Lipsey, M. (2007). Empirical Benchmarks for Interpreting 
Effect Sizes in Research. New York, NY: MDRC. 
Hill, D. (2000, May 1). He's Got Your Number. Education Week Teacher. 
Hill, D. (2000, May 1). He's Got Your Number. Education Week Teacher. 
Hitch, C., & McKean, R. N. (1960). The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Hoffman, B. (1964/2003). The Tyranny of Testing. Mineola, NY: Dover. 
Hoffman, B. (2003). The Tyranny of Testing. Mineola, NY: Dover. 
Horkheimer, M. (1932/1999). Notes on Science and the Crisis. In C. Lemert (Ed.), Social 
Theory: The Multicultural and Classic Readings (pp. 208-212). Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press. 
Horkheimer, M., & Adorno, T. W. (1944/2002). Dialectic of Enlightenment. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
Horn, J., & Wliburn, D. (2013). The Mismeasure of Education. Charlotte, NC: Information Age 
Publishing. 
Howard, R. (1985). Brave New Workplace. New York: Viking Press. 
Howe, K. (1988). Against the Quantitative-Qualitative Incompatibility Thesis (Or Dogmas Die 
Hard). Educational Researcher, 17(8), 10-16. 
Husserl, E. (1954/1970). Philosophy and the Crisis of European Humanity. In The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (D. Carr, Trans., pp. 269-299). 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Husserl, E. (1954/1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. 
(D. Carr, Trans.) Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Imbens, G. (2014). Instrumental Variables: An Econometrician's Perspective. Bonn, Germany: 
Institute for the Study of Labor. 
  
257 
 
Imbens, G., & Angrist, J. (1994). Identification and Estimation of Local Average Treatment 
Effects. Econometrics, 62(2), 467-475. 
INFORMS. (nd). Alexander Mood. Retrieved January 21, 2015, from INFORMS.org: 
https://www.informs.org/About-INFORMS/History-and-Traditions/Miser-Harris-
Presidential-Portrait-Gallery/Alexander-Mood 
INFORMS. (nd). What is Operations Research? Retrieved January 20, 2015, from The Institute 
for Operations Research and Management Sciences: https://www.informs.org/About-
INFORMS/What-is-Operations-Research 
Ingersoll, R. (2003). Out-of-field Teaching and the limits of Teacher Policy. Philadelphia, PA: 
Consortium for Policy Research in Education. 
Institute of Education Sciences. (nd). Frequently Asked Questions. Retrieved August 1, 2015, 
from What Works Clearinghouse: http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/Document.aspx?sid=15 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement. (nd). Brief History of 
IEA: 55 Years of Educational Research. Retrieved July 15, 2015, from International 
Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement: 
http://www.iea.nl/brief_history.html 
Jacob, B., Lefgren, L., & Sims, D. (2010). The Persistence of Teacher-Induced Learning Gains. 
The Journal of Human Resources, 45(4), 915-943. 
James, H. T. (1968). The New Cult of Efficiency and Education:The Horace Mann Memorial 
Lecture 1968. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. 
Jardini, D. R. (1996). Out of the Blue Yonder: The RAND Corporation's Diversification into 
Social Welfare Research. PhD Dissertation: Carnegie Mellon University. UMI 
Dissertation Services. 
Jardini, D. R. (2000). Out of the Blue Yonder: The Transfer of Systems Thinking from the 
Pentagon to the Great Society, 1961–1965. In A. Hughes, & T. Hughes, Systems, 
Experts, and Computers: The Systems Approach in Management and Engineering, World 
War II and After. Cambridge: The MIT Press. 
Kane, T. (2004). The Impact of After-School Programs: Interpreting the Results from Four 
Recent Evaluations. New York: William T. Grant Foundation. 
Kane, T., & Cantrell, S. (2010). Learning About Teaching: Initial Findings from the Measures of 
Effective Teaching Project. Seattle, WA: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Kane, T., & Staiger, D. (2008). Estimating Teacher Impacts on Student Achievement: An 
Experimental Evaluation. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
  
258 
 
Kane, T., McCaffrey, D., Miller, T., & Staiger, D. (2013). Have We Identified Effective 
Teachers? : Validating Measures of Effective Teaching Using Random Assignment. 
Seattle, WA: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Karabel, J. (2005). The Chosen. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
Katz, M. (1975). Class, Bureaucracy, and Schools. New York: Prager. 
Katz, M. B. (2001). The Irony of Early School Reform. New York: Teachers College Press. 
Katz, M. S. (1976). A History of Compulsory Education Laws. Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta 
Kappa Educational Foundation. 
Kaufmann, E. P. (2004). The Rise and Fall of Anglo-America. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Kean, T. (1986). Who Will Teach? The Phi Delta Kappan, 68(3), 205-207. 
Kershaw, J., & McKean, R. (1959). Systems Analysis and Education. Santa Monica, CA: The 
RAND Corporation. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_memoranda/2009/RM2473.pdf 
Keynes, J. M. (1936). The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. Cambridge: 
Macmillan. 
Koerner, B. I. (2014, November 25). How the World's First Computer was Rescued from the 
Scrap Heap. Retrieved January 27, 2015, from Wired: 
http://www.wired.com/2014/11/eniac-unearthed/ 
Koretz, D. (2000). Limitations in the Use of Achievement Tests as Measures of Educators' 
Productivity. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. 
Kozol, J. (1967). Death at an Early Age: The Destruction of the Hearts and Minds of Negro 
Children in the Boston Public Schools. New York: Houghton Mifflin. 
Kozol, J. (2005). The Shame of the Nation. New York: Crown Publishing. 
Kraft, M., & Papay, J. (2014). Can Professional Environments in Schools Promote Teacher 
Development? Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 36(4), 476-500. 
Kuhn, T. (1962). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Kupermintz, H. (2003). Teacher Effects and Teacher Effectiveness: A Validitiy Investigation of 
the Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System. Educational Evaluation and Policy 
Analysis, 25(3), 287-298. 
  
259 
 
Labaree, D. (2010). Someone Has to Fail: The Zero-Sum Game of Public Schooling. Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press. 
Labaree, D. (2010). Someone Has To Fail: The Zero-Sum Game of Public Schooling. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Presss. 
Lagemann, E. C. (2002). An Elusive Science: The Troubling History of Education Research. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Le Bon, G. (1895/1969). The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind. New York: Ballantine 
Books. 
Lemann, N. (1999). The Big Test: The Secret History of the American Meritocracy. New York: 
Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
Lenzer, G. (1998). August Comte and Modern Positivism. In G. Lenzer (Ed.), Auguste Comte 
and Positivism (pp. xxxi-lxxxi). Piscataway, NJ: Transaction. 
Lessinger, L. (1970). Engineering Accountability for Results in Education. Phi Delta Kappan, 
52(4), 217-225. 
Lessinger, L. (1971). The Powerful Notion of School Accountability. In L. Browder Jr., 
Emerging Patterns of Administrative Accountability (pp. 62-73). Berkeley, CA: 
McCutchan Publishing Corporation. 
Levin, H. M. (1972, January 10). Is 'Accountability' Just a Catchword? . The New York Times. 
Levinowitz, A. J. (2016, April 4). The New Astrology. Aeon. 
Levi-Strauss, C. (1963). Structural Anthropology. (C. Jacobson, Trans.) New York: Basic Books. 
Lippman, W. (1922, December). A Future for the Tests. The New Republic. 
Lippman, W. (1922, July). Mental Age of Americans. The New Republic. 
Lippman, W. (1922, October). The Abuse of the Tests. The New Republic. 
Lippman, W. (1922, August). The Mystery of the "A" men. The New Republic. 
Lippman, W. (1922, September). The Reliability of Intelligence Tests. The New Repiblic. 
Lippman, W. (1997). Public Opinion. New York: Free Press. 
Littler, C. (1978). Understanding Taylorism. British Journal of Sociology, 185-202. 
  
260 
 
Lukacs, G. (1923/1971). Reification and the Consciousness of the Proletariat. In History and 
Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics (R. Livingstone, Trans., pp. 83-222). 
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Lukes, S. (1982). Introduction. In S. Lukes (Ed.), The Rules of the Sociological Method (pp. 1-
27). New York: The Free Press. 
Manna, P., & Petrilli, M. J. (2008). Double Standard? "Scientifically-Based Research and the No 
Child Left Behind Act. In F. M. Hess (Ed.), When Research Matters: How Scholarship 
Influences Education Policy (pp. 63-88). Cambridge MA: Harvard Education Press. 
Marcuse, H. (1941/1982). Some Social Implications of Modern Technology. In A. Arato, & E. 
Gebhardt (Eds.), The Essential Frankfurt School Reader (pp. 138-162). New York: 
Continuum. 
Marcuse, H. (1964/1991). One-Dimensional Man (2nd ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. 
Marcuse, H. (1966/1955). Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud (2nd ed.). 
Boston: Beacon Press. 
Marshall, A. G. (2011, October 21). Education or Domination? The Rockefeller, Carnegie, and 
Ford Foundations Developing Knowledge for the Developing World. Retrieved February 
2, 2015, from The People's Book Project: 
http://thepeoplesbookproject.com/2011/10/21/education-or-domination-the-rockefeller-
carnegie-and-ford-foundations-developing-knowledge-for-the-developing-world/ 
McCaffrey, D., Lockwood, J., Koretz, D., Louis, T., & Hamilton, L. (2004). Models for Value-
Added Modeling of Teacher Effects. Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics, 
29(1), 67-101. 
McCaffrey, D., Sass, T., & Lockwood, J. R. (2008). The intertemporal stability of teacher effect 
estimates. Nashville, TN: National Center on Performance Incentives. 
McDonnell, L. M. (2005). No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or 
Revolution? Peabody Journal of Education, 80(2), 19-38. 
McDougall, W. (1921). Is America safe for Democracy. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Retrieved December 16, 2014, from http://hdl.handle.net/2027/hvd.32044014220461 
McFarland, J. W. (1954). What about Life Adjustment Education. The High School Journal, 
37(8), 243-250. 
McGuire, F. (1994). Army alpha and beta tests of intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg, Encyclopedia 
of Intelligence (Vol. 1, pp. 125-129). New York: Macmillan. 
  
261 
 
Mecklenberger, J. (1972, January). Performance Contracts? One View. Educational Leadership, 
pp. 297-300. 
Mehta, J. (2013). The Allure of Order: High Hopes, Dashed Expectations, and the Troubled 
Quest to Remake American Schooling. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mendro, R., & Bembry, K. (2000). School Evaluation: A Change in Perspective. Dallas 
Independent School District: Dallas. Retrieved April 27, 2015, from 
http://www.dallasisd.org/cms/lib/TX01001475/Centricity/Shared/evalacct/research/article
s/Mendro-School-Evaluation-A-change-in-Perspective-2000.pdf 
Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964/1968). The Visible and the Invisible. (C. Lefort, Ed., & A. Lingis, 
Trans.) Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. 
Merton, R. (1973). Changing Foci of Interests in the Sciences and Technology. In R. Merton, 
The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Emprical Investigations (pp. 191-203). 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Merton, R. (1973a). Technical and Moral Dimensions of Policy Research. In R. Merton, The 
Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations (p. 70). Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Micklethwait, J., & Wooldridge, A. (1996). The Witch Doctors: Making Sense of the 
Management Gurus. New York: Random House. 
Mihaly, K., McCaffrey, D., Staiger, D., & Lockwood, J. R. (2013). A Composite Estimator of 
Effective Teaching. Seattle, WA: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
Miles, M., & Huberman, A. M. (1984). Drawing Valid Meaning from Qualitative Data: Toward 
a Shared Craft. Educational Researcher, 13(5), 20-30. 
Milesi, C., & Gamoran, A. (2006). Effects of Class Size and Instruction on Kindergarten 
Achievement. Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis, 28(4), 287-313. 
Miller, F. (1975, November 16). Panaceas Come and Go, but Teachers Endure. The New York 
Times. 
Miller, S. M., Roby, P., & van Steenwijk, A. A. (1970). Creaming the Poor. Trans-action, 7(8), 
38-45. 
Minton, H. L. (1998). Commentary on "New methods for the diagnosis of the intellectual level 
of subnormals" Binet & Simon 1905 and "The uses of intelligence tests" Lewis M. 
Terman 1916. Retrieved from Classics in the History of Psychology: 
http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Binet/commentary.htm 
  
262 
 
Mirowski, P. (2005). How Positivism Made a Pact with Postwar Social Sciences in the United 
States. In G. Steinmetz (Ed.), The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences (pp. 142-
172). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Monroe, W. (1920). Improvement of Instruction through the use of Educational Tests. The 
Journal of Educational Research, 1(2), 96-102. 
Morozov, E. (2013). To Save Everything, Click Here: The Folly of Technological Solutionism. 
New York: Public Affairs. 
Mosteller, F. (2009). Equality of Educational Opportunity. In F. Mosteller, The Pleasures of 
Statistics (pp. 89-110). New York: Springer. 
Moynihan, D. P. (1965). The Negro Family: A Case for National Action. Washington, DC: 
Government Printing Office. 
Moynihan, D. P. (1970). Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. New York: Free Press. 
Murphy, K. (2014, June 13). Key witness says he was misquoted. LA Daily News. 
Nasaw, D. (1979). Schooled to Order: A Social History of Public Schooling in the United States. 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
Nathan, J. (1986). Implications for Educators of "Time for Results". The Phi Delta Kappan, 
68(3), 197-201. 
National Center for Education Statistics. (2013). The History of NAEP Contractors. Retrieved 
July 15, 2015, from National Assessment of Educational Progess: 
https://nces.ed.gov/nationsreportcard/contracts/history.aspx 
National Center for Educational Evaluation. (2013). The Effectiveness of Secondary Math 
Teachers from Teach for America and the Teaching Fellows Program. Washington, DC: 
Institute of Education Sciences. 
National Council on Teacher Quality. (2014, October). State-by-State Evaluation Timeline 
Briefs. Retrieved June 6, 2015, from National Council on Teacher Quality: 
http://www.nctq.org/dmsView/Evaluation_Timeline_Brief_Overview 
National Council on Teacher Quality. (nd). About NCTQ - Advisory Board. Retrieved Feb 7, 
2016, from National Council on Teacher Quality: 
http://www.nctq.org/about/advisoryBoard.jsp 
National Governors' Association. (1986). Time for Results: The Governors' 1991 Report on 
Education. Washington, DC: National Governors' Association Publications Office. 
  
263 
 
National Institute for Direct Instruction. (2011). A Bibliography of the Direct Instruction 
Curriculum and Studies Examining its Efficacy. Eugene, Oregon: National Institute for 
Direct Instruction. 
National Research Council. (1995). International Comparative Studies in Education: 
Descriptions of Selected Large-Scale Assessments and Case Studies. Washington DC: 
The National Academies Press. 
New York City Department of Education. (2011). FAQs for Teacher Data Reports. Retrieved 
December 2013, from Teacher Page: A Resource for Teachers: 
http://schools.nyc.gov/Teachers/TeacherDevelopment/TeacherDataToolkit/FAQ/default.
htm 
Newman, M. (1996, June 21). Students' Math Scores Rise in New York City. The New York 
Times. 
Nixon, R. (1970, March 3). "Special Message to the Congress on Education Reform". (G. Peters, 
& J. Woolley, Eds.) Retrieved March 27, 2015, from The American Presidency Project: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=2895 
No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, P.L. 107-110, 20 USC 7801. (2002). 20 USC 7801. 
Oakes, J. (1985). Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Otterman, S. (2010, December 26). Hurdles Emerge in Rising Effort to Rate Teachers. The New 
York Times. 
Otterman, S. (2011, October 17). In Cheating Cases, Teachers Who Took Risks or Flouted 
Rules. The New York Times. 
Papay, J. (2011). Different Tests, Different Answers: The Stability of Teacher Value-Added 
Estimates Across Outcome Measures. American Educational Research Journal, 48(1), 
163-193. 
Papay, J., & Kraft, M. (2015). Productivity returns to experience in the teacher labor market: 
Methodological challenges and new evidence on long-term career improvement. Journal 
of Public Economics, 130, 105-119. 
Parssinen, T. M. (1974). Popular Science and Society: The Phrenology Movement in Early 
Victorian Britain. Journal of Social History, 8(1), 1-20. 
Passow, H., Goldberg, M., & Tannenbaum, A. (1967). Education of the Disadvantaged. New 
York: Holt, Reinhart & Winston. 
  
264 
 
Pecheone, R., & Wei, R. C. (2009). Review of "The Widget Effect: Our National Failure to 
Acknowledge and Act on Teacher Differences". Boulder, CO: Education and the Public 
Interest Center. 
Peterson, S. (2007). Iowa Test of Basic Skills. In N. Salkind, Encyclopedia of Measurement and 
Statistics (p. 487). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications. 
Pfleiderer, P. (2014). Chameleons: The Misuse of Theoretical Models in Finance and 
Economics. Stanford, CA: Working Paper, Stanford Graduate School of Business. 
Phillips, A. (2012, February 14). City to Release Teacher Ratings After Union Loses Suit. 
Retrieved January 28, 2014, from WNYC School Book: 
http://www.wnyc.org/story/301599-city-to-release-teacher-ratings-after-union-loses-suit/ 
Phillips, D. C., & Burbules, N. C. (2000). Postpositivism and Educational Research. Lanham, 
MD: Rowman & Littlefield. 
Picciano, A. G., & Spring, J. (2013). The Great American Education-Industrial Complex: 
Ideology, Technology, and Profit. New York: Routledge. 
Picciano, A., & Spring, J. (2013). The Great American Education-Industrial Complex. New 
York: Routledge. 
Pickering, M. (2009). Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography Volume III. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Plucker, J. A., & Esping, A. (. (2013). Lewis Madison Terman. Retrieved December 9, 2014, 
from Human Intelligence: Historical Influences, Current Controversies, Teaching 
Resources: http://www.intelltheory.com/terman.shtml 
Plucker, J. A., & Esping, A. (. (2013a, November 7). Henry Herbery Goddard. Retrieved 
December 8, 2014, from Human Intelligence: Historical Influences, Current 
Controversies, Teaching Resources: http://www.intelltheory.com/goddard.shtml 
Plucker, J. A., & Esping, A. (. (2013b, November 7). Lewis Madison Terman. Retrieved 
December 8, 2014, from Human Intelligence: Historical Influences, Current 
Controversies, Teaching Resources: http://www.intelltheory.com/terman.shtml 
Popenoe, P. (1921). Measuring Human Intelligence. The Journal of Heredity, 12, 231-236. 
Popham, W. J. (1997). The Moth and the Flame: Student Learning as a Criterion of Instructional 
Competence. In J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student 
Achievement a Valid Evaluatin Measure? (pp. 264-274). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin 
Press. 
  
265 
 
Popper, K. (1959/1968). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. New York: Basic Books. 
Pullin, D. (2013). Legal Issues in the Use of Student Test Scores and Value-Added Models to 
Determine Educational Quality. Education Policy Analysis Archives, 21(6), 1-24. 
RAND Corporation. (nd). A Brief History of RAND. Retrieved January 20, 2015, from RAND 
Corporation: http://www.rand.org/about/history/a-brief-history-of-rand.html 
Ravitch, D. (2010). The Death and Life of the Great American School System. New York: Basic 
Books. 
Reese, W. (2013). Testing Wars in the Public Schools: A Forgotten History. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University press. 
Reichenbach, H. (1938/1977). An Analysis of the Foundations and the Structure of Knowledge. 
In H. Reichenbach, & M. Reichenbach (Ed.), Reichenbach's Collected Works (M. 
Reichenbach, Trans., Vol. 4). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Reissman, F. (1962). The Culturally Deprived Child. New York : Harper and Brothers. 
Ridgeway, V. F. (1956). Dysfunctional Consequences of Performance Measurements. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, 1(2), 240-247. 
Rivlin, A. M. (1971). Systematic Thinking for Social Action. Washington DC: The Brookings 
Institution. 
Rockoff, J. (2004). The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence From 
Panel Data. American Economic Review, 94(2), 247-252. 
Romer, P. M. (2015). Mathiness in the Theory of Economic Growth. American Economic 
Review, 105(5), 89-93. 
Rosenthal, J. (1972, January 10). Performance Contracts Lose Luster. The New York Times, p. 
25. 
Rosenthal, R., & Jacobson, L. (1968). Pygmalion in the Classroom: Teachers' Expectations and 
Pupils' Intellectual Development. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Rossi, P., & Freeman, H. (1993). Evaluation: A Systematic Approach, 5th Edition. London: Sage 
Publications. 
Rothstein, J. (2008). Teacher quality in educational production: Tracking, decay, and student 
achievement. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Rothstein, J. (2009). Student sorting and bias in value added estimation: Selection on observables 
and unobservables. Washington, DC: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
  
266 
 
Rothstein, J. (2009). Student Sorting and Bias in Value-Added Estimation: Selection on 
Observables and Unobservables. Education Finance and Policy, 4(4), 537-571. 
Rothstein, J. (2010). Teacher Quality in Educational Production: Tracking, Decay, and Student 
Achievement. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(1), 175-214. 
Rothstein, J. (2011). Review of Learning About Teaching. Boulder, CO: National Education 
Policy Center. 
Rothstein, J. (2011). Review of Learning About Teaching. Boulder, CO: National Education 
Policy Center. 
Rothstein, J. (2012). Teacher Quality Policy When Supply Matters. Washington, DC: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Rothstein, J. (2015). Revisiting the Impacts of Teachers. Working Paper. 
Rothstein, J., & Mathis, W. (2013). Review of 'Have We Evaluated Effective Teachers' and 'A 
Composite Estimate of Effective Teaching': Culminating Findings from the Measures of 
Effective Teaching Project. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center. 
Rothstein, J., & Mathis, W. (2013). Review of Have We Identified Effective Teachers? and A 
Compositie Estimator of Effective Teaching: Culminating Findings from the Measures of 
Effective Teaching Project. Boulder, CO: National Education Policy Center. 
Rothstein, R. (2012, September 14). Teacher Accountability and the Chicago Teachers Strike. 
Retrieved February 7, 2016, from Working Economics Blog: 
http://www.epi.org/blog/teacher-accountability-chicago-teachers/ 
Roy, A. (2012, March 26). Capitalism: A Ghost Story. Outloook India. 
Rubinstein, G. (2013). How I teach 2.6 months more of math in a year than the rest of you 
slackers. Retrieved from Gary Rubinstein's Blog: 
https://garyrubinstein.wordpress.com/2013/09/20/how-i-teach-2-6-months-more-of-math-
in-a-year-than-the-rest-of-you-slackers/ 
Rubinstein, G. (2014). Kanine Years. Retrieved from Gary Rubinstein's Blog: 
https://garyrubinstein.wordpress.com/2014/06/15/kanine-months/ 
Rudalevige, A. (2003). No Child Left Behind: Forging a congressional compromise. In P. E. 
Peterson, & M. R. West (Eds.), No child left behind? (pp. 23-54). Washington DC: 
Brookings. 
Rudolph, J. L. (2002). Scientists in the Classroom: The Cold War reconstruction of American 
science education. New York: Palgrave. 
  
267 
 
Sadker, D. M., & Zittleman, K. R. (2007). Online Appendix B: Summary of Educational Reform 
Reports. Retrieved June 5, 2015, from Teachers Schools and Society Online Appendices: 
http://highered.mheducation.com/sites/0073525839/student_view0/online_appendices.ht
ml 
Sanders, W., & Horn, S. (1994). The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System: Mixed Model 
Methodology in Educational Assessment. Journal of Personnel Evaluation in Education, 
8, 299-311. 
Sanders, W., & Horn, S. (1998). Research Findings from the Tennessee Value-Added 
Assessment System: Implication for Educational Evaluation and Research. Journal of 
Personnel Evaluation in Education, 12(3), 247-256. 
Sanders, W., & McLean, R. A. (1984). Objective component of teacher evalluation: A feasibility 
study. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee, College of Business Administration. 
Sanders, W., & Rivers, J. C. (1996). Cumulative and Residual Effects of Teachers on Future 
Student Academic Achievement. Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Value-Added 
Research and Assessment Center. 
Sandoval, E., Lesser, B., & Chapman, B. (2012, February 26). Analysis of New York City 
school rankings shows that top-rated schools have the best teachers. The New York Daily 
News. 
Santos, F. (2012, February 24). City Teacher Data Reports are Released. Retrieved from WNYC 
Schoolbook: http://www.wnyc.org/story/301783-teacher-data-reports-are-released/ 
Santos, F. (2012, February 24). City Teacher Data Reports are Released. Retrieved January 28, 
2014, from WNYC School Book: http://www.wnyc.org/story/301783-teacher-data-
reports-are-released/ 
Saretzky, G. D. (1982). Carl Campbell Brigham, the Native Intelligence Hypothesis, and the 
Scholastic Aptitude Test. Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service. Retrieved 
December 26, 2014 
Schultz, S. K. (1974). The Culture Factory: Boston Public Schools, 1789-1860. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Schwartz, H. (1952, April). Samuel Gridley Howe as Phrenologist. The American Historical 
Review, 57(3), 644-651. 
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
  
268 
 
Scott, J. C. (1998). Seeing Like A State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. 
Sears, J. B. (1921). The Measurement of Teaching Efficiency. The Journal of Educational 
Research, 4(2), 81-94. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/27524510 
Simmel, G. (1922/1955). Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations. New York: Free Press. 
Smith, M. (2004). The Education Improvement Act: A Progress Report. Nashville, TN: 
Comptroller of the Treasury: Office of Educational Accountability. 
Smolin, L. (2008). The Trouble with Physics. New York: Mariner Books. 
Snyderman, M., & Herrnstein, R. (1983). Intelligence tests and the Immigration Act of 1924. 
American Psychologist, 38(9), 986-995. 
Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness. (nd). History. Retrieved August 3, 2015, 
from Society for Research on Educational Effectiveness: 
https://www.sree.org/pages/history.php 
Staiger, D. O., & Rockoff, J. E. (2010). Searching for Effective Teachers with Imperfect 
Information. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(3), 97-118. 
Staiger, D., & Stock, J. (1997). Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments. 
Econometrica, 65, 557-586. 
Stake, R. E. (1971). Testing Hazards in Performance Contracting. The Phi Delta Kappan, 52(10), 
583-589. 
Stanford, J. (2013, April 11). Even Texas politicians have had enough of Sandy Kress by Jason 
Stanford. Retrieved August 23, 2015, from DISD Blog: 
http://www.disdblog.com/2013/04/11/even-texas-politicians-have-had-enough-of-sandy-
kress-by-jason-stanford/ 
Steinberg, M., & Garrett, R. (2015). Classroom Composition and Measured Teacher 
Performance: What do Teacher Observation Scores Really Measure. Educational 
Evaluation and Policy Analysis. 
Steinmetz, G. (2005). Positivism and Its Others in Social Science. In G. Steinmetz (Ed.), The 
Politics of Method in the Human Sciences (pp. 1-56). Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press. 
  
269 
 
Steinmetz, G. (2005a). Scientific Authority and the Transition to Post-Fordism. In G. Steinmetz 
(Ed.), The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences (pp. 275-323). Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press. 
Stepner, M. (2014, August 1). binscatter: Binned Scatterplots in Stata. Retrieved from 
https://michaelstepner.com/binscatter/binscatter-StataConference2014.pdf 
Stevens, W. K. (1971, March 23). Test Expert Calls I.Q. and Grade Equivalency Scores 
'Monstrosities'. The New York Times, p. 19. 
Stevens, W. K. (1973, October 7). Residents of Detroit Taking 5-Week Strike by School 
Teachers in Their Stride - For the Time Being. The New York Times, p. 57. 
Stoddard, L. (1922). The Revolt Against Civilization. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 
Stokes, K. (2015, July 16). Testing Revolt In Washington State Brings Feds Into Uncharted 
Waters. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2015/07/16/420837531/testing-
revolt-in-washington-state-brings-feds-into-uncharted-waters 
Stone, J. (2000). What is Value-Added and why do we need it. Alexandria, VA: The Foundation 
Endowment. 
Stratford, M. (2015, September 14). The New College Scorecard. Inside Higher Ed. 
Sykes, G. (1997). On Trial: The Dallas Value-Added Accountability System. In J. Millman 
(Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
Tarde, G. (1898/1969). The Public and the Crowd. In T. N. Clarke (Ed.), Gabriel Tarde On 
Communication and Social Influence (pp. 277-295). Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Taylor, F. W. (1911). The Principles of Scientific Management. New York and London: Harper 
and Brothers. 
Taylor, K. (2015, November 15). Cuomo, in Shift, Is Said to Back Reducing Test Scores’ Role in 
Teacher Reviews. The New York Times, p. A30. 
Terman, L. M. (1916). The Uses of Intelligence. In L. M. Terman, The Measurement of 
Intelligence (pp. 1-22). Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. (2013). Ensuring Fair and Reliable Measures of 
Effective Teaching. Seattle, WA: The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. 
The College Board. (2014). Test Specifications for the Redesigned SAT. Princeton, NJ: The 
College Board. 
  
270 
 
Thomas, J. Y., & Brady, K. P. (2005). Chapter 3: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act 
at 40: Equity, Accountability, and the Evolving Federal Role in Public Education. 
Review of Research in Education, 29, 51-67. 
Thorndike, E. L. (1913, August). Eugenics: With Special Reference to Intellect and Character. 
Popular Science Monthly, 83, pp. 125-138. 
Thorndike, E. L. (1920). Intelligence and its Uses. Harper's Magazine, 150, pp. 227-235. 
Retrieved December 26, 2014 
Thorndike, E. L. (1940). Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Macmillan. 
Thum, Y. M., & Bryk, A. S. (1997). Value-Added Productivity Indicators: The Dallas System. In 
J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: Is Student Achievement a Valid 
Evaluation Measure? (pp. 100-110). Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
Topping, K. J., & Sanders, W. (2000). Teacher Effectiveness and computer assessment of 
reading: relating value-added and learning information system data. School effectiveness 
and school improvement, 11(13), 305-337. 
Trochim, W. (2006). Positivism & Postpositivism. Retrieved June 2015, from Research Methods 
Knowledge Base. 
Tyack, D. (1974). The One Best System. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Tyack, D., & Cuban, L. (1995). Tinkering Toward Utopia: A Century of Public School Reform. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
US Bureau of the Census. (1961). School Enrollment October 1961. Retrieved January 11, 2015, 
from census.gov: http://www.census.gov/hhes/school/data/cps/1961/tab01-02.pdf 
US Bureau of the Census. (1970, October). School Enrollment, October 1970. Retrieved January 
11, 2015, from www.census.gov: 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/school/data/cps/1970/tab04.pdf 
US Bureau of the Census. (1975). Historical Statistics of the United States from Colonial Times 
to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, Part 2. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
US Congress Office of Technology Assessment. (1992). Testing in American Schools: Asking 
the Right Questions. Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. Retrieved January 
9, 2015, from http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ota/Ota_1/DATA/1992/9236.PDF 
US Department of Education. (1993). 120 Years of American Education: A Statistical Portrait. 
Washington DC: US Government Printing Office. 
  
271 
 
Vasquez-Heilig, J. (2013, January 17). The Teat: Sandy (Alexander) Kress. Retrieved August 24, 
2015, from Cloaking Inequity: http://cloakinginequity.com/2013/01/17/the-teat-sandy-
alexander-kress/ 
Vergara v. State of California, BC484642 (SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF 
CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES June 10, 2014). 
Viera, A. J., & Garrett, J. M. (2005). Understanding Interobserver Agreement: The Kappa 
Statistic. Family Medicine, 37(5), 360-363. 
Vogell, H., Perry, J., Judd, A., & Pell, M. B. (2012, March 25). Cheating Our Children: 
Suspicious school test scores across the nation. The Atlanta Journal Constitution. 
Walcott, D. (2012, February 24). Teacher Ratings Paint and Incomplete Picture. The New York 
Daily News. 
Walinsky, A. (1969, February 2). Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding. The New York Times. 
Retrieved February 17, 2015, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/10/04/specials/moynihan-community.html 
Waller, W. (1932/2014). The Sociology of Teaching. New York: Wiley & Sons. 
Walsh, A. (2013). Science Wars: Politics, Race and Gender (1st ed.). New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers. 
Weber, M. (1904/1949). Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy. In E. A. Shils, & H. A. 
Finch (Eds.), The Methodology of the Social Sciences (pp. 49-112). New York: Free 
Press. 
Weber, M. (1949). The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics. In E. A. 
Shils, & H. A. Finch (Eds.), The Methodology of the Social Sciences (pp. 1-47). New 
York: The Free Press. 
Webster, W., & Mendro, R. (1995). Evaluation for improved decision-making and productivity. 
Studies in Educational Evaluation, 21(4), 361-399. 
Webster, W., & Mendro, R. (1997). The Dallas Value-Added Accountability System. Dallas: 
The Dallas Independent School District. 
Webster, W., Mendro, R. L., Orsak, T., Weerasinghe, D., & Bembry, K. (1997). Little Practical 
Difference and Pie in the Sky. In J. Millman (Ed.), Grading Teachers, Grading Schools: 
Is Student Achievement Data a Valid Evaluation Measure? (pp. 120-130). Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Corwin Press. 
  
272 
 
Wedel, J. (2009). Shadow Elite: How the world's new power brokers undermine democracy. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Wedel, J. (2009). Shadow Elite: How the world's new power broker's undermine democracy: 
Government and the free market. New York: Basic Books. 
Weiner, L. (1993). Preparing Teachers for Urban Schools: Lessons from Thirty Years of School 
Reform. New York: Teacher's College Press. 
Weingarten, R. (2014, June 10). Statement from AFT President Weingarten on Vergara 
Decision. Retrieved from www.aft.org. 
Weingarten, R., & Pechthalt, J. (2014, June 15). Weingarten and Pechthalt discuss 'Vergara' 
decision. Retrieved from aft.org. 
Weisberg, D., Sexton, S., Mulhern, J., & Keeling, D. (2009). The Widget Effect: Our National 
Failure to Acknowledge and Act On Differences in Teacher Effectiveness. New York: 
The New Teacher Project. 
West, W. F. (2011). Progam Budgeting and the Performance Movement: The Elusive Quest for 
Efficiency in Government. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
What Works Clearinghouse. (2012). WWC Review of the Report “The Long-Term Impacts of 
Teachers". Washington, DC: Institute of Education Sciences. 
What Works Clearinghouse. (2013). Have We Identified Effective Teachers? Validating 
Measures of Effective Teaching Using Random Assignment. Retrieved from What 
Works Clearinghouse: http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/quickreview.aspx?sid=221 
Whitt, H. (1986). The sheaf coefficient: A simplified and expanded approach. Social Science 
Research, 174-189. 
Wiggam, A. E. (1922). The New Decalouge of Science. The Century Magazine, 103, pp. 643-
650. 
Willing, M. (1920). The Encouragement of Individual Instruction by Means of Standardized 
Tests. The Journal of Educational Research, 1(3), 193-198. 
Winerip, M. (2011, November 6). In Tennessee, Following the Rules for Evaluations Off a Cliff. 
The New York Times. 
Winerip, M. (2011b, August 21). Eager for Spotlight, but Not if It Is on a Testing Scandal. The 
New York Times. 
Winerip, M. (2011c, July 31). Pennsylvania Joins States Facing a School Cheating Scandal. The 
New York Times. 
  
273 
 
Winerip, M. (2012, March 4). Hard-Working Teachers, Sabotaged When Student Test Scores 
Slip. The New York Times, p. A20. 
Wise, A. (1979). Legislated Learning: The Bureaucratization of the American Classroom. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Wise, A. E. (1979). Legislated Learning: The Bureaucratization of the American Classroom. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Woolner, K. (2001). Introduction to VORP: Value Over Replacement Player. Retrieved from 
Stathead.com: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20070928064958/http://www.stathead.com/bbeng/woolner/v
orpdescnew.htm 
Yates, J. (1993). Control through Communication: The Rise of System in American 
Management. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Yerkes, R. M. (1921). Psychological Examining in the United States Army. Memoirs of the 
National Academy of Sciences, 15. Retrieved December 15, 2014, from 
https://archive.org/details/psychologicalexa00yerkuoft 
Zavis, A., & Barboza, T. (2010, September 28). Teacher Suicide Shocks School. The Los 
Angeles Times. 
Zeichner, K. (2013, August 27). How the public is deceived about 'highly qualified teachers'. 
Retrieved August 5, 2015, from The Answer Sheet: 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2013/08/27/how-the-public-is-
deceived-about-highly-qualified-teachers/ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
